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Abstract
This thesis studies the impact of private information on the existence of insurance markets. In the
first chapter, I study the case of insurance rejections. Across a wide set of non-group insurance
markets, applicants are rejected based on observable, often high-risk, characteristics. I explore
private information as a potential cause by developing and testing a model in which agents have
private information about their risk. I derive a new no-trade result that can theoretically explain
how private information could cause rejections. I use the no-trade condition to generate measures
of the barrier to trade private information imposes. I develop a new empirical methodology to
estimate these measures that uses subjective probability elicitations as noisy measures of agents'
beliefs. I apply the approach to three non-group markets: long-term care (LTC), disability, and
life insurance. Consistent with the predictions of the theory, in all three settings I find significant
evidence of private information for those who would be rejected; I find that they have more private
information than those who can purchase insurance; and I find that it is enough to cause a complete
absence of trade. This presents the first empirical evidence that private information leads to a
complete absence of trade.
In the second chapter, I show that private information explains the absence of a private un-
employment insurance market. I provide the empirical evidence that a private UI market would
be afflicted by private information and suggest the amount of private information is sufficient to
explain a complete absence of trade. I present evidence a private market would still not arise even
if the government stopped providing unemployment benefits.
Finally, in the third chapter I use the empirical and theoretical tools developed in the first
chapter to explore the impact of an adjusted community rating policy that would force insurance
companies to only price based on age. My results suggest such a policy would completely unravel
the LTC insurance market. Not only would welfare not be improved for those who are currently
rejected, but the regulation would prevent the healthy from being able to purchase long-term care
insurance.
Thesis Supervisor: Daron Acemoglu
Title: Elizabeth and James Killian Professor of Economics
Thesis Supervisor: Amy Finkelstein
Title: Professor of Economics
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Chapter 1
Private Information and Insurance
Rejections
1.1 Introduction
Not everyone can purchase insurance. Across a wide set of non-group insurance markets, compa-
nies choose to not sell insurance to potential customers with certain observable, often high-risk,
characteristics. In the non-group health insurance market, 1 in 7 applications to the four largest
insurance companies in the United States were rejected between 2007 and 2009, a figure that ex-
cludes those who would be rejected but were deterred from even applying.1 In US long-term care
insurance, 12-23% of 65 year olds have health conditions that would preclude them from being able
to purchase insurance (Murtaugh et al. (1995)).2
It is surprising that a company would choose to not offer its products to a certain subpopulation.
Although the rejected generally have higher expected expenditures, they still face unrealized risk. 3
Regulation does not generally prevent risk-adjusted pricing in these markets, so why not simply
offer them a higher price?
In this paper, we explore whether private information can explain rejections. We begin by
developing a model of how private information could cause rejections. Our setting is the familiar
binary loss environment introduced by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), which we generalize to in-
corporate an arbitrary distribution of privately informed types. We study the set of implementable
allocations, which satisfy resource, incentive, and participation constraints - constraints that must
'Figures obtained through a formal congressional investigation by the Committee on Energy and Commerce, which
requested and received this information from Aetna, Humana, UnitedHealth Group, and WellPoint. Congressional
report was released on October 12, 2010. The 1 in 7 figure does not subtract duplicate applications if people applied
to more than 1 of these 4 firms.
2 Appendix 1.C presents the rejection conditions from Genworth Financial (one of the largest US LTC insurers),
gathered from their underwriting guidelines provided to insurance agents for use in screening applicants.
3 For example, in long-term care we estimate those who would be rejected have an average five-year nursing home
entry rate of less than 20%.
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hold across market structures such as monopoly or competition.
We derive a "no-trade" condition which characterizes when insurance companies would be
unwilling to sell insurance on terms that anyone in the market would accept. This condition has
an unraveling intuition similar to the one introduced in Akerlof (1970). The market unravels when
the willingness to pay for a small amount of insurance is less than the pooled cost of providing this
insurance to those equal to, or higher than, an individuals' own cost. When this no-trade condition
holds, an insurance company cannot offer any contract, or menu of contracts, because they would
attract an adversely selected subpopulation that would render them unprofitable. Thus, the theory
explains rejections as segments in which the no-trade condition holds.
We use the no-trade condition to generate comparative static predictions for properties of type
distributions which are more likely to lead to no trade. In particular, we characterize the barrier
to trade in terms of an equivalence to a tax rate levied on insurance premiums in a world with no
private information. The comparative statics reveal a qualitative explanation for why it is so often
the observably high-risk who are rejected: when distributions can be ordered according to a hazard
rate ordering, higher mean risk distributions impose a higher implicit informational tax.
We then develop a new empirical methodology for studying private information to test the
predictions of theory. We use information contained in subjective probability elicitations to infer
properties of the distribution of private information. At no point do we view these elicitations as
true beliefs. Rather, we use information in the joint distribution of elicitations and the realized
events corresponding to these elicitations to deal with potential errors in elicitations.4 We proceed
with two complementary approaches. First, we make the weak assumption that agent's elicitations
cannot contain more information about the subsequent loss than would the true beliefs.5 We
estimate the explanatory power of the subjective probabilities on the subsequent realized event,
conditional on public information. This allows us to generate nonparametric lower bounds on a
measure of the magnitude of private information provided by the theory. With these bounds, we
provide a simple test for the presence of private information, along with a test of whether those
who would be rejected have larger estimates of this lower bound.
Our second approach moves from a nonparametric lower bound to a semiparametric point
estimate of the distribution of private information by making an additional parametric assumption
on the distribution of elicitation error which allows elicitations to be noisy and potentially biased
measures of agents true beliefs. We then flexibly estimate the distribution of private information.
This allows us to quantify the barrier to trade in terms of the implicit informational tax rate
imposed by private information. We then test whether this quantity is larger for those who would
be rejected relative to those who are served by the market and whether it is large (small) enough to
explain (the absence of) rejections for plausible values of agents' willingness to pay for insurance.
4
1n this sense, our approach builds on previous work using subjective probabilities in economics (e.g. Gan et al.
(2005), see Hurd (2009) for a review).
5 If beliefs are generated through rational expectations given some information set, this assumption is equivalent
to assuming the clicitations are a garbling of the agent's true beliefs in the sense of Blackwell (1951, 1953).
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We apply our approach to three non-group markets: long-term care (LTC), disability, and life
insurance. We combine two sources of data. First, we use data from the Health and Retirement
Study, which elicits subjective probabilities corresponding to losses insured in each of these three
settings and contains a rich set of demographic and health information commonly used by insur-
ance companies in pricing insurance. We supplement this with a detailed review of underwriting
guidelines from major insurance companies to identify those who would be rejected (henceforth
"rejectees"6 ) in each market.
Across all three market settings and a wide set of specifications, we find robust support for
the hypothesis that private information causes insurance rejections. We find larger nonparametric
lower bounds on a measure of the magnitude of private information for rejectees relative to those
served by the market. Our semiparametric approach reveals an informational implicit tax rates
for rejectees of 68-73% in LTC, 90-128% in Disability, and 64-127% tax in Life; in each setting
we estimate smaller barriers to trade for non-rejectees. Finally, not only can we explain rejections
in these three non-group markets, but the estimated distribution of private information about
mortality (constructed for our life insurance setting) can also explain the lack of rejections in
annuity markets. While some individuals are informed about being a relatively high mortality risk,
very few are exceptionally informed about having low mortality risk. Thus, low mortality risks can
obtain annuities without a significant number of even lower mortality risks adversely selecting their
contract.
Our paper is related to several distinct literatures. On the theoretical dimension, it is, to our
knowledge, the first paper to show that private information can lead to no gains to trade in an in-
surance market with an endogenous set of contracts. While no trade can occur in the Akerlof (1970)
lemons model, this model exogenously restricts the set of tradeable contracts, which is unappealing
in the context of insurance since insurers generally offer a menu of premiums and deductibles. In
this sense, our paper is more closely related to the large screening literature using the binary loss
environment initially proposed in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). While the Akerlof lemons model
restricts the set of tradeable contracts, this literature generally restricts the distribution of types
(e.g. "two types" or a bounded support) and generally argues that trade will always occur (Riley
(1979); Chade and Schlee (2011)). But by considering an arbitrary distribution of types, we show
this not to be the case. Indeed, the no trade condition we provide can hold under common distri-
butions previously not addressed. For example, with a uniform distribution of types (over [0, 1]),
trade cannot occur unless individuals are willing to pay more than a 100% tax for insurance.
Empirically, our paper is related to a recent and growing literature on testing for the existence
and consequences of private information in insurance markets (Chiappori and Salani6 (2000); Chi-
appori et al. (2006); Finkelstein and Poterba (2002, 2004); see Einav et al. (2010) and Cohen and
Siegelman (2010) for a review). This literature focuses on the revealed preference implications of
6 Throughout, we focus on those who "would be rejected", which corresponds to those whose choice set excludes
insurance, not necessarily the same as those who actually apply and are rejected.
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private information by looking for a correlation between insurance purchase and subsequent claims.
This approach can only identify private information amongst those served by the market. In con-
trast, our approach can study private information for the entire population, including rejectees.
Our results suggest significant amounts of private information for the rejectees, but less for those
served by the market. Thus, our results provide a new explanation for why previous studies using
the revealed preference approach have not found evidence of significant adverse selection in life
insurance (Cawley and Philipson (1999)) and LTC insurance (Finkelstein and McGarry (2006)).
The absence of adverse selection may be the insurer's selection.
Finally, our paper is related to the broader literature on the workings of markets under uncer-
tainty and private information. While many theories have pointed to potential problems posed by
private information, our paper presents, to the best of our knowledge, the first empirical evidence
that private information can lead to a complete absence of trade.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the theory and the no-trade result.
Section 3 presents the comparative statics and testable predictions of the model. Section 4 outlines
the empirical methodology. Section 5 presents the three market settings and our data. Section
6 presents the empirical specification and results for the nonparametric lower bounds. Section 7
presents the empirical specification and results of the semiparametric estimation of the distribution
of private information. Section 8 concludes.
1.2 Theory
This section develops a model of private information. Our primary result (Theorem 1.1) is a no-
trade condition which provides a theory of how private information can lead insurance companies
to not offer any contracts.
1.2.1 Environment
There exists a unit mass of agents endowed with non-stochastic wealth w > 0. All agents face a
potential loss of size I > 0 that occurs with privately known probability p, which is distributed with
c.d.f. F (p) in the population. We impose no restrictions on F (p); it may be a continuous, discrete,
or mixed distribution, and have full or partial support, which we denote by %P C [0., 1].7 Throughout
the paper, we let the uppercase P denote the random variable representing a random draw from
the population (with c.d.f. F (p)) and the lowercase p denote a specific agent's probability (i.e.
their realization of P). Agents have observable characteristics, X. For now, one should assume
7 By choosing particular distributions F (p), our environment nests many previous models of insurance. For
example, V = {PL, PH} yields the classic two-type model considered initially by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and
subsequently analyzed by many others. Assuming F (p) is continuous with I = [a, b] C (0, 1), one obtains an
environment similar to Riley (1979). Chade and Schlee (2011) provide arguably the most general treatment to-date
of this environment in the existing literature by considering a monopolists problem with an arbitrary F with bounded
support T C [a, b] c (0, 1).
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that we have conditioned on observable information (e.g. F (p) = F (pIX = x) where X includes
all observable characteristics such as age, gender, and observable health conditions).
Agents have a standard Von-Neumann Morgenstern preferences u (c) with expected utility given
by
pu(cL) + (1 - p)(cNL)
where CL (CNL) is the consumption in the event of a loss (no loss). We assume u (c) is continuously
differentiable, with u'(c) > 0 and u" (c) < 0. An allocation A = {CL (P) , CNL (p)}pE consists of
consumption in the event of a loss, CL (p), and in the event of no loss, cNL (p) for each type p C T.
While it is common in this environment to now introduce a specific institutional structure, such
as a game of competition or monopoly, our approach is different. Instead, we abstract from specific
institutional structure and study the set of implementable allocations.
Definition 1.1. An allocation A = {CL (p) , CNL (p)}pE is implementable if
1. A is resource feasible:
J [w pl - PCL (p) (1 p) CNL (p)] dF (p) > 0
2. A is incentive compatible:
pu (cL (p)) + (1 p) u (cNL (p) ;> pu (cL (p)) + (1 - p) u(cNL()) p,
3. A is individually rational:
pu (cL (p)) + (1 - p) U (cNL (p)) >pu ( l) + (1 - p) u (w) Vp C T
Our focus on the set of implementable allocations makes our results applicable across institutional
settings, such as monopoly or competition. Any economy which faces the above information and
resource constraints must yield implementable allocations. Moreover, by focusing on implementable
allocations we circumvent problems arising from the potential non-existence of competitive Nash
equilibriums, as highlighted in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976).
1.2.2 The No-Trade condition
Theorem 1.1 characterizes when the endowment is the only implementable allocation.
Theorem 1.1. (No Trade). The endowment, {(w - l,w)}, is the only implementable allocation if
and only if
p u' (w - 1)< E [PIP > p]
-p ( 1 I- VpJ E \{1} (1.1)
where \{ 1} denotes the support of F (p) excluding the point p 1.
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Conversely, if (1.1) does not hold, then there exists an implementable allocation which strictly
satisfies resource feasibility and individual rationality for a positive mass of types.
Proof. See Appendix 1.A.1 8  []
The left-hand side of equation (1.1), P uw is the marginal rate of substitution betweeni-p u'(w) i h agnlrt fsbttto ewe
consumption in the event of no loss and consumption in the event of a loss, evaluated at the
endowment, (w - 1, w). It is a type p agent's willingness to pay for an infinitesimal amount of
additional consumption in the event of a loss, in terms of consumption in the event of no loss. The
actuarially fair cost of this transfer to the type p agent is P. However, the right hand side of
equation (1.1) is the price of providing such a transfer, not at type p's own cost of , but rather
at the average cost if all higher-risk types P > p also obtained this transfer, EJPJ!p]. Intuitively,
if no other contracts are offered, then a contract preferred by type p will also be preferred by all
types P > p, rendering the cheapest possible provision of insurance to type p to be at a price ratio
of E[PIPp]. If no agent is willing to pay this cost, the endowment is the only implementable
allocation.
Conversely, if equation (1.1) does not hold, there exists an implementable allocation which does
not totally exhaust resources and provides strictly higher utility than the endowment for a positive
mass of types. So, a monopolist insurer could earn positive profits by facilitating trade. 9 In this
sense, the no-trade condition (1.1) characterizes when one would expect trade to occur.
The no-trade condition can hold for common distributions, such as the uniform distribution.
Example 1.1. Suppose that F (p) is uniform, F (p) = p. Then, E [P|P > p] = -. The no-trade
condition 1.1 is given by
p U' (w-l) 1+p
< 2 Vp E [0, 1)1 p U' (w) 1 - p
2
which holds if and only if
U' (w - 1) < 2
With a uniform distribution of private information, trade can only occur if agents marginal
utility of consumption is twice as large in the state where the loss occurs. So, unless agents are
willing to pay a 100% tax for insurance (which moves consumption from the state of no loss to the
state of the loss), there will be no trade. 10
The no-trade condition has an unraveling intuition similar to that of Akerlof (1970). His model
considers a given contract and shows that it will not be traded when its demand curve lies ev-
erywhere below its average cost curve, which is in turn a function of those who demand it. Our
8 While Theorem 1.1 is straightforward, its proof is less trivial because one must show that Condition 1.1 rules
out not only single contracts but also any menu of contracts in which different types may receive different allocations.
9 Also, one can show that a competitive equilibrium, as defined in Miyazaki (1977) and Spence (1978) can be
constructed for an arbitrary type distribution F (p) and would yield trade (result available from the author upon
request).
laWo discuss this tax rate analogy further in Section 1.3
18
model is different. While Akerlof (1970) derives conditions under which a given contract would
unravel and result in no trade, our model provides conditions under which any contract or menu
of contracts would unravel.
This distinction is important since previous literature has argued that trade must always occur
environments similar to ours with no restrictions on the contract space (Riley (1979); Chade and
Schlee (2011)). The key difference in our approach is that we do not assume types are bounded
away from 1.11 In fact, the no-trade condition requires the highest risk type in the economy have
a probability of a loss arbitrarily close to p = 1. Otherwise the highest risk type, say f5, would be
able to obtain an actuarially fair full insurance allocation, CL (P) = cNL () = w - pl, which would
not violate the incentive constraints of any other type.
Corollary 1.1. Suppose condition (1.1) holds. Then F (p) < 1 Vp < 1.
This corollary highlights the unraveling intuition: no trade occurs when people don't want
to subsidize risks worse than themselves; this naturally requires the perpetual existence of worse
risks. 12
At the same time, the fact that the no-trade condition requires risks arbitrarily close to 1 can be
viewed as a technicality. In reality, insurance companies offer a finite set of contracts, presumably
because they incur a setup cost for creating each contract. If we require that each allocation other
than the endowment must attract a non-trivial fraction of types, then we no longer require risks
arbitrarily close to 1, as illustrated in Remark 1.1.
Remark 1.1. Suppose each consumption bundle (CL, cNL) other than the endowment must attract a
non-trivial fraction a > 0 of types. More precisely, suppose allocations A = {cL (p) , cNL (p)}p must
have the property that for all q G C,
P ({pl (cL (p) , cNL (p)) = (cL (q) , cNL (q)) ) > a
where p is the measure defined by F (p). Then, the no-trade condition is given by
p u' (w -1) E [P|P > p]
< Vp E T$1 a1 P u'(w) 1 -E[P|P>p]
where 1_ [ = (0, F-1 (1 - a)] n (4'\ {1}).13 Therefore, the no-trade condition need only hold for
values p < F-1 (1 - a).
In other words, if contracts must attract a nontrivial fraction of types, then no trade can occur
even if types are bounded away from p = 1. Going forward, we retain the benchmark assumption
of no such frictions or transactions costs, but return to this discussion in our empirical work in
Section 1.7.
11Both Riley (1979) and Chade and Schlee (2011) assume T C [a, b] c (0,1), so that b < 1.
1 2Note that we do not require any positive mass at p = 1, as highlighted in Example 1.1.
1 3 if F-' (1 - a) is a set, we take F- 1(1 - a) to be the supremum of this set
19
The no-trade condition (1.1) provides a theory of rejections: they occur in market segments
where (1.1) holds and insurance is offered in segments where (1.1) does not hold, where market
segments are defined by observable information. In order to derive testable implications of this the-
ory, the next section examines properties of distributions, F (p), which make the no-trade condition
more likely to hold.
1.3 Comparative Statics and Testable Predictions
Qualitatively, Theorem 1.1 suggests a property of distributions which lead to no trade: thick upper
tails of risks. The presence of a thicker upper tail increases the value of E [PIP > p] at given values
of p. In this section, we formalize this intuition by constructing precise measures of the barrier to
trade imposed by private information which will guide our empirical tests of the theory.
1.3.1 Two Measures of Private Information
We construct two measures of private information. To begin, we multiply the no-trade condition
(1.1) by 1 yielding,p
U' (w - 1) E [P|P > p] 1 - p cxl'\{1
1' (w) -1 -E[P|P>p] p
The left-hand side is the ratio of the agents' marginal utilities in the loss versus no loss state,
evaluated at the endowment. The right-hand side independent of the utility function, u, and is the
cost of providing an infinitesimal transfer to type p if the pool of types worse than p, P > p, also
were attracted to the contract. We define this term the pooled price ratio.
Definition 1.2. For any p E I\ {1}, the pooled price ratio at p, T (p), is given by
TE[PIP>p] 1 (1.2)
1 - E[P|P>p] p
Given T (p), the no-trade condition has a succinct expression.
Corollary 1.2. (Quantification of the barrier to trade) The no-trade condition holds if and only if
7"(1 )< inf T (p) (1.3)
Whether or not there will be trade depends on only two numbers: the agent's underlying
valuation of insurance, ,(WL) and the cheapest cost of providing an infinitesimal amount of1 1,(W) I
insurance, infpE\{l1} T (p). When this cost is above the underlying valuation of insurance, there
can be no trade. We call infPE\{}1 T (p) the minimum pooled price ratio. This number characterizes
the barrier to trade imposed by private information.
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Equation (1.3) has a simple tax rate interpretation. Suppose for a moment that there were no
private information but instead a government levies a sales tax of rate t on insurance premiums in
a competitive insurance market. The value u'(w-" ) - 1 is the highest such tax rate an individual
would be willing to pay to purchase any insurance. 14 Thus, infpeI\{1} T (p) - 1 is the tax rate
equivalent of the barrier to trade imposed by private information. In this sense, it quantifies the
magnitude of the barrier to trade imposed by private information.
Equation (1.3) leads to a simple comparative static.
Corollary 1.3. (Comparative static in the minimum pooled price ratio) Consider two market seg-
ments with pooled price ratios T1 (p) and T2 (p) and common vNM preferences u. Suppose
inf Ti (p) < inf T 2 (p)
pEI\{1} pEW\{1}
then if the no-trade condition holds in segment 1, it must also hold in segment 2.
Higher values of the minimum pooled price ratio are more likely to lead to no trade. Because
the minimum pooled price ratio characterizes the barrier to trade imposed by private information,
Corollary 1.3 is the key comparative static on the distribution of private information provided by
the theory.15
In addition to the minimum pooled price ratio, we also provide another metric which leads to
a less precise comparative static but will be useful to guide portions of our empirical analysis.
Definition 1.3. For any p c T, define the magnitude of private information at p by m (p),
given by
m (p) = E [PIP > p] - p (1.4)
The value m (p) is the difference between p and the average probability of everyone worse than
p. Note that m (p) E [0, 1] and m (p) + p = E [PIP > p]. The following comparative static follows
directly from the no-trade condition (1.1).
Corollary 1.4. (Comparative static in the magnitude of private information) Consider two market
segments with magnitudes of private information m 1 (p) and m-12 (p) and common support T and
common vNM preferences u. Suppose
m 1 (p) M2 (p) Vp E T
14 To clarify, the equivalence is to a tax rate paid only in the state of no loss, so that it can be interpreted as a tax
on the insurance premium.
1 5Corollaries 1.2 and 1.3 do require that the willingness to pay, ") does not vary with p. This would be
violated if agents with different values of p made different informal insurance decisions, such as larger savings. We
consider this case in detail in Appendix 1.A.2. In short, u'(W may vary with p, motivating a comparative static
in T (p) for all p, as opposed to the minimum pooled price ratio. Our empirical results are quite robust to this more
restrictive test.
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Then if the no-trade condition holds in segment 1, it must also hold in segment 2.
Higher values of the magnitude of private information are more likely to lead to no trade. Notice
that the values of m (p) must be ordered for all p E T, and it is thus a less precise statement than
the comparative static provided in Corollary 1.3.
1.3.2 High-Risk Distributions
Before turning to our empirical methodology, we note that the comparative statics of the model
already provide a qualitative explanation of the fact that it is often the high (mean) risks who are
rejected. Let P1 and P2 be two continuously distributed random variables with common support
f.2 p)T C [0, 1] and hazard rates hj (p) = 1 ,' where fj (p) is the p.d.f. and Fj (p) is the c.d.f. of Pj.
We say that the two random variables are ordered according to the hazard rate ordering if either
hi (p) < h2 (p) for all p or hi (p) > h2 (p) for all p.
Proposition 1.1. Suppose P1 and P2 are ordered according to the hazard rate ordering. Let T1
and T2 denote their associated pooled price ratios. Then
E [P1] < E [P2] -> inf T1 (p) < inf T2 (p) (1.5)
for any T C T\ {1}. In particular, (1.5) holds for T = T\ {1} or T = TWi, as defined in Remark
1.1.
Proof. Follows immediately from the fact that the hazard rate ordering implies the mean-residual
life ordering. See Shaked and Shanthikumar (1994).
When distributions can be ordered according to their hazard rates, the higher mean risk distri-
bution has a larger minimum pooled price ratio. 16 Therefore, it satisfies the no-trade condition for
a larger set of values of w, In this sense, higher risk distributions are more likely to lead to
no trade, which can explain why it is so often those with high (mean) risk characteristics who are
rejected.
1.3.3 Moving Towards Data: Testable Hypotheses
Our goal of the rest of the paper is to test the empirical predictions of the theory by estimat-
ing properties of the distribution of private information, F (plX), for rejectees and non-rejectees.
Assuming for the moment that F (pIX) is observable to the econometrician, our ideal tests are
as follows. Qualitatively, we test whether F (plX) has a thicker upper tail of high risks for the
rejectees. Quantitatively, we estimate the minimum pooled price ratio for each X and conduct
16 Note that the hazard rate ordering is weaker than the likelihood ratio ordering. So if distributions can be ordered
according to their likelihood ratios (e.g. they have the monotone likelihood ratio property, "MLRP"), then higher
mean risk distributions lead to larger minimum pooled price ratios.
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two types of tests: first, we test the comparative statics given by Corollaries 1.3 and 1.4 of higher
values of the minimum pooled price ratio for rejectees versus non-rejectees. Second, we ask whether
the minimum pooled price ratio is large (small) enough to explain (the absence of) rejections for
plausible values of agents' willingness to pay, as suggested by Corollary 1.2.17
Of course the execution of these tests require estimating properties of the distribution of private
information, F (plX), to which we now turn.
1.4 Empirical Methodology
We develop an empirical methodology to study private information and operationalize the tests in
Section 1.3.3. The key feature of our approach is that we utilize information contained in subjective
probability assessments to infer properties of the distribution of private information. Let L denote
an event (e.g. dying in the next 10 years) that is commonly insured in some insurance market
(e.g. life insurance).1 Let Z denote an individual's subjective probability elicitation about event
L (i.e. Z is a response to the question "what do you think is the probability that L will occur?").
A premise of our approach is that these elicitations are non-verifiable to an insurance company.
Therefore, they can be excluded from the set of public information, which we will denote by X,
and used to infer properties of the distribution of private information. But while these elicitations
are non-verifiable to insurance companies, they are arguably noisy and potentially biased measures
of true beliefs.
We develop two complementary approaches for dealing with the potential error in subjective
probability elicitations. Our first approach provides a nonparametric lower bound on the average
magnitude of private information, E [m (P)], and tests whether rejection segments have higher
values of E [m (P)]. This provides a test in the spirit of the comparative static in m (p) (Corollary
1.4) while relying on very minimal assumptions on the relationship between agents' beliefs and
their probability elicitations. Our second approach adds a parametric structure to the distribution
of elicitation error, which allows us to (non-parametrically) identify the distribution of private
information (so that the overall approach is semiparametric). We then estimate the pooled price
ratio, T (p), and a close analogue to the minimum pooled price ratio, infpCqJ\{1} T (p), where we
focus on the minimum over a compact set 'i which excludes points in the upper quantiles of F (p)
1 Our tests do not focus on potential demand side variation across values of X (i.e. how willingness-to-pay,
U'(w-) varies with X and potentially differs across rejectees and non-rejectees). Finding empirical support for our
71, (in)
comparative static tests would only be inconsistent with the theory if the difference in willingness-to-pay for rejectees
versus non-rejectees is larger than our estimated differences in the minimum pooled price ratio. In contrast, if
rejectees have lower willingness-to-pay than non-rejectees, our tests are too strict: they may lead us to find evidence
inconsistent with the theory when in fact the theory is correct.
18 0f course, individuals face more than a single binary event and insurance generally insures a combination of
many different events. Our approach is to focus on one commonly insured event and ask whether the pattern of
rejections in that market is consistent with the predictions of our theory about whether insurance could be provided
for that binary event.
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to avoid problems associated with extreme value estimation. We then test both whether segments
facing rejection have larger values of the minimum pooled price ratio (Corollary 1.3) and whether
these estimates are large (small) to explain (the absence of) rejections for plausible values of "(1)U, (w)
as suggested by Corollary 1.2.
In this section, we introduce these empirical approaches. We defer a discussion of the empirical
specification and statistical inference to Sections 1.6 and 1.7, after we have discussed our data and
settings.
1.4.1 Nonparametric Lower Bound Approach
To begin, we retain the assumption from the theoretical section that agents act as if they have
beliefs about the probability of the loss L. 19 Moreover, as has heretofore been implicit, we assume
these beliefs are correct.
Beliefs P are correct: Pr {L IX, P} = P
Assumption 1.4.1 states that if we hypothetically gathered a large group of individuals with the
same observable values X and the same beliefs P and then observed whether or not they experience
the loss L, we would find that, on average, a fraction P of this group experiences the loss. As an
empirical assumption, it is relatively strong, but it provides perhaps the simplest link between the
realized loss L and beliefs.2 0 Note that we have now introduced public information, X. To most
closely match the theory, we assume X is the set of information that an insurance company would
use to price insurance. We discuss this important data requirement further in Section 1.5.
Although agents act as if they have beliefs, they may not report these beliefs in probabilistic sur-
vey questions. Our lower bound approach assumes only that Z contains no additional information
about L than would the true beliefs.
Z contains no additional information than P about the loss L, so that Pr {LIX., P, Z}
Pr {LIX, P}
Assumption 1.4.1 is very weak; it would be violated only if people could provide elicitations Z
which are informative about L even conditional on the true beliefs of those making the reports. 2 1
190ur approach therefore follows the view of personal probability expressed in the seminal work of Savage (1954):
Although agents may not perfectly express their beliefs through survey elicitations, they would behave consistently
in response to gambles over L ("consistently" in the sense of Savage's axioms).
2 0 This is a common assumption made, either implicitly or explicitly, in existing (revealed preference) approaches to
studying private information (e.g. Einav et al. (2010)). We find some motivation for correct beliefs and our treatment
of subjective probability elicitations in existing empirical work in the forecasting literature spanning economics,
psychology, and engineering. Broadly, this literature suggests survey elicitations suffer significant limitations as
measures of beliefs, but implicit forecasts based on behavior, as in prediction markets, tend to be more accurate (for
an overview, see Sunstein (2006) and (Arrow et al. 2008)). Examples of the limitations of survey elicitations of beliefs
include Gan et al. (2005) who consider the subjective mortality probabilities we use in this paper. Additional examples
in psychology and cognitive engineering shows that simple improvements in elicitation methods can substantially
improve forecasts by reducing elicitation biases (Miller et al. (2008), Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995)).
2
'Assumptions 1.4.1 and 1.4.1 are jointly implied by a rational expectations model in which agents know both X
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For the empirical tests, we classify segments X into those in which insurance companies do and
do not sell insurance, X E eNoReject and X E 9Reject. We then proceed as follows. First, we form
the predicted value of L given the observable variables X and Z,
Pz = Pr {LIX, Z}
Loosely, our approach asks how much Z explains L, conditional on X. To assess this qualita-
tively, we plot the predicted values of Pz separately for rejectees (X C 8Reject) and non-rejectees
(X E eNoReject). If Z is more informative for the rejectees, we would expect to see that the
distribution of Pz given X is more dispersed for the rejectees.
We then measure the extent to which Z explains L conditional on X using a measure of dis-
persion inspired by the theory. Recall from Definition 1.3 that m (p) in segment X is given by
m (p) = E [PIP > p, X] - p." We construct an analogue with Pz,
nz (p) = EzIx [Pz|Pz > p, X| - p
which is difference between p and the average predicted probability, Pz, of those with predicted
probabilities higher than p (note that mz (p) is defined for any p).23 We then construct the average
magnitude of private information implied by Z in segment X, E [mz (Pz) X], which is the average
difference in segment X between an individual's predicted loss, and the predicted losses of those
with higher predicted probabilities. Intuitively, E [nz (Pz) X] is a (nonnegative) measure of the
dispersion of the distribution of Pz.
In the spirit of the comparative statics given by Corollary 1.4, we test whether rejectees have
higher values of E [mz (Pz) IX]:
Az = E [mz (Pz) X E eReject] - E [mz (Pz) |X C NoReject] > o (1.6)
which asks whether segments in which insurance companies have chosen to not sell insurance
have higher average magnitudes of private information implied by Z than segments in which they
sell insurance. Stated more loosely, equation (1.6) asks whether the subjective probabilities of
the rejectees better explain the realized losses than the non-rejectees, where "better explain" is
measured using E [nz (Pz) IX]. Equation (1.6) is the key empirical test provided by the lower
bound approach. 24
and Z in formulating their beliefs P. In this case, our approach views Z as a "garbling" of the agent's true beliefs in
the sense of Blackwell ((1951), (1953)).
22 The expectation is conditional on X but for brevity we omit explicit reference to X in our notation for m (p).
2 3The subscript Z notes that the variable Z is used in its construction; it does not mean to indicate we are
conditioning on a realized value of Z in the construction of mz (p).
2 4In addition to aggregating the data across all X in each rejection classification, we also conduct the test for
subgroups (e.g. conditional on age or gender).
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Lower Bounds Our estimable variable, Pz, is not equal to the true beliefs, P. Rather we obtain
distributional lower bounds, as illustrated in Proposition 1.2.
Proposition 1.2. (Lower bound) Suppose assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then
1. The true beliefs, P, are a mean-preserving spread of Pz:
Pz = E [PX, Z] (1.7)
2. The average magnitude of private information implied by Z is a lower bound for the true
average magnitude of private information:
E [mz (Pz) X] < E [i (P) |X] (1.8)
Proof. See Appendix 1.B.1. E
Because Z contains no additional information about L than do the true beliefs P, the true
beliefs are a mean preserving spread of Pz. Correspondingly, the average magnitude of private
information implied by Z, E [mz (Pz) JX] is a lower bound for E [m (P) X].
Statement (2) highlights that testing E [mz (Pz) X] = 0 provides a nonparametric test for
the presence of private information (Note E [mz (Pz) X] > 0 implies E [m (P) JX] > 0). Since
E [mz (Pz) X] = 0 if and only if Pr {LIX, Z} = Pr {LIX}, the test for private information is
straightforward: do the subjective probabilities explain the realized loss?25
Our approach is nonparametric in the sense that we have made no parametric restrictions on
how the elicitations Z relate to the true beliefs P.26 For example, Pz and mz (p) are invariant to
monotonic transformations in Z: Pz = Ph(z) and iz (p) = rmh(z) (p) for any monotonic function
h. Thus, we do not require that Z be a probability or have any cardinal interpretation. Respon-
dents could all change their elicitations to 1 - Z or 100Z; this would not change the value of
E [mz (Pz) X].
But while the benefit of the lower bound approach is that we make only minimal assumptions
on how subjective probabilities relate to true beliefs, the resulting empirical test in equation (1.6)
suffers several limitations. First, orderings of lower bounds of E [m (P) X] across segments do not
2 5Our test for the presence of private information is different from the test used by Finkelstein and McGarry
(2006) that was initially proposed in Finkelstein and Poterba (2006). Their approach treats subjective probabilities
as "unused observables" that are excluded from the set of variables used by insurance companies for pricing insurance.
They infer the presence of asymmetric information if two conditions are satisfied: 1) the subjective probabilities are
correlated with the realized loss (conditional on observables) and 2) the subjective probabilities are correlated with
insurance purchase (conditional on observables). In contrast, we show that the second requirement is not necessary
when using subjective probabilities for identifying private information. Indeed, it would prevent identification of
private information amongst rejectees.
26 In particular, we have not imposed parametric restrictions on the distribution of Z given beliefs P, fzlp (ZIP).
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necessarily imply orderings of its true magnitude. 2 7 Second, orderings of E [m (P) IX] does not
imply orderings of m (p) for all p, which was the statement of the comparative static in m (p) in
Corollary (1.4).28 Finally, in addition to having limitations as a test of the comparative static,
this approach cannot quantify the minimum pooled price ratio. These shortcomings motivate our
second approach, which imposes some structure on the relationship between Z and P and allows
us to move from lower bounds to point estimates of the distribution of private information.
1.4.2 Semiparametric Approach: Estimation of the Distribution of Private In-
formation
The goal of the second approach is to estimate the distribution of private information and the
minimum pooled price ratio. We then examine the distribution for the presence of thicker upper
tails for the rejectees relative to the non-rejectees. With the minimum pooled price ratio, we test
whether it is larger for rejectees versus non-rejectees (Corollary 1.3) and whether it is large (or
small) enough to explain (the absence of) rejections for plausible values of the willingness to pay
for insurance (Corollary 1.2). Whereas our nonparametric lower bound approach allowed for an
arbitrary relationship between Z and P, we now restrict the way in which elicitations relate to
beliefs.
Z is distributed with p.d.f./p.m.f. fzIp (ZIP; 6) of a known parametric family with unknown
parameters 0 of finite dimension.
This restriction limits the extent to which the distribution of Z can vary with P. In our
particular specification discussed futher in Section 1.7.1.1, we will allow f (ZIP; 0) to capture noise
and bias. In addition to Assumption 1.4.2, we retain Assumptions 1.4.1 and 1.4.1 which ensure
that Pr {L = 1IX, Z, P} = P.
With Assumptions 1.4.1-1.4.2, the joint p.d.f./p.m.f. of the observed variables L 29 and Z
2 7 In Appendix (1.B.1.3), we provide a stylized example of elicitation error which yields conditions under which
orderings of our lower bounds do imply orderings of the true magnitude. Loosely, we require the error in the elicitation
to be similar between the two segments under comparison.
2 8Because E [m (P)] is a measure of dispersion, it is invariant to location shifts in the distribution of P (i.e. if
= P + r7, then E [m (P)] = E [m (? ). So, testing equation (1.6) is distinct from analyzing whether rejectees
have higher mean risk, as suggested by Proposition 1.1. Since rejectees have almost universally higher mean risks,
testing for higher values of E [m (P)] for the rejectees may a priori be an overly restrictive test of the theory. Since
this biases us against finding results consistent with the theory, we do not discuss this interaction in detail. We
discuss this further in Appendix 1.B.1, where we show that the minimum pooled price ratio is bounded above (using
a Holder inequality) by a term increasing in both the mean, Pr {L X}, and E [m (P) X].
2 9 For notational brevity, we let L also denote the binary indicator that the event L occurs, 1 {L}.
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(conditional on X = x), denoted f&,z (L, Z), is given by
1
fL,z (L., Z) = fL,z (L, Z|P = p) fp (p) dp
I
f(Pr { L = 1|Z, P = p})L (1 - Pr {L = 1|Z, P = p}) 1 -L fZP (ZIp; 6) fp (p) dp
= pL (1 - p)1-L fZJP (ZIP; 6) fp (P) dp
where fp (p) is the unobserved density of the distribution of private information (assumed to be
continuous for ease of exposition). The first equality follows by taking the conditional expectation
with respect to P. The second equality follows by expanding the joint density of L and Z given P
and Assumption 1.4.2. The third equality follows from Assumptions 1.4.1 and 1.4.1.
Assumption 1.4.2 allows us to estimate 0, as opposed to an arbitrary two-dimensional continuous
function, fzlp. This allows us to estimate both 0 and fp using the observed joint distribution of the
data, fL,z (L, Z). We discuss identification in general and for our particular functional form choice
in Appendix 1.B.2. But the order condition is straightforward. The observed joint distribution,
fL,Z, contains two continuous functions of Z (one for L = 1 and another for L = 0). We use one
of these functions to identify fp and another to identify 0. While we have imposed a functional
form on 0, we do not impose a functional form on the distribution of private information, fp. In
practice. we flexibly approximate fp and estimate all parameters (both 0 and the approximating
parameters for fp) using maximum likelihood.
Given estimates of the distribution of private information, we translate these into measures of
the barrier to trade imposed by private information. Recall from Corollary 1.2 that this magnitude
is fully characterized by the minimum pooled price ratio, infpcep( 1} T (p), where T (p) can be
calculated at each p using estimates of E [PIP > p] derived from the estimated distribution of
private information. One remaining limitation is that for values of p in the upper quantiles of
F (p), E [PIP > p] is an extreme value that is not well-identified, since the expectation is taken
with respect to a smaller and smaller effective sample as p increases. However, for a fixed quantile
T, estimates of the minimum pooled price ratio over l, = [0, F- (T)] n (TI\ {1}) are continuously
differentiable functions of the MLE parameter estimates of F (p) for p < F- (r). 30 So, derived
MLE estimates of infp, T (p) are consistent and asymptotically normal. Thus, our approach is
to construct the minimum pooled price ratio over $' for a fixed T < 1. We then assess robustness
to the choice of T.
While our motivation for restricting attention to $T as opposed to T is primarily because of sta-
tistical limitations, Remark 1.1 in Section 1.2.2 provides an economic rationale for why infp,4 , T (p)
may not only be a suitable substitute for infpECP\{} T (p) but also may actually be more relevant if
firms face frictions to setting up contracts. If contracts must attract a non-trivial fraction 1 - r of
3 0 Non-differentiability could hypothetically occur at points where the infimum is attained at distinct values of p.
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the market in order to be viable, then infP,g T (p) characterizes the barrier to trade imposed by
private information.
In short, the semiparametric approach makes an additional parametric assumption on the sta-
tistical relationship between elicitations Z and beliefs P which allows us to estimate the distribution
of private information and implement the tests outlined in Section (1.3.3).
1.5 Setting and Data
We employ our empirical approach to ask whether private information can explain rejections in
three non-group insurance market settings: long-term care, disability, and life insurance.
1.5.1 The Three Non-Group Market Settings
Long-term care (LTC) insurance insures against the financial costs of nursing home use and pro-
fessional home care. Expenditures on LTC represent one of the largest uninsured financial burdens
facing the elderly. LTC expenditures in the US totaled over $135B in 2004 (CBO (2004)), and
expenditures are heavily skewed: less than half of the population will ever enter a nursing home in
their life. Despite this, the LTC insurance market is small, with roughly 4% of all nursing home
expenses paid by private insurance, compared to 31% paid out-of-pocket (CBO (2004)).31
The private disability insurance protects against the lost income resulting from a work-limiting
disability. It is primarily sold through group settings, such as one's employer; more than 30% of
private workers have group-based disability policies. In contrast, the non-group market is quite
small. Only 3% of non-government workers own a private non-group disability policy, most of
whom are self-employed or professionals who do not have access to employer-based group policies
(ACLI (2010)).32
Life insurance provides payments to ones' heirs or estate upon death, insuring lost income or
other expenses. Policies either expire after a fixed length of time (term life) or cover one's entire
life (whole life). In contrast to the non-group disability and LTC markets, the private non-group
life insurance market is quite big. More than half of the adult US population owns life insurance.
54% of these policies are sold in the non-group market. 43% of these are term policies, while the
remaining 57% are whole life policies (ACLI (2010)).
Not everyone can purchase insurance in these three non-group markets. As mentioned in the
introduction, Murtaugh et al. (1995) estimates that 12-23% of 65 year olds have a health condition
which would cause them to be rejected by LTC insurers. In life and disability insurance, we know
of no formal studies documenting the prevalence of rejections, but our review of underwriting
3 1Medicaid pays for nursing home stays provided one's assets are sufficiently low and is a substantial payer of
long-term stays.
3 2 In contrast to health insurance where the group market faces significant tax advantages, group disability policies
are taxed. Either the premiums are paid with after-tax income, or the benefits are taxed upon receipt.
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guidelines and conversations with underwriters in these markets establish a prevalence of rejections
based on certain pre-existing conditions that we discuss in more detail in Section 1.5.2.2.
Insurance companies in these markets are not legally prevented from charging higher prices
to reflect actuarial differences in risk.3 3 They do face some regulation. Capital levels must be
maintained to prevent policy default. Also, they are limited in the extent to which policy prices
can be raised over time after purchase, which is intended to prevent exploitative price increases
on those who have already sunk payments into a policy. But no regulation prevents insurance
companies from offering risk-adjusted prices to those who are currently rejected in these three
market settings. 34
Previous research has found minimal or no evidence of private information using the revealed
preference approach in these settings. In life insurance, Cawley and Philipson (1999) find no evi-
dence of adverse selection. He (2009) revisits this with a different sample focusing on new purchasers
and does find evidence of small amounts of adverse selection. In long-term care, Finkelstein and
McGarry (2006) find direct evidence of private information by showing subjective probabilities are
correlated with subsequent nursing home use. However, they find no evidence that this private
information leads to adverse selection in the form of a correlation between insurance purchase and
subsequent losses in the LTC insurance market.3 5 To our knowledge, there is no previous study of
private information in the non-group disability market.
1.5.2 Data
Both of our approaches have the same data requirements. The ideal dataset would contain, for
each setting, four pieces of information:
1. Loss indicator, L, corresponding to a commonly insured loss
2. Agents' subjective probability elicitation, Z, about this loss
3. The set of public information, X, which would be observed by insurance companies in setting
contract terms
4. The classification, -Reject and gNoReject, of who would be rejected if they applied for insur-
ance
Our data source for the loss, L, subjective probabilities, Z, and public information X, come from
years 1993-2008 of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). The HRS is an individual-level panel
survey of individuals over 55 and their spouses (included regardless of age). It contains a rich set
3 3 The Civil Rights Act does prevent purely racial discrimination in pricing.
3 4 Interviews with underwriters in these markets also suggest that fear of regulation is not an issue in preventing
charging a higher price to those currently rejected.
35 They suggest heterogeneous preferences, in which good risks also have a higher valuation of insurance, can
explain why private information doesn't lead to adverse selection.
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of health and demographic information, along with subjective probability elicitations about future
events.
To construct the rejection classification, we primarily rely on insurance company underwriting
guidelines which are used by underwriters and often provided to insurance agents with the purpose
of preventing those with rejection conditions from applying. We supplement this information with
interviews with insurance underwriters. We discuss each piece of our data in further detail.
1.5.2.1 Loss Variables and Subjective Probability Elicitations
The HRS contains three subjective probability elicitations about future events which correspond
to a commonly insured loss in each of our settings:
Long-Term Care: "What is the percent chance (0-100) that you will move to a nursing
home in the next five years?"
Disability: "[What is the percent chance] that your health will limit your work activity
during the next 10 years?"
Life: "What is the percent chance that you will live to be AGE or more?" (where
AGEE {75,80,85,90,95,100} is respondent-specific and chosen to be 10-15 years from
the date of the interview)
Figures 1-1(a,b,c) display histograms of these responses (divided by 100 to translate into probabil-
ities). 36 As has been noted in previous literature using these subjective probabilities (Gan et al.
(2005); Finkelstein and McGarry (2006)), these histograms highlight why it would be problematic
to view these as true beliefs. Many respondents report 0, 50, or 100. Taken literally, responses of
0 or 100 imply an infinite degree of certainty, which is difficult to believe. We find it more likely
that respondents who report focal point values are responding on more of an ordinal scale (e.g.
high, medium, low) as opposed to having a literal probabilistic interpretation. Our lower bound
approach remains agnostic on the way in which focal point responses relate to true beliefs.3 7 Our
parametric approach will take explicit account of this focal point response bias, discussed further
in Section 1.7.1.1.
Corresponding to each subjective probability elicitation, we construct binary indicators of the
loss, L. In long-term care, L denotes the event that the respondent enters a nursing home in
the subsequent 5 years. In disability, L denotes the event that the respondent reports that their
health limits their work activity in the subsequent 10-11 years. 38 In life, L denotes the event that
36 We use the sample selection described in Subsection (1.5.2.4)
37 For our empirical specification, we will include indicators for focal point responses
380ur loss variable is necessarily defined as 11 years for those in the AHEAD 1993 wave 2 group because the panel
does not provide responses exactly 10 years from 1993. Our results are robust to the exclusion of this group.
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Figure 1-1: Subjective Probability Histograms
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the respondent dies before AGE, where AGEE {75,80,85,90,95,100} corresponds to the subjective
probability elicitation, which is 10-15 years from the survey date. 39
1.5.2.2 Rejection Classification
Not everyone can purchase insurance in these three non-group markets. An ideal dataset would
classify our entire samples into rejectees and non-rejectees. Practically, this requires knowing the
conditions that cause rejection and matching these conditions to those reported in the HRS. As we
discuss below, this match faces limitations which lead us to construct a third group, "Uncertain",
which allows us to be relatively confident in our classification of rejectees and non-rejectees.
To identify conditions that lead to rejection, we obtain underwriting guidelines used by under-
writers and provided to insurance agents for use in screening applicants. An insurance company's
underwriting guidelines provide a list of conditions for which underwriters are instructed to not
offer insurance at any price. These guidelines are not publicly available, which limits our ability to
obtain this information. The extent of our access varies by market: In long-term care, we obtain
a set of guidelines used by an insurance broker from 18 of the 27 largest long-term care insurance
companies collectively representing over 95% of the US market. 4 0 In disability and life, we obtain
several underwriting guidelines and supplement this information with interviews with underwriters
at several major insurance companies.
To match these conditions to our dataset, we use the detailed health and demographic infor-
mation available in the HRS to identify individuals with conditions which would lead them to be
rejected. While the HRS contains a relatively comprehensive picture of respondents' health, some-
times the conditions which would lead to rejection are too precise too be accurately matched in the
HRS. For example, individuals with advanced stages of lung disease would be unable to purchase
life insurance; however, the HRS only provides information for the presence of a lung disease.
We exercise caution in performing this match by constructing a third classification, "Uncertain",
to which we classify those who may be rejected, but for whom data limitations prevent a solid
assessment. This allows us to be relatively confident in our classification of rejectees and non-
rejectees. We present our lower bound estimates for all three classifications. 41
Table 1.1 presents the list of conditions for the rejection and uncertain classification, along with
the frequency of each condition in our sample (using the sample selection outlined below in Section
1.5.2.4). In long-term care, activity of daily living (ADL) restrictions (e.g. needs assistance walking,
dressing, using toilet, etc.), any previous stroke, any previous home care, and anyone over the age
of 80 would be rejected. In disability, a back condition, obesity (40+ BMI), and doctor-diagnosed
psychological conditions such as depression or bi-polar would lead to rejection. In life, individuals
39 We construct the corresponding elicitation to be 100% - Ziuve where Z""' is the survey elicitation for the
probability of living to AGE.
4 0 These guidelines display broad consistency in the rejection practices across firms. We thank Amy Finkelstein
for making this broker-collected data available.
4For brevity, we do not present results from our semiparametric approach for the uncertain group.
33
Table 1.1: Rejection Classification
Long-Term Care Disability Life
Classification Condition % Sample Condition % Sample Condition % Sample
Rejection Any ADL/IADL Restriction 6.5% Back Condition 22.7% Cancer4 (Current) 13.1%
Past Stroke 7.8% Obesity (BMI > 40) 1.7% Stroke (Ever) 7.3%
Past Nursing/Home Care 12.4% Psychological Condition 6.3%
Over age 80 18.4%
Uncertain Lung Disease 10.0% Arthritis 36.9% Diabetes 13.8%
Heart Condition 28.4% Diabetes 7.7% High Blood Pressure 50.7%
Cancer (Current) 14.7% Lung Disease 5.1% Lung Disease 10.9%
Hip Fracture 1.3% High Blood Pressure 35.3% Cancer (Ever, not current) 12.1%
Memory Condition' 0.8% Heart Condition 6.1% Heart Condition 26.5%
Other Major Health Problems 2  26.7% Cancer (Ever Have) 4.6% Other Major Health Problemsz 23.5%
Blue-collar/high-risk Job3  23.3%
Other Major Health Problems 2  16.2%
'Memory conditions generally lead to rejection, but were not explicitly asked in waves 2-3; we classify memory conditions as uncertain for consistency, since they would presumably be considered an "other" condition in
waves 2-3.
2Wording of the question varies slightly overtime, but generally asks: "Do you have any other major/serious health problems which you haven't told me about?"
3We define blue collar/high-risk jobs as non-self employed jobs in the cleaning, foodservice, protection, farming, mechanics, construction, and equipment operators4We exclude minor basel cell cancers
Note that percentages will not add to the total fraction of the population classifed as rejection and uncertain because of people with multiple conditions
with a past stroke or current cancer would be rejected. We classify individuals with these conditions
as rejected in their respective markets.
Table 1.1 also lists the conditions leading to an uncertain classification in each market. In
addition to specific conditions for which the HRS data is too coarse, we also attempt to capture
the presence of rarer conditions not asked in the HRS (e.g. Lupus would lead to rejection in LTC,
but is not explicitly reported in the HRS). To do so, we take advantage of a question in the HRS
which asks respondents if they have any additional major health problems which were not asked
about in the survey. We classify individuals reporting yes to this question as Uncertain.
1.5.2.3 Public Information
Our ideal dataset would contain all information that insurance companies would use in pricing
contracts. For non-rejectees, this is a straightforward requirement which involves analyzing existing
contracts. But for rejectees, we must make an assumption about how insurance companies would
price contracts to these people if they were to offer them. Our preferred approach is to assume
insurance companies price rejectees separately from those to whom they currently offer contracts,
but use a relatively similar set of public information. Thus, our primary data requirement is the
public information currently used by insurance companies in pricing insurance.
The HRS contains an extensive set of health, demographic, and occupation information which
allows us to approximate the set of information which insurance companies use in pricing insur-
ance. 42 The quality of this approximation varies by market. For long-term care, we replicate the
information set of the insurance company quite well. For example, perhaps the most obscure piece of
information that is acquired by some LTC insurance companies is an interview in which applicants
are asked to perform word recall tasks to assess memory capabilities; the HRS conducts precisely
this test with survey respondents. In disability and life, we replicate most of the information used
by insurance companies in pricing. One caveat is that insurance companies will sometimes perform
tests, such as blood and urine tests, which we will not observe in the HRS. Conversations with
underwriters in these markets suggest these tests are primarily to confirm application information,
which we can approximate quite well with the HRS. But, we cannot rule out the potential that
there is additional information which can be gathered by insurance companies in the disability and
life settings. 43
In addition to our preferred specification which includes variables used in pricing, we also
assess the robustness of our estimates to alternative sets of controls. 44 This is for two reasons.
4 2 We are not the first to note the ability of the HRS to replicate the information used by insurance companies in
pricing; for LTC, see Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) and for Life, see He (2009).
4 3 In LTC, insurance companies are legally able to conduct tests, but it is not common industry practice.
4 4 While it might seem intuitive that including more controls would reduce the amount of private information,
this need not be the case. To see why, consider the following example of a regression of quantity on price. Absent
controls, there may not exist any significant relationship. But, controlling for supply (demand) factors, price may
have predictive power for quantity as it traces out the demand (supply) curve. Thus, adding controls can increase the
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First, although we have been careful in constructing the pricing controls, it may not be a perfect
representation of the set of information used in pricing. Second, we do not want our conclusions for
the amount of private information for the rejectees to depend on an assumption of how insurance
companies would hypothetically use information to price their contracts. We therefore perform our
analysis for three increasing sets of public information:
1. "Age and Gender": A baseline specification with fully saturated age-by-gender dummies
2. "Pricing Controls": Includes all variables currently used in pricing
3. "Extended Controls": Includes all Pricing Controls plus a large set of additional variables
not currently used in pricing but potentially related to the outcome
The age and gender specification provides a baseline. The pricing controls assumes insurance
companies would price similarly for those facing rejection. This is our preferred specification.
The extended controls specification adds a rich set of interactions between health conditions and
demographic variables that could be, but are not currently, used in pricing insurance.
We conduct the lower bound approach for all three sets of controls. For brevity, we focus
exclusively on our preferred specification of pricing controls for our semiparametric approach. 45
The variables used in the pricing and full controls specifications for each market are presented
in Table 1.2. In LTC, our preferred specification includes age, age squared, and gender interactions;
indicators for various health conditions; ADL restrictions; and performance on a word recall test.
Our extended controls specification adds full interactions for age and gender, along with interac-
tions of 5 year age bins with measures of health conditions, indicators for the number of living
relatives (up to 3), census region, and income deciles. For disability, our preferred specification in-
cludes age, age squared, and gender interactions; indicators for self employment and various health
conditions; BMI; and wage decile. Our extended controls specification adds full interactions of age
and gender; full interactions of wage decile, part time status indicator, job tenure quartile, and
self-employment indicator; interactions between 5 year age bins and various health conditions and
BMI; full interactions of job characteristics (e.g. "job requires heavy lifting"); and full interactions
of 5 year age bins and census region. For life, our preferred specification includes age, age squared,
and gender interactions, smoking status, indicators for the death of a parent before age 60, BMI,
income decile, and indicators for a set of health conditions. We also include a set of indicators for
the years between the survey date and the AGE corresponding to the loss. 46 Our extended controls
specification adds full interactions of age and gender; full interactions between age and the AGE
predictive power of another variable (price, in this case). Of course, conditioning on additional variables X' which
are uncorrelated with L or Z has no effect on the population value of E [m (P) IX E -]. .
4 5 fBecause the extended controls specification includes a lot of variables, we risk over-fitting the data. As we
discuss in Section 1.6.1, this does not pose an insurmountable problem for the lower bound approach. However, it
would pose a problem for the semiparametric approach, and thus provides another reason for our exclusive focus on
the preferred pricing specification.
4 6 We also include this in our age & gender and extended control specifications for life.
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Table 1.2: Covariates
Long-Term Care Disability Life
Price Controls Extended Controls Price Controls Extended Controls Price Controls Extended Controls
Age, Age^2, Gender
Gender*age
Gender*ageA2
Word Recall Performance'
Indicators for
ADLIADL Restriction
Psych Condition
Diabetes
Lung Disease
Arthritis
Heart Disease
Cancer
Stroke
High blood pressure
Full interactions of
Age
Gender
Word Recall Performance'
Indicators for
ADUIADL Restriction
Psychological Condition
Diabetes
Lung Disease
Arthritis
Heart Disease
Cancer
Stroke
High blood pressure
Interactions between 5 yr age bins and the
presence of:
Number of Health Conditions (High bp,
diabetes, heart condition, lung disease,
arthritis, stroke, obesity, psych
condition)
Number of ADL / IADL Restrictions
Number of living relatives (<=3)
Past home care usage
Census region (1-5)
Income Decile
Age, Age^2, Gender
Gender*age
Gender*age^2
Indicators for
Self Employed
Obese
Psych condition
Back condition
Diabetes
Lung Disease
Arthritis
Heart Condition
Cancer
Stroke
High Blood Pressure
BMI
Wage Decile
Full interactions of
Age
Gender
Full interactions of
wage decile
part time indicator
job tenure quartile
self-employment indicator
Interactions between 5 yr age bins
and the presence of:
Arthritis
Diabettes
Lung disease
Cancer
Heart condition
Psychological condition
Back condition
BMI Quartile
Full interactions of
BMI quartile
5 year age bins
Full interactions of
Job requires stooping
Job requires lifting
Job requires phys activity
Full Interactions of
5 year age bins
Census region (1-5)
Age, Age^2, Gender
Gender*age
Gender*age^2
Smoker Status
Indicator for years to question
2
Indicator for death of parent
before age 60
BMI
Indicators for
Psychological Condition
Diabetes
Lung Disease
Arthritis
Heart Disease
Cancer
Stroke
High blood pressure
Income decile
Full interactions of
Age
Gender
Full Interactions of
age
AGE in subj prob question
Interactions of 5 yr age bins
with:
Smoker Status
Income Decile
Heart condition
Stroke
Cancer
Lung disease
Diabetes
High blood pressure
Census Region
BMI
Indicator for death of parent
before age 60
Indicator for lowest quartile performance on word recall test
2Full indicator variables for number of years to AGE reported in subjective probability question
in the subjective probability question; interactions between 5 year age bins and smoking status,
income decile, census region, and various health conditions;4 7 BMI; and an indicator for death of a
parent before age 60.
1.5.2.4 Sample Selection
For each sample, we begin with years 1993-2008 of the HRS. Our selection process varies across
each of the three market settings due to data constraints. Table 1.3 presents the summary statistics
for each sample.
LTC For LTC, we exclude individuals for whom we cannot follow for a subsequent five years to
construct our loss indicator variable; years 2004-2008 are used but only for construction of the loss
indicator. Also, we exclude individuals who currently reside in a nursing home. Our primary sample
consists of 9,051 observations from 4,418 individuals for our no reject sample, 10,108 observations
from 3,215 individuals for the reject sample, and 10,690 observations from 5,190 individuals for the
uncertain sample. In each of our samples, we include multiple observations for a given individual
(which are spaced roughly two years apart) to increase power. All standard errors will be clustered
at the household level.
In addition to our primary sample, we will report results for our nonparametric lower bounds
using a sample that excludes individuals who own long-term care insurance (roughly 13% of re-
maining sample) to ensure we estimate private information inherently held by the individual which
is not the effect of insurance contract choice on subsequent utilization (a.k.a. "moral hazard"). 4 8
Rejectees differ from non-rejectees on many dimensions. They are older (average age of 79 versus
71), more likely to have health conditions such as arthritis, diabetes, and high blood pressure, and
have a 17% entry rate to a nursing home in the subsequent 5 years, compared to an entry rate of
only 4% for those not facing rejection. But while they are higher risk, on average they still have
less than a 20% chance of going to a nursing home in the next five years. This suggests they still
face significant of un-realized risk.
Disability For disability, we begin with the set of individuals up to age 60 who are currently
working and report no presence of work-limiting disabilities. To construct the corresponding loss
realization, we limit the sample to individuals who we can observe for a subsequent 10 years (years
47Although the HRS asks whether respondents have (non-basal cell) cancer, it only asks which organ the cancer
occurs in the 2nd wave (1993/1994) of the survey. In the robustness section, we will consider an additional extended
controls specification for life insurance which uses data only from these years and includes a full set of cancer organ
indicators (50+ indicators).
48While one might be tempted to control for the purchase of insurance or the contract characteristics, this would
be misguided. If agents with different beliefs sort into different contracts, controlling for contract choice could lead
to a finding of no private information. Insurance purchase is a potentially endogenous response to the presence of
private information and thus should not be included as a control variable.
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Table 1.3: Sample Selection
Long-Term Care Disability Life
No Reject Reject Uncertain No Reject Reject Uncertain No Reject Reject. Uncertain
Subj. Prob (mean)'
(std dev)
Loss
Demographics
Age
0.111 0.168 0.132
(0.194) (0.249) (0.207)
0.039 0.175 0.054
(0.195) (0.38) (0.227)
71.7
(4.366)
79.4 72.2
(6.934) (4.303)
0.292 0.385 0.352
(0.257) (0.264) (0.262)
0.156 0.441 0.339
(0.363) (0.497) (0.473)
54.7
(4)
55.0
(4.016)
55.6
(3.679)
0.366 0.556 0.491
(0.313) (0.341) (0.337)
0.273 0.572 0.433
(0.446) (0.495) (0.496)
70.4
(7.627)
75.3
(7.785)
72.9
(7.548)
Female
Health Status Indicators
Arthritis
Diabetes
High Blood Pressure
Sample Size
Observations (Ind x wave)
Unique Individuals
Unique Households
0.622 0.631 0.564
(0.485) (0.483) (0.496)
0.479 0.616 0.552
(0.5) (0.486) (0.497)
0.140 0.172 0.147
(0.347) (0.377) (0.354)
0.505 0.598 0.535
(0.5) (0.49) (0.499)
9,051
4,418
3,283
10,108
3,215
2,620
10,690
5,190
3,860
0.606 0.602 0.551
(0.489) (0.49) (0.497)
0.000 0.553
(0) (0.497)
0.510
(0.5)
0.000 0.090 0.121
(0) (0.287) (0.326)
0.280 0.392 0.378
(0.449) (0.488) (0.485)
2,540
1,480
1,112
2,216
1,280
975
3,757
1,929
1,540
0.595 0.564 0.588
(0.491) (0.496) (0.492)
0.351 0.435 0.443
(0.477) (0.496) (0.497)
0.000
(0)
0.000
(0)
2,689
1,720
1,419
0.163 0.185
(0.369) (0.388)
0.574 0.685
(0.495) (0.465)
2,362
1,371
1,145
6,800
4,270
3,545
Fraction Insured 2 13.9% 10.7% 14.8% 65.1% 63.3% 64.2%
'We transform the life insurance variable to 1-Pr{living to AGE} to correspond to the loss definition
2Calculated based on full sample prior to excluding individuals who purchased insurance
2000-2008 are used solely for the construction of the loss indicator). Our final sample consists of
2,540 observations from 1,480 individuals for our no reject classification, 2,216 observations from
1,280 individuals for our reject classification, and 3,757 observations from 1,929 individuals for our
uncertain classification. 49
Rejectees differ from non-rejectees on many dimensions. They are more likely to have high
blood pressure, diabetes, and arthritis,50 and have a higher risk of experiencing a work-limiting
disability (44.1% versus 15.6%). But, similar to LTC, not everyone with a rejection condition will
experience a work-limiting disability in the subsequent 10 years, which again suggests they face
unrealized risk.
Life For our life sample, we restrict to individuals who we are able to follow through the age
corresponding to the subjective probability elicitation 10-15 years in the future, so that years 2000-
2008 are used solely for the construction of the loss indicator. For example, if a 63 year old is
asked about the probability they will live to age 75, we require being able to see this person for
a subsequent 12 years in the survey. Our final sample consists of 2,689 observations from 1,720
individuals for our no reject classification, 2,362 observations from 1,371 individuals for our reject
classification, and 6,800 observations from 4,270 individuals for our uncertain classification.
Similar to LTC, we include those who own life insurance in our primary sample (64% of the
sample) but present results excluding this group for robustness. Similar to our other settings, the
rejectees are older, sicker, and more likely to experience the loss than non-rejectees.
Discussion There are several broad patterns across our three samples. First, a sizable fraction of
the sample would be rejected in each setting. Because the HRS primarily surveys older individuals,
our sample is older (and therefore sicker) than the average purchaser in each market. This is a
primary benefit of the HRS; it allows us to obtain a significant sample size of rejectees. But, it
is important to understand that this fraction of rejectees is not a measure of the fraction of the
applicants in each market that would be rejected.
Second, many rejectees own insurance. These individuals could (and perhaps should) have
purchased insurance prior to being stricken with their rejection condition. Also, they may have
been able to purchase insurance in group markets through their employer, union, or other group
which has less stringent underwriting requirements.
Third, rejectees differ from non-rejectees on many dimensions; their older, sicker, and have a
higher probability of experiencing the loss. This is consistent with Proposition 1.1 which showed
that higher risk distributions are more likely to satisfy the no-trade condition.
4 9 Ideally, we would also test the robustness of our results using a sample of those who do not own disability
insurance, but unfortunately the HRS does not ask about disability insurance ownership.
5 0Diabetes and arthritis may lead to rejection, so those without a rejection condition but with one of these two
conditions are placed in the uncertain classification
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1.5.2.5 Relation to Ideal Data
The extent to which our data resembles an ideal dataset varies by market. In general, we approxi-
mate the ideal dataset quite well, aside from our necessity to classify a relatively large fraction of
our sample as uncertain. In disability and in life, we are able to classify a smaller fraction of the
sample as rejected or not rejected as compared with LTC. Also, for disability and life we rely on
a smaller set of underwriting guidelines (along with underwriter interviews) to obtainn rejection
conditions, as opposed to LTC where we obtain an fairly large fraction of the underwriting guide-
lines used in the market. In disability and life we also do not observe medical tests which may
be used by insurance companies to price insurance (although our conversations with underwriters
suggest this is primarily to verify application information, which we approximate quite well using
the HRS). In contrast, in LTC we are able to classify a relatively large fraction of the sample, are
able to closely approximate the set of public information, and are able to assess the robustness of
our results to the exclusion of those who own insurance to remove the potential impact of a moral
hazard channel driving any findings of private information. While re-iterating that all three of our
samples approximate our ideal dataset quite well, our LTC sample is arguably the best of our three
samples.
1.6 Lower Bound Estimation
We now turn to the estimation of lower bounds of the average magnitude of private information,
E [mz (Pz) IX], outlined in Section 1.4.1.
1.6.1 Empirical Estimation
We estimate E [mz (Pz) IX] separately for each setting (e.g. LTC), sample (e.g. Reject), and speci-
fication (e.g. Price Controls). Implementation involves two steps. First, while the approach is theo-
retically nonparametric, in practice we choose a flexible parametric approximation for Pr {LIX, Z}.
Second, we must make an assumption that allows us to reduce the dimensionality of the way in
which the distribution Pz varies with X to enable estimation of the distribution of Pz and mz (p)
for each X.
To approximate Pz = Pr {LIX, Z} for our age/gender and price controls specifications, we use
a probit specification,
Pr {LIX, Z} = <b (3X + F (age, Z))
where X are our control variables and F (age, Z) captures the effect of Z on Pr {L IX, Z}. 51 This
5 1One could allow the the effect of Z to vary with other covariates. Our results are robust to much simpler
specifications (e.g. assuming F (age, Z) = -yZ) and richer specifications, such as including gender in F. Note that
although the coefficients for the effect of Z on Pr {LIX, Z} is restricted via functional form, we are not necessarily
restricting the estimated distribution of Pr {L IX, Z}, since the distribution of Z can (and does) vary with X.
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form allows the affect of Z to vary with age (note that age is already included in X). 52 We
approximate F (age, Z) using full interactions of functions of Z and functions of age. For Z, we use
second-order Chebyshev polynomials plus separate indicators for focal point responses at Z = 0,
50, and 100. We use a linear function of age. Our approximation of F (age, Z) is then given by the
full set of these interactions (whose coefficients are to be estimated). All results are robust to the
inclusion of additional or fewer polynomials in Z or age, or the use of a linear or logit specification,
as opposed to the probit. For our extended controls specification, the high dimensionality of X leads
us to use a linear specification, Pr {LIX, Z} = fX + F (age, Z). We use the same approximation
for F. 53
Estimating mz (p) = E [Pz Pz > p, X] - p requires estimating the entire distribution of Pz at
each possible value of X. To make this feasible, we adopt an assumption for how the distribution of
Pz varies with X: conditional on ones age and rejection classification, the distribution of residual
private information implied by Z, Pz - E [PzIX], does not vary with X. This allows observable
variables affect the mean but not the shape of the distribution of Pz (conditional on age and rejec-
tion classification). 54 We then estimate the conditional expectation, mIz (p) = E [Pz lPz > p, X] - p
using the empirical distribution of Pz - E [PzlX] within each age grouping.
After estimating nz (p), we construct its average using the empirical distribution of Pz, yielding
E [mz (Pz) X c E], where 0 is a given sample (e.g. LTC rejectees). For each market, we then
construct the difference between the reject and no reject estimates,
Az = E [mz (Pz) IX CE 8eje*] - E (mz (Pz) IX G 8NoReiect]
and test whether we can reject a null hypothesis that Az < 0. While choosing E to be an entire
sample (e.g. all LTC rejectees) increases power, we will also construct estimates for subgroups (e.g.
age groupings) of the rejectees and non-rejectees.
1.6.2 Statistical Inference
Statistical inference for E [mz (Pz) IX c 8] for a given sample 8 and for Az is straightforward,
but requires a bit of care to cover the possibility of no private information. In any finite sample,
our estimates of E [mz (Pz) X E 9] will be positive (Z will always have some predictive power in
finite samples). Provided the true value of E [mz (Pz) X E 9] is positive, the bootstrap provides
consistent, asymptotically normal, standard errors for E [mz (Pz) IX E 8] (Newey (1997)). But, if
5 2 In our LTC Reject Sample, we also include full interactions between F and an indicator for having a rejection
health condition; this allows r to vary differentially for those over age 80 with no other rejection conditions besides
age>80.
5 3 0f course. the switch from the probit to linear specification leads F to have a different interpretation.
5 4 This assumption is only required to arrive at a point estimate for E [mz (Pz) IX E e], and is not required to
test for the presence of private information (i.e. whether F = 0). Also, our results for E [mz (Pz) IX E e] are robust
to alternative assumptions, such as assuming the residual distribution does not vary with X within 5 year age bins.
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the true value of E [mz (Pz) X E 01 is zero (as would occur if there were no private information
amongst those with X c 0), then the bootstrap distribution is not asymptotically normal and
does not provide adequate finite-sample inference. 5 5 We therefore supplement the bootstrap with
a Wald test which restricts F (age, Z) = 0.56 This tests for the presence of private information. We
report results from both the Wald test and the bootstrap.
We conduct inference on Az in a similar manner. To test the null hypothesis that Az < 0,
we construct conservative p-values by taking the maximum p-value from two tests: 1) a Wald test
of no private information held by the rejectees, E [mz (Pz) X c 9Reject] = 0, and 2) the p-value
from the bootstrapped event of less private information held by the rejectees, A < 0.57
1.6.3 Graphical Results for Pz - E [PzjX]
We begin with graphical evidence of the predictive power of subjective probability elicitations. Fig-
ure 1-2(a,b,c) plots the estimated distribution of Pz -E [Pz X] aggregated by rejection classification
for the rejectees and non-rejectees, using our preferred pricing control specification. 58
Consistent with the hypothesis that rejectees are better informed about whether or not they
would experience the loss, the distribution of Pz - E [Pz X] is more dispersed for the rejectees
relative to those served by the market in all three market settings we consider. As we now show,
this translates into higher estimates of our lower bounds on the average magnitude of private
information.
1.6.4 Lower Bound Results
The top row of Table 1.4 provides the estimates of Az. Across all specifications and all market
settings, we estimate larger lower bounds on the average magnitude of private information for the
rejectees relative to those served by the market. These differences are all statistically significant at
the 1% level (third row of Table 1.4). Consistent with the theory, this suggests private information
imposes a greater barrier to trade for rejectees relative to those served by the market.
The lower sets of rows in Table 1.4 report the estimated magnitude of private information for
each classification (No Reject, Reject, and Uncertain), along with their standard errors and p-values
for the presence of private information. We discuss these details by market.
5 5 In this case, P -4 0 in probability, so that estimates of the distribution of Pz E [Pz lX] converge to zero in
probability (so that the bootstrap distribution converges to a point mass at zero).
5 6 The event I' (age, Z) = 0 in sample 0- is equivalent to both the event Pr {LXI , Z} = Pr {L IX} for all X E 0 and
the event E [mz (Pz) IX E 8] = 0.
5 7 More precise p-values would be a weighted average of these two p-values, where the weight on the Wald test
is given by the unknown quantity Pr {E [mz (Pz) IX E 8Reject] OJA < 0}. Since this weight is unknown, we
construct conservative p-values robust to any weight in [0, 1].
58Subtracting E [PzIX] = Pr {LIX} allows for simple aggregation across X within each sample.
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Figure 1-2: Distribution of Residual Private Information
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Table 1.4: Magnitude of Private Information (Lower Bound)
LTC Disability Life
Age & Price Extended Age & Price Extended Age & Price Extended
Gender Controls Controls Gender Controls Controls Gender Controls Controls
Difference: Az 0.0234*** 0.0245*** 0.0213*** 0.0445*** 0.0255** 0.0234** 0.0449*** 0.0338*** 0.0397***
Bootstrap s.e. (0.0041) ' (0.004) ' (0.004) r (0.0115) ' (0.0109) r (0.0098) r (0.0113) r (0.0109) r (0.0097)
p-value 2  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0120 0.0200 0.0000 0.0020 0.0000
No Reject 0.0041 0.0041 0.0040 0.0282*** 0.0257*** 0.027*** 0.031** 0.025 0.021
Bootstrap s.e. (0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0061) (0.006) (0.0058) (0.0074) (0.0067) (0.0061)
Wald test p-value 3  0.3880 0.4330 0.2156 0.0009 0.0056 0.0055 0.0102 0.1187 0.2395
Reject 0.0274*** 0.0286*** 0.0253*** 0.0727*** 0.0512*** 0.0504*** 0.0759*** 0.0587*** 0.0604***
Bootstrap s.e. (0.0038) (0.0036) (0.0034) (0.0098) (0.0089) (0.0082) (0.0085) (0.0088) (0.0081)
Wald test p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Uncertain 0.0058** 0.0056** 0.0053** 0.0567*** 0.0421*** 0.0407*** 0.0463*** 0.0294*** 0.028***
Bootstrap s.e. (0.002) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0072) (0.0066) (0.0064) (0.0058) (0.0053) (0.0051)
Wald test p-value 0.0121 0.0472 0.0147 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001
'Bootstrapped standard errors computed using block re-sampling at the household level (results shown for N=500 repetitions)
2p-value is the sum of the p-value for the rejection group having no private information and the p-value for the hypothesis that the difference is less than or equal to zero, where the latter is computed using
bootstrap (N=50 repetitions)
3p-value for the Wald test which restricts coefficients on subjective probabilities equal to zero. Standard errors clustered at the household level
* p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
LTC In long-term care, we find significant evidence of private information amongst the rejectees,
with estimated magnitudes of 0.0286 (p < 0.001) in our preferred specification. 59 In contrast, we
find no statistically significant evidence of private information held by the non-rejectees (0.0041,
p = 0.433 for our preferred specification). The estimates are quite similar for different control
specifications: all estimates lie within an estimated standard error (0.004).
Our finding that the subjective probabilities are significant predictors of subsequent nursing
home use is consistent with the empirical results of Finkelstein and McGarry (2006). However,
splitting the sample by the rejection classification, our results reveal that this private information
is primarily held by those who would be rejected. This provides a new explanation for the absence
of a positive correlation found in Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) between insurance purchase and
realized claims in the long-term care market: insurance companies choose to not sell insurance
to those whose observable characteristics indicate they may have significant amounts of private
information.
Disability In disability, we find significant evidence of private information held by both the
rejectees and non-rejectees. In our preferred specification, we estimate magnitudes of 0.0512 (p <
0.01) for the rejectees and 0.0257 (p < 0.01) for non-rejectees, leading to an estimated difference of
Az = .0255 (p = 0.006). The results are robust to the inclusion of additional controls: the extended
controls specification yields statistically indistinguishable results from our preferred specification
(.0234, p = .018). Our age and gender specification leads to slightly higher estimated magnitudes
for the rejectees of 0.0737, but not significantly different from our price controls specification.
To the best of our knowledge, these estimates provide the first evidence of private information
in the non-group private disability insurance market. Although many factors could be driving this
market's small size (only 3% of private employees own a non-group private disability policy (ACLI
(2010))), private information may be a contributing factor.
Life In life, we find significant evidence of private information amongst the rejectees with mag-
nitudes of 0.0587 (p < 0.001) in our preferred specification. The magnitudes are quite similar with
the extended controls (0.0604, p < 0.001). In contrast, we find smaller magnitudes for the non-
rejectees (0.0250, p = 0.119) and cannot reject the null hypothesis of no private information. Yet
our point estimate of 0.025 remains similar to the statistically significant estimate conditional on
age and gender alone (0.0310, p = 0.01). So, we also cannot rule out the presence of some private
information for the non-rejectees.
Our finding of minimal evidence of private information for those served by the market is consis-
tent with existing empirical work in life insurance using the revealed preference approach (Cawley
5 9 Because the estimated magnitudes are lower bounds, we do not focus our discussion on their absolute magnitudes.
But the interpretation is straightforward: the estimated magnitude of 0.0286 implies that E [PzlPz > p] differs from
p by 0.0286 on average, which implies that, on average, the average predicted probability of a loss (given Z) for worse
risks differs from ones' own risk by 2.86pp.
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and Philipson (1999), He (2009)). But, while Cawley and Philipson (1999) suggest their results
imply that there is no evidence of asymmetric information afflicts the life insurance market, our
results suggest much of agents' private information is held by those who would be rejected by insur-
ance companies. So although private information may not significantly affect the adverse selection
of observed contracts, it may simply pose a barrier to the existence of the market itself.
Uncertain Classification The estimated magnitudes for the uncertain classification generally
fall between the estimates for the rejection and no rejection groups, as indicated by the bottom set
of rows in Table 1.3. In general, our theory does not have a prediction for the uncertain group.
However, if E [mz (Pz) X] takes on similar values for all rejectees (e.g. E [mz (Pz) |X] -mR) and
non-rejectees (e.g. E [mz (Pz) X] mNR), then linearity of the expectation implies
E [mz (Pz) X E 9Uncertain _ AR - (1 - A) mNR (1.9)
where A is the fraction in the uncertain group who would be rejected. Thus, it is perhaps not
unreasonable to have expected E [mz (Pz) X E 9Uncertain] to lie in between our estimates for the
rejectees and non-rejectees, as we find. Nevertheless, we have no theoretical reason to suppose
the average magnitude of private information is constant within rejection classification; thus this
should be viewed only as a potential method for interpreting the results, not as a robust prediction
of the theory.
1.6.5 Subsample Analysis
The results in Table 1.4 aggregate across all observables, X, within each rejection classification.
While this aggregation improves statistical power, it is important to also examine the results within
subgroups to test whether the rejectees have higher magnitudes of private information conditional
on observable variables. 60 In this section, we examine age-based subgroups.
Figure 1-3(a,bi,bii,c) plots the estimates of E [mz (Pz) IX E eage,rejectclass] separately for each
age and rejection classification. 6 1 In all three settings, we find larger estimates for the rejectees
versus non-rejectees conditional on age.
6 0 In addition to analyzing subgroups as a finer test of the theory, one might also worry that aggregation masks
other potential drivers of the magnitude of private information aside from the presence of rejection conditions. In
particular, the rejectees are generally older than the non-rejectees. If older people naturally, for some reason, have
more private information, irrespective of whether or not they would be rejected, then we would estimate Az > 0 in
aggregate, even though it may not be the case that Az > 0 conditional on age.
61We use our preferred specification, which is quite flexible in age and allows F to vary with age. Figure 1-
3(a,bi,bii,c) provides bootstrapped standard errors, which are consistent as long as F # 0. In general, we cannot
reject the null hypothesis that F = 0 on a subsample consisting of one specific age, but our results in Table 1.4 do
reject F = 0 at all ages for all but the LTC and life no reject samples.
47
Figure 1-3: Magnitude of Private Information (Lower Bound)
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In long-term care, we can also more closely examine the specific rejection practices based on
age. LTC insurers reject applicants above age 80 regardless of health conditions (such as ADL
restrictions or a past stroke). Figure 1-3a plots the lower bound estimates at each age, separately
reporting estimates for those with and without rejection health conditions above age 80. The results
show that the estimates for those without rejection conditions increases at ages nearing 80. Indeed,
an individual at age 81 with no other rejection conditions (but who would be rejected based on
age) has a very similar magnitude of private information to a 65 year old who would be rejected.
In short, the results provide a picture of why insurance companies automatically reject individuals
beginning at age 80 as opposed to other age cutoffs.
In life (Figure 1-3c), we find larger estimates for the rejectees across the age spectrum. For
disability, we also generally find larger estimates (Figure 1-3b), although the difference between the
reject and no reject estimates appears to be increasing in age.6 2 In short, we find larger estimates
for rejectees conditional on age.
1.6.6 Robustness
1.6.6.1 Insurance Ownership Sample Selection
Our primary results in Table 1.4 do not exclude individuals who own insurance. If insurance choice
affects the risk of experiencing the loss, then differential insurance ownership could cause a finding
of private information. We test the robustness of our results to this potential bias by restricting to
those who do not own insurance in our LTC and Life samples. Table 1.5 presents these results.
For LTC, our estimates of Az with the restricted sample are almost identical to the preferred
specification estimates (0.0245 versus 0.0257). Across each group (reject, no reject uncertain),
our estimated results for E [mz (Pz) X C 8] excluding those who own insurance are also nearly
identical. In particular, we still cannot reject the null hypothesis of no private information for the
non-rejectees (p = 0.828).
For Life, our estimate of Az with the restricted sample is smaller (0.011 versus 0.0328), and
no longer statistically significant. But closer inspection reveals that the drop in magnitude is
primarily driven by a larger, yet still statistically insignificant estimate for the non-rejectees (0.0377,
p = 0.233).63 For the rejectees, the estimates lie within an estimated standard error of our preferred
estimate, 0.0491 versus 0.0587, when we exclude those who own insurance. Thus in both LTC and
life, we find our results are robust to the inclusion of those with insurance.
6 2 We present separate results for males and females in Figure 1-3b because of the changing gender composition
of the sample over time. Individuals below age 55 are included in the HRS only if they have a spouse above age 55.
Thus, we have relatively more females below age 55. But, as shown in these figures, we generally find larger estimates
for rejectees conditional on age and gender. We have also examined LTC and Life by age & gender and the results
again show larger magnitudes for the rejectees conditional on age and gender.
6 3 This is consistent with the much smaller sample size leading to a greater (spurious) predictive power of the
subjective probabilities
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Table 1.5: Robustness Checks: Sample Selection
LTC, Price Controls Life, Price Controls
Primary Excluding Primary Excluding
Sample Insured Sample Insured
Difference: Az 0.0245*** 0.0257*** 0.0338*** 0.011
Bootstrap s.e. r (0.004) ' (0.0043) ' (0.0109) r (0.0166)
p-value2  0.0000 0.0000 0.0020 0.2960
No Reject 0.0041 0.0033 0.0249 0.0377
Bootstrap s.e. (0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0067) (0.0112)
Wald test p-value3  0.4330 0.8280 0.1187 0.2334
Reject 0.0286*** 0.029*** 0.0587*** 0.0491*
Bootstrap s.e. (0.0036) (0.0039) (0.0088) (0.0116)
Wald test p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0523
Uncertain 0.0056** 0.0056 0.0294*** 0.0269
Bootstrap s.e. (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0053) (0.008)
Wald test p-value 0.0472 0.1352 0.0001 0.1560
'Bootstrapped standard errors computed using block re-sampling at the household level (results shown for N=500
repetitions)
2p-value is the sum of the p-value for the rejection group having no private information and the p-value for the hypothesis
that the difference is less than or equal to zero, where the latter is computed using bootstrap (N=500 repetitions)
3p-value for the Wald test which restricts coefficients on subjective probabilities equal to zero. Standard errors clustered
at the household level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
1.6.6.2 Organ Controls for Life Specification
Our specifications for life insurance did not include controls for the affected organ of cancer sufferers
in the reject sample. Although later years of the survey do not specify the organ of the cancer, it
is provided in the 1993/4 wave of the survey. In Table 1.6, we report the results from our primary
specification (all years) and the results from a specification restricted to years 1993/1994 which
includes a full set of 54 indicators for the affected organ added to our set of extended controls. Our
finding of significant private information amongst rejectees is robust to including these additional
controls. We estimate a value for E [mz (Pz) jX c OReiect] of 0.0308 (p = .018) including these
controls, as compared to 0.0338 (p < 0.001) for our primary specification.
1.6.7 Summary
We estimate significantly larger lower bounds for the average magnitude of private information for
the rejectees versus non-rejectees. Our estimates are robust to a wide set of controls for public
information, are robust to excluding those who own insurance in LTC and life, and are also consis-
tent within age-based subsamples. Consistent with the theory in Section (1.2), our results suggest
private information imposes a greater barrier to trade for the rejectees.
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Table 1.6: Robustness Checks: Organ Controls (Life Setting)
Preferred Organ + Extended Controls
Specification (1993/1994 Only)
Difference: Az 0.0338*** 0.0308**
Bootstrap s.e.1  (0.0109) (0.0121)
p-value 2  0.0020 0.0140
No Reject 0.0249 0.0218
Bootstrap s.e. (0.0067) (0.007)
Wald test p-value 3  0.1187 0.3592
Reject 0.0587*** 0.0526***
Bootstrap s.e. (0.0088) (0.01)
Wald test p-value 0.0000 0.0024
Uncertain 0.0294*** 0.0342***
Bootstrap s.e. (0.0053) (0.0061)
Wald test p-value 0.0001 0.0003
'Bootstrapped standard errors computed using block re-sampling at the household level (results shown for N=500
repetitions)
2p-value is the sum of the p-value for the rejection group having no private information and the p-value for the
hypothesis that the difference is less than or equal to zero, where the latter is computed using bootstrap (N=500
repetitions)
sp-value for the Wald test which restricts coefficients on subjective probabilities equal to zero, Standard errors
clustered at the household level
* p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
1.7 Estimation of Distribution of Private Information
While the lower bound approach provides evidence that private information imposes larger barriers
to trade for the rejectees, it suffers several limitations. First, we made comparisons using lower
bounds, not the levels of E [m (P) X c 0]. Second, we made comparisons using the average mag-
nitude of private information, E [m (P) JX], not m (p) Vp or inf T (p) as suggested by Corollaries
1.3 and 1.4. Third, we could not quantify the minimum pooled price ratio.
To overcome these limitations, we introduce additional structure to the statistical relationship
between elicitations and beliefs, as outlined in Section 1.4.2.
1.7.1 Empirical Specification
1.7.1.1 Elicitation Error Structure
Elicitations Z may differ from true beliefs P in many ways. They may be systematically biased,
with values either higher or lower than true beliefs. They may be noisy, so that two individuals with
the same beliefs may have different elicitations. Moreover, as shown in Figure 1-1 and recognized
in previous literature (e.g. Gan et al. (2005)) people may have a tendency to report focal point
values at 0, 50, and 100%.
Our model of elicitations will capture these three forms of elicitation error. To do so, we as-
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sume that the elicitation Z is drawn from a mixture of a censored normal and an ordered probit
distribution. With probability 1 - A, agents with belief P report Z from a censored normal dis-
tribution (censored on [0, 1]) with mean P + a (X) and variance o2 . 6 4 With probability A, agents
report Z E {0, .5, 1} according to an ordered probit with mean P + a (X), variance o.2, and ordered
probit cutoffs of K and 1 - K, where n C [0, .5]. The ordered probit allows a fraction A of agents
to report their beliefs not on a scale of 0-100%, but rather on a scale of "low, medium, and high",
corresponding to elicitations of 0%, 50%, and 100%. Letting f (ZIP, X) denote the p.d.f./p.m.f. of
the distribution of elicitations, we have
(1 - A) 4 (P-Q(X) + AD (K.P-a(X) if Z = 0
A X)1- P-(X) _1 (K-P-a(X))) if Z =0.5f (Z|P. X) = o
(1 - A) P - n -()A (1 if Z - 1
$Z-P-a(X)
_r if 0.71.
where # denotes the standard normal p.d.f. and 4D the standard normal c.d.f. We estimate four
elicitation error parameters: (o-, A, r,, a (X)). a captures the dispersion in the elicitation error, A
is the fraction of focal point respondents, K is the focal point window. We allow the elicitation
bias term, a (X), to vary with the observable variables, X. 65 Throughout this section we use our
preferred pricing controls.
By modeling focal point responses as an independent ordered probit, we are assuming that those
who respond with focal point responses at 0, 50%, and 100% are drawn from the same distribution
for P as those who report non-focal point values. Ideally, one would allow this distribution to differ;
yet the focal point bias inherently limits the extent of information that can be extracted from their
responses. In practice, this independence assumption means that most of our identification for the
distribution of P will come from those reporting non-focal point values.
1.7.1.2 Flexible Approximation for the Distribution of Private Information
Although we impose a restrictive parametric structure on the distribution of elicitations given
beliefs, we will flexibly estimate the distribution of private information.
Ideally, we would flexibly estimate F (plX) separately for every possible value of X. Unfortu-
nately, the dimensionality of X prevents this in practice. Instead, we adopt an index assumption:
F (plX) = F(p Pr {LIX}) (1.10)
where we assume F (p~q) is continuous in q. This assumes that the distribution of private infor-
64 In Appendix 1.B.2.2, we provide Monte Carlo evidence that our estimation of the distribution of private infor-
mation, F (p), is reasonably robust to relaxing normality by introducing skewness and kurtosis.6 5This allows elicitations to be biased, conditional on X; but we maintain the assumption that true beliefs are
unbiased.
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mation is the same for two segments, X and X', that have the same observable loss probability,
Pr {LJX} = Pr {LIX'}. We will refer to q as an index. This assumption provides empirical
tractability while still allowing the shape of F to vary with observables. Also, recall we conduct es-
timation separately for the rejectees and non-rejectees, so that we only impose the index assumption
conditional on rejection classification.
We approximate F (p~q) for q Pr {LIX} using mixtures of beta distributions,
F (p~q) = Emi??Beta (i (q) , 0i)
where ri is the weight on each beta distribution, pi (q) is the mean of the ith beta distribution
at q, and Oi is the shape parameter of the ith beta distribution.6 6 We allow the shape parameter
to vary for each beta distribution and we allow the mean of each beta distribution to vary as a
linear function of q, [i (q) = p+Pi q. Consistent beliefs (Assumption 1.4.1) imposes the restriction
Eir/ipi (q) = q which provide constraints on {I, p}, reducing the number of estimated parameters.
Beta distributions are quite flexible and well-suited for approximating arbitrary distributions.
In practice, they fit our data quite well with a small mixture; we use two beta distributions for
our preferred results in all settings except the no reject sample for LTC where we include an
additional term to capture a point-mass at q.67 All of our results are robust to including a 3rd beta
distribution.
Bootstrap delivers consistent standard errors provided the true distribution, F (plq), is contin-
uous. This assumption is violated in the event of no private information (in which case F (p~q) =
1 {p < q} for all p, q). However, the Wald tests for the presence of private information (constructed
using our lower bound approach) provide a simple test of this event. 68
6 6 The p.d.f. of a beta distribution with parameters a and 3 is given by
beta (x; a , ) = B 2)
B(a,f3
The mean of a beta distribution with parameters a and # is given by p and the shape parameter is given by
+,a±3.
67 Although the beta distributions can theoretically approximate uninformed (point-mass) distributions quite well,
convergence is slow in practice. We speed up our estimation for the no reject sample for LTC by mixing a truncated
normal distribution which converts to a point mass distribution for a variance below 0.000025. This allows the
estimation to more easily capture uninformed distributions. Including this point mass term in the other samples does
not affect our results.
68 Notice that F (pq) =1 {p < q} for all p and q if and only if Pr {LIX, Z} = Pr {LIX} for all X, so that our Wald
test for the latter equality (from our lower bound approach) continues to provide a valid test for the presence of private
information in our semiparametric approach. One could also construct a test for no private information for various
sets of q values, however this suffers problems of limited power (and potential multiple testing issues)., so we choose
to focus on one aggregate test for the presence of private information in each rejection classification. In principle,
imposing our restrictions on fzIp (ZIP) could produce a more powerful test for the presence of private information.
However, such a test faces technical hurdles since it involves testing whether F (plq) lies along a boundary of the set
of possible distributions and must account for sample clustering (which makes a likelihood ratio test inappropriate).
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1.7.1.3 Pooled Price Ratio (and its Minimum)
In principle, we can construct an estimate of the minimum pooled price ratio for any value of X;
given our index assumption, this amounts to constructing the pooled price ratio for various values of
the index q. We will often focus on results for the mean loss conditional on rejection classification,
q = Pr {L IX E 8]}, as these estimates are based on the most in-sample information. But, we also
present results for the 20th, 50th, and 80th percentiles of the distribution of q within each sample.
This allows us to assess the minimum pooled price ratio varies with observables, X, within each
sample.
As described in Section 1.4.2, we estimate the analogue to the minimum pooled price ratio,
infpey T (p) for , = [0, F-1 (T)]. Our preferred choice for T is 0.8, as this ensures at least 20%
of the sample (conditional on q) is used to estimate E [PIP > p] and produces estimates that are
quite robust to changes in the number of approximating beta distributions. For robustness, we also
present results for T= 0.7 and T = 0.9 along with plots of the pooled price ratio for all p below
the estimated 90th quantile, F-1 (0.9). We construct 5/95% confidence intervals for inf,i T (p)
by combining bootstrapped confidence intervals and extending the 5% boundary to 1 in the event
that we cannot reject a null hypothesis of no private information.
1.7.2 Estimation Results
1.7.2.1 Graphs of the Distribution of Private Information
Qualitatively, no trade requires the existence of a "thick upper tail" of high risks who prevent the
provision of insurance to lesser risks. We now assess this prediction. Figure 1-4(a-f) and Figure
1-5(a-f) present the estimated p.d.f.s and c.d.f.s of private information F (p~q). Figure 1-4 plots the
distribution for the index equal to the mean loss in each sample, q = Pr {LIX E O}, and Figure 1-5
plots the distribution for values of the index at the 20th, 50th, and 80th quantiles of the distribution
of q in each sample. In all three market settings and across a wide range of values of the index, q,
in each sample, we find evidence of a pronounced upper tail of risk for the rejectees. In contrast,
we do not find such a significant upper tail for the non-rejectees. Broadly, these thicker upper tails
for rejectees are consistent with the qualitative prediction of the theory that private information
leads to rejections.
1.7.2.2 Minimum Pooled Price Ratio
We now turn to our quantitative estimates of the minimum pooled price ratio. Table 1.7 presents
the estimates of the minimum pooled price ratio evaluated at several values of the index, q: the
sample mean (q = Pr {LIX c O}), the 20th, 50th, and 80th quantiles of the distribution of q within
each sample. We let T = 0.8 and assess robustness to this choice in Table 1.8, discussed below.
Andrews (2001) provides a potential method for constructing an appropriate test, but we leave this for future work.
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Figure 1-4: PDF of Private Information
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Figure 1-5: CDF of Private Information
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Table 1.7: Minimum Pooled Price Ratio
LTC Disability Life
Quantile of Index, q Mean 20% 50% 80% Mean 20% 50% 80% Mean 20% 50% 80%
Reject 1.715 1.681 1.711 1.730 1.954 1.900 1.937 2.282 1.727 1.642 1.751 2.269
5% 1.538 1.525 1.523 1.602 1.890 1.851 1.878 2.259 1.500 1.483 1.582 1.987
95% 1.784 1.837 1.777 1.768 2.076 2.025 2.043 2.315 2.241 2.286 2.330 2.415
Pr{Llreject} 0.175 0.094 0.157 0.244 0.441 0.293 0.430 0.578 0.572 0.351 0.589 0.791
No Reject 1.128 1.269 1.161 1.096 1.611 1.703 1.626 1.572 1.361 1.640 1.406 1.345
5% 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.243 1.256 1.248 1.250 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
95% 1.227 1.793 1.453 1.251 2.346 3.017 2.442 2.274 1.397 1.768 1.444 1.487
Pr{L|No Reject} 0.039 0.017 0.030 0.057 0.156 0.109 0.146 0.197 0.273 0.073 0.194 0.458
Difference (Reject - No Reject) 0.586 0.412 0.550 0.634 0.343 0.198 0.312 0.710 0.366 0.002 0.345 0.923
5% 0.406 0.212 0.150 0.437 -1.181 -1.938 -1.439 -0.016 0.116 -0.246 0.146 0.681
95% 0.657 0.575 0.637 0.673 0.695 0.639 0.684 1.032 0.950 0.444 1.013 1.254
Note: 5/95% Cl computed using bootstrap block re-sampling at the household level (N=250
Bootstrap Cl is bias corrected using the non-accelerated procedure in Efron (1982).
Reps); 5% level extended to include 1 if p-value of F-test for presence of private information is less than .05;
Table 1.8: Minimum Pooled Price Ratio (Robustness to T)
LTC Disability Life
Quantile Region: W, 0-70% 0-80% 0-90% 0-70% 0-80% 0-90% 0-70% 0-80% 0-90%
Reject 1.715 1.715 1.715 2.350 1.954 1.727 1.865 1.727 1.572
5% 1.538 1.538 1.627 2.216 1.890 1.682 1.626 1.500 1.415
95% 1.784 1.784 1.782 2.549 2.076 1.817 2.577 2.241 2.110
No Reject 1.128 1.128 1.128 1.611 1.611 1.611 1.444 1.361 1.281
5% 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.272 1.243 1.247 1.000 1.000 1.000
95% 1.227 1.227 1.227 2.346 2.346 2.089 1.457 1.397 1.286
Difference 0.586 0.586 0.586 0.739 0.343 0.117 0.421 0.366 0.291
5% 0.406 0.406 0.485 -0.252 -1.181 -0.582 0.170 0.116 0.115
95% 0.657 0.657 0.661 1.085 0.695 0.443 1.134 0.950 0.817
Note: 5195% Cl computed using bootstrap block re-sampling at the household level (N=250 Reps); 5% level extended to include 1 if p-value of F-
test for presence of private information is less than .05; Bootstrap Cl is bias corrected using the non-accelerated procedure in Efron (1982).
Q1
LTC For the rejectees, the pooled price ratio reaches a minimum of 1.715 (5/95% CI of [1.575,1.7791)
at the mean value of the index, q = 0.175, as reported in Table 1.7. This implies private informa-
tion imposes an implicit tax of 71.5%. The estimates are similar for rejectees with other values of
the index, q, ranging from 1.681 to 1.730. Together, the results are consistent with Corollary 1.2
provided the rejectees are unwilling to pay a 70% tax for insurance.
For those served by the market, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no private information,
F (p~q) = 1 {p < q} Vq. We estimate a minimum pooled price ratio of 1.206 (5/95% CI of [1.00-
1.484]) at the mean value of the index q (q = 0.175); estimates range from 1.337 to 1.147 as we
vary the index between the 20th and 80th percentile of its distribution (q = 0.017 to q = 0.057).
Our point estimates are consistent with the presence of trade as long as non-rejectees are willing
to pay a 14-34% implicit tax. Finally, the bottom rows of Table 1.7 report the estimated difference
between the pooled price ratio for the rejectees relative to the non-rejectees, suggesting we can
reject a null hypothesis of smaller minimum pooled price ratios for the rejectees relative to the
non-rejectees. 69
In sum, our results are consistent with the theory that private information causes rejections
as long as rejectees are unwilling to pay implicit taxes of 68-72% and non-rejectees are willing
to pay implicit taxes of 10-27%.70 To assess whether this is plausible, we perform two analyses.
First, Table 1.9 presents calibrated values of u(w)- 1 for values of the coefficient of relative risk
aversion (henceforth CRRA) of 1, 2 or 3, and the size of the uninsured drop in consumption of
10%, 15%, and 20%.71 For example, if CRRA is 2 and the nursing home entry is equivalent to a
drop in consumption of 15%, then agents are would be willing to pay a 38.4% tax on insurance,
rationalizing the observed pattern of trade. Second, the calibrated model of Brown and Finkelstein
(2008) suggests individuals are willing to pay roughly a 27-62% markup for existing LTC insurance
policies, which easily rationalizes our observed pattern of rejections. 72
Disability For the rejectees, we estimate a minimum pooled price ratio of 1.954 (5/95% CI of
[1.884,2.032]) at the mean index (q - 0.441), which implies a tax rate equivalence of 95.4%. The
estimates are similar at the 20th and 50th quantile of q (1.900 and 1.937), and higher at the 80th
69 These comparisons are conditional on a given value of the percentile of q; although not reported, results are
similar for other comparisons (e.g. 80th percentile of q for the rejectees compared to the 20th percentile of q for the
non-rejectees).
7 0Note that our inability to reject a tax rate of 0% at the 5% level suggests our results are consistent with the
presence of trade for any loss size or risk aversion parameter.
7 1These calculations are of course highly stylized since we do not estimate the CRRA nor do we take a stand on
the consumption impact on the losses we study-indeed, the factors determining willingness-to-pay in these settings
may be quite complicated. We only provide these numbers to aid in interpreting the magnitude of the results.
7 2These numbers are not provided directly in Brown and Finkelstein (2008), but can be inferred from Figure 1
and Table 2. Figure 1 suggests the break-even point for insurance purchase is at the 60-70th percentile of the wealth
distribution. Table 2 shows this corresponds to individuals being willing to pay a tax of 27-62%). Of course, these
estimates are only approximations to ") , since they consider the willingness-to-pay for a given (non-marginal)
LTC policy, not the willingness-to-pay for an E-sized transfer which would yield an estimate of " .
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Table 1.9: Willingness to Pay Calibration
Coeff. Rel. Risk Aversion
Consumption drop 1 2 3
10% 11.1% 23.5% 37.2%
15% 17.6% 38.4% 62.8%
20% 25.0% 56.3% 95.3%
quantile (2.282) of the index. The results are consistent with Corollary 1.2 provided the rejectees
are unwilling to pay a 90-130% tax for insurance.
For the non-rejectees, we estimate a minimum pooled price ratio of 1.611 (5/95% CI of [1.272,2.391]),
implying that the barrier to trade faced by a person with an average observable loss probability
among the rejectees is equivalent to a 61% tax on insurance premiums. This ranges from 1.703
to 1.572 as we vary the index q from its 20th to 80th quantile of its distribution (q = 0.109 to
q = 0.197). This suggests individuals must be willing to pay a 55-70% tax on insurance premiums
in order to facilitate trade in this market. Finally, the estimated differences between the rejectees
and non-rejectees are all positive, yet statistically insignificantly different from zero, arguably a
result of the imprecise estimation for the non-rejectees.
In sum, our results are consistent with the theory that private information leads to rejections as
long as rejectees are unwilling to pay a 90-130% tax for disability insurance and non-rejectees are
willing to pay a 55-70% tax. The implied willingness to pay for insurance of 70-90% is consistent
with Bound et al. (2004), which calibrates the marginal willingness to pay for an additional unit
of disability to be roughly 46-109%.73 The observed pattern of rejections can also be rationalized
if disability yields a loss size of roughly 15-20% of consumption and agents have a coefficient of
relative risk aversion of 3.
Life For the rejectees, we estimate a minimum pooled price ratio of 1.727 (5/95% CI of [1.527,2.1931)
at the mean index, q = 0.572, indicating a tax rate equivalence of 72.7%. The estimates for other
values of the index range from 1.642 at the 20th quantile of q (q = 0.572) to 2.269 at the 80th
quantile of q (q = 0.791). The results are consistent with Corollary 1.2 as long as the rejectees are
unwilling to pay a 65-130% tax for insurance. 74
7 3 See column 6 of Table 1.2. The range results from differing samples. The lowest estimate is 46% for workers
with no high school diploma and 109% for workers with a college degree. The sample age range of 45-61 is roughly
similar to the age range used in our analysis.
7 4 The mapping to a willingness to pay in terms of CRRA preferences and a consumption drop is a bit more
abstract and perhaps less useful in our life insurance setting; but if death is equivalent to a 15% consumption drop
and CRR.A is 3, then individuals would be willing to pay a 62.8% tax, insufficient to sustain trade and consistent
with Corollary 1.2.
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For those served by the market, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no private information,
as in LTC. We estimate a minimum pooled price ratio of 1.361 (5/95% CI of [1.00,1.4211), which
implies a tax rate of 36.1% for a rejectee with an average observable loss probability. Our estimates
for other values of the index, q, range from 1.640 at the 20th quantile (q = 0.273) to 1.345 at the
80th quantile (q = 0.458). Although some of these point estimates are large, we cannot reject the
null hypothesis of a zero tax rate faced by the non-rejectees. The estimated differences between
the rejectees and non-rejectees are generally significant at the 5% level, aside from the comparisons
involving the point estimate of 1.640 for the 20th percentile of the index for the non-rejectees.
Choice of T Table 1.8 presents results for r = 0.7, 0.8, 0.9 in each sample using the mean
index value, q, in each sample.. Also, Figure 1-6(a-f) plots the estimated pooled price ratios, T (p),
for values of p less than the estimated 90th quantile of the distribution of private information at
varying values of the index, q, in each sample.
For LTC, the minimum of the pooled price ratio occurs at an interior point of the distribution,
both for the rejectees and non-rejectees. Thus, our results are not sensitive to the choice of T (in
the range where T < 0.9) For disability, the minimum of the pooled price ratio occurs at an interior
point for the non-rejectees, but is on the boundary for the rejectees, so the minimum pooled price
ratio for the rejectees drops as we increase 7, as reported in Table 1.8 and shown in Figure 1-6b.
Although the estimates for the rejectees fall to 1.727 for r = 0.9 and rise to 2.350 for T =0.7, they
remain quite large across these choices of r. For life, the minimum of the pooled price ratio lies
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at the boundary for both the rejectees and non-rejectees. For the rejectees, the minimum pooled
price ratio falls from 1.727 to 1.572 at r = 0.9 and rises to 1.865 at T = 0.7. For the non-rejectees,
our estimates rise to 1.444 at r = 0.7 and fall to 1.281 at T = 0.9. As indicated by the bottom
rows of Table 1.8, we can still reject the null hypothesis of a lower minimum pooled price ratio for
rejectees relative to non-rejectees at each value of T.
In short, the values of the minimum pooled price ratio and the comparisons between rejectees
and non-rejectees are quite robust to the choice of T.
1.7.2.3 Results for Elicitation Error Distribution
Table 1.10 presents our estimated results for the elicitation error distribution. In general, we
find considerable support for the maintained hypothesis that subjective probabilities are noisy and
potentially biased measures of agents beliefs. Estimates of the standard deviation of the elicitation
error are primarily around 0.3-0.4, with the exception of an estimate of 0.1 for the non-rejectees in
disability. Also, we estimate a sizable fraction of focal point respondents in each sample (35-50%).75
1.7.2.4 Annuities
Finally, we consider one additional test of our theory that private information leads to insurance
rejections. There are no rejections in annuity markets. At first glance, it may seem odd that we find
evidence of private information about mortality that, we argue, leads to rejections in life insurance.
Yet annuities, which provide a fixed income stream regardless of one's length of life, insure the
same (yet opposing) risk of living too long.
Our estimated distribution of private information about mortality reveals that, although some
agents know that they have a relatively higher than average mortality risk, few agents know that
they have an exceptionally lower than average mortality risk. As shown in Figure 1-4c, there are
relatively few people, rejected or otherwise, with probabilities below the large mass around 0.15-0.2.
Repeating our estimation of the pooled price ratio for 1 - P (probability of living 10-15 years),
Table 1.11 reports a minimum of 1.177 for the life non-rejectees sample (for r = 0.8 and mean index
q), which occurs around 0.2 and is insignificantly different from a zero tax of 1.0. Because there are
few people with rejection conditions that have significantly lower probabilities of dying, providing
an annuity to the large mass of relatively healthy people does not require preventing the sick from
being able to purchase it. By reversing the direction of the incentive constraints, rejections no
longer occur.
75 We do find significant evidence of bias, a (X), which varies with X. The mean bias by sample is given by the
difference of the first two rows of Table 1.3. Also, as shown in Table 1.10, we estimate focal windows around 0.2 in
LTC (both rejectees and non-rejectees) and the non-rejectees in Life. This suggests focal responses of 0 correspond to
non-focal response ranges of [0, 0.2], responses of 50 correspond to non-focal responses of [0.2, 0.8] and responses of 1
correspond to non-focal responses of [0.8, 1]. For rejectees in life and for both rejectees and non-rejectees in disability,
we find estimates of the focal window close to zero. Estimates of a focal window of 0 have the simple interpretation
that the focal point responders report 50% regardless of their private information.
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Table 1.10: Elicitation Error Parameters
LTC Disability Life
No Reject Reject No Reject Reject No Reject Reject
Standard Deviation 0.287 0.320 0.305 0.100 0.384 0.427
s.e. (0.035) (0.011) (0.031) (0.006) (0.016) (0.012)
Fraction Focal Respondents 0.372 0.496 0.343 0.508 0.386 0.392
s.e. (0.055) (0.017) (0.023) (0.011) (0.015) (0.014)
Focal Window 0.179 0.238 0.002 0.193 0.033 0.031
s.e. (0.024) (0.018) (0.028) (0.007) (0.028) (0.011)
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors computed using block re-sampling at the household level (results shown for N=250 repetitions)
Table 1.11: Minimum Pooled Price Ratio (Annuities)
Annuities
Quantile Region: W 0-70% 0-80% 0-90%
No Reject 1.2227 1.1770 1.1523
5% r 1.0000 r 1.0000 r 1.0000
95% 1.4045 1.2651 1.2651
Reject 1.405 1.334 1.268
5% r 1.248 r 1.221 r 1.227
95% 1.736 1.720 1.720
Note: 5/95% Cl computed using bootstrap block re-sampling at the household
level (N=250 Reps); 5% level extended to include 1 if p-value of F-test for
presence of private information is less than .05; Bootstrap Cl is bias corrected
using the non-accelerated procedure in Efron (1982)
1.8 Conclusion
This paper finds evidence consistent with the hypothesis that private information leads insurance
companies to choose to not sell insurance to a subset of the population. We provide a new "no-
trade" theorem which shows why insurance companies may choose to not offer insurance at any
price acceptable to anyone in the market. We use the model to develop metrics to measure the
barrier to trade imposed by private information. And, we develop a new empirical methodology
to study private information which allows us to test whether a) those who would be rejected have
larger barriers to trade imposed by private information and b) whether this barrier, measured as
an implicit tax rate on insurance premiums, is sufficiently large to explain an absence of trade.
We apply our approach to three markets: long-term care, disability, and life insurance, each of
which have segments to whom insurance companies choose to not offer insurance. Across all of our
settings, we find evidence of more private information for the rejectees., and we find its magnitude
large enough to plausibly explain an absence of trade. In short, our results suggest that if insurance
companies were to offer any contract or set of contracts to those currently rejected, they would be
too adversely selected to yield a positive profit.
Our finding of no significant amounts private information for those who are served by the market
in LTC and life is consistent with previous literature finding no evidence of adverse selection in these
markets Finkelstein and McGarry (2006); Cawley and Philipson (1999)). But our results suggest a
new interpretation of the role of private information in insurance markets: its most salient impact
may not be the adverse selection of existing contracts, but rather the existence of the market itself.
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L.A Theory Appendix
1.A.1 Proof of No-Trade Theorem
We prove the no-trade theorem in several steps. First, we translate the problem to a maximization
problem in utility space. Second, we prove the converse of the theorem directly by constructing an
implementable allocation other than the endowment when Condition 1.1 does not hold. Third, we
prove the no trade theorem for a finite type distribution. Fourth, we show finite type distributions
can approximate solutions to arbitrary distributions, proving the no trade theorem for a general
type distribution.
Most of these steps are straightforward. In our opinion, the key theoretical contribution comes
in step 3 (Lemma (1.A.5)), where we show that Condition 1.1 implies that a separating allocation
cannot improve over a full pooling allocation. Indeed, the ability for insurance companies to offer
separating contracts is an important ingredient in previous models of this environment (Spence,
1979; Riley, 1979; Chade and Schlee, 2011).
1.A.1.1 Utility Space
First, we translate the problem to utility space. With this translation, the incentive and individual
rationality constraints are linear in utility. Let c (u) = U-1 (u) denote the inverse of the utility
function u (c), which is strictly increasing, continuously differentiable, and strictly convex. We
denote the endowment allocation by E {(CL (p) , CNL (P)) p = {(w - I, l)}p. Let us denote the
endowment allocation in utility space by EU {u (w - 1), u (w)}p. For allocations in utility space,
we normalize UNL (1) = U (w).
Given a utility allocation AU = {U(p) ,UNL (p) p , let us denote the slack in the resource
constraint by
H (AU) J [w - Pl - PC (UL (p)) -(1- p) CNL (p)] dF (p)
We begin with a useful lemma that allows us to characterize when the endowment is the only
implementable allocation.
Lemma 1.A.1 (Characterization). The endowment is the only implementable allocation if and
only if EU is the unique solution to the following constrained maximization program, P1
P1 max ( [w -pI -pc (uL (p)) -(1 -p)c (uNL (p))] dF (p)
{UL(p) ,UNL (p)p 
s.t. PUL (P) + (- P) NL (P) >PUL () + (1 - P) UL () VpCF
pUL (p)+(1 P)UNL (P) >pu (w - ) + (1 - p)u (7w) Vp CX
Proof. Note that the constraint set is linear and the objective function is strictly concave. The
first constraint is the incentive constraint in utility space. The second constraint is the individ-
ual rationality constraint in utility space. The linearity of the constraints combined with strict
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concavity of the objective function guarantees that the solutions are unique. Suppose that the en-
dowment is the only implementable allocation and suppose, for contradiction, that the solution to
the above program is not the endowment. Then, there exists an allocation AU = {UL (p) , UNL (p)}
such that f [w - pl - Pc (UL (P)) - (1 - p) c (UNL (p))] dF (p) > 0 which also satisfies the IC and IR
constraints. Therefore, AU is implementable, which yields a contradiction.
Conversely, suppose that there exists an implementable allocation B such that B $ E. Let BU
denote the associated utility allocations to the consumption allocations in B. Then, BU satisfies
the incentive and individual rationality constraints. Since the constraints are linear, we know that
the allocations CU (t) = tBU + (1 - t) EU lie in the constraint set. By strict concavity of the
objective function, II (CU (t)) > 0 for all t E (0, 1). Since II (EU) = 0, EU cannot be the solution
to the constrained maximization program.
The lemma allows us to focus our attention on solutions to P1, a simple concave maximization
program with linear constraints.
1.A.1.2 Converse
We begin the proof with the converse portion of the theorem: if the no-trade condition does not
hold, then there exists an implementable allocation A 7 E which does not utilize all resources and
provides a strict utility improvement to a positive measure of types.
Lemma 1.A.2 (Converse). Suppose Condition 1.1 does not hold so that there exists p \ f{1}
such that P U(W-1) > E[PJP:P. Then, there exists an allocation AU = {{iL (p) , iiNL (p))}P and
a positive measure of types, I C IV, such that
pe&A (P) + (1 - P) iNL (P) > pu (W -- 1) + (1 - A) U Mw VP C 4f
and J [W - pL - PC (n2L (p)) - (1 p) c ($]NL (p))] dF (p)
Proof. The proof follows by constructing an allocation which is preferable to all types p > P and
showing that the violation of Condition 1.1 at fi ensures its profitability. Given P E T, either P = f
occurs with positive probability, or any open set containing f has positive probability. In the case
that P occurs with positive probability, let i = {ufi}. In the latter case, note that the function
E [PIP > p] is locally continuous in p at P so that WLOG the no-trade condition does not hold for
a positive mass of types. WLOG, we assume i has been chosen so that there exists a positive mass
of types 4 such that p E 'P implies p > i. Then, for all p E kI, we have 1e C 'P such that
p U' (w - l) E [PIP > p]
1 -p '1(w) 1 - E [P|P > p]
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Now, for E, q > 0, consider the augmented allocation to types p E 4':
UL (E, 7) =u (w - l)+E+
UNL (E,71) = U (W)-- E
Note that if q = 0, e traces out the indifference curve of individual P. Construct the utility allocation
AU (E, 77) defined by
(w -l)+E+ ,U(w) - if p>(ut (P)! ,GNL (P)) = P)if >P
I (U (7w -) ,u (7)) if p < p
Note that for E > 0 and j > 0 the utility allocation (inL (p) , nNL (p)) is strictly preferred by all
types p 2 P relative to the endowment utility allocation. Therefore, Af is individually rational and
incentive compatible. We now only need to verify that there exists an allocation with E > 0 and
rj> 0 which does not exhaust resources. We have
UI (e, rj) J [w - p1 - PC (hL (P)) - (1 P) c (f1NL (p))] dF (p)
Notice that this is continuously differentiable in e and q. Differentiating with respect to E and
evaluating at E = 0 yields
leo [Pc' (u (w - l + )) + (1 p) C (U ) 1 {p > Pj} dF (p)
which is strictly positive if and only if
E [P|P > P] c' (u (w - I + 71)) < P (1 - E [P|P > P]) c' (u (w))1 - P
Notice that this is continuous in 7. So, at 7j 0, we have
>U pO3 u' (w - 1) E [P|P > P]
O1 - '(w) 1 - E [PIP > P]
and thus by continuity, the above condition holds for sufficiently small 7 > 0, proving the existence
of an allocation which both delivers strictly positive utility for a positive fraction of types and does
not exhaust all resources.
This shows that Condition 1.1 is necessary for the endowment to be the only implementable
allocation.
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1.A.1.3 Lemmas
Here, we prove two useful lemmas. First, we show that if Condition 1.1 holds, then the MRS is
bounded by the pooled price ratio in the relevant quadrant of allocations.
Lemma 1.A.3. Suppose Condition 1.1 holds. Then for all CL, cNL C [w - 1>11, we have
p u' (cL) E [P|P > p] Vp T\{I}
1 p u' (cNL) 1 - E [PIP > p]
and if CL,CNL G (w 1,), we have
p U' (cL) E [P|P > p]
1 p u' (cNL) 1- E [P\P > p|
Proof. Since u' (c) is decreasing in c, we have "(CL) < "(w 1) Therefore, the result follows
immediately from Condition 1.1. The strict inequality follows from strict concavity of u (c). 0
Lemma 1.A.4. In any solution to P1, we have CL (p) > w - I and CNL (p) 5 w-
Proof. Suppose A = {CL (p) , CNL (p)}p is a solution to P1. First, suppose that CL () < w - 1.
For this contract to be individually rational, we must have CNL (P) > w. Incentive compatibility
requires CL (p) 5 CL (p) < w - I Vp < f and CNL (p) > CNL (p) > w Vp < pi. Consider the new
allocation A {CL (p) , CNL (p)} defined by
CL(p) if p>P
cL(p){
wlifp~j3
CNL(p) if p>f
cNL (P) =
w if p<3
Then A is implementable (IC holds because of single crossing of the utility function). It only
remains to show that II (A) < I (A). But this follows trivially. Notice that the IR constraint and
concavity of the utility function requires that points (CL (p) , cNL (p)) lie above the zero profit line
p (w - 1 - CL) + (1 - p) (w - CNL). Thus, each point (CL (p) , CNL (p)) must earn negative profits at
each p < P.
Now, suppose CNL (P) > w. Then, the incentive compatibility constraint requires CNL (p) >
w Vp < pi. Construct A as above, yielding the same contradiction. D
We now prove the theorem in two steps. First, we prove the result for a finite type distribution.
We then pass to the limit to cover the case of arbitrary distributions.
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1.A.1.4 Finite Types
To begin, suppose that = {p1i, ...PN}. We first show that condition 1.1 implies that the solution
to P1 is a pooling allocation which provides the same allocation to all types.
Lemma 1.A.5. Suppose 'I= {pi...,pN} and that condition 1.1 holds (note that this requires
PN = 1). Then, the solution to P1 is a full pooling allocation: there exists UL, UNL such that
(uL (p) , uNL (p) (iiL , NL) for all p E T\ (0 , UL (1) = EL, UNL (0) = INL-
Proof. Let AU ={i (p) ,UNL (p)}P denote the solution to P and suppose for contradiction that
the solution to P is not a full pooling allocation. Let p = min {pu* (p) = u* (1)}, let P_=
max {plu,* (p) f u* (1)}. The assumption that I is finite implies that > P. Let us define the
pooling sets J = {pIu* (p) = u* (1)} and K = {plu* (p) =u (_ )}. We will show that a profitable
deviation exists which pools groups J and K into the same allocation. First, notice that if f = 1,
then clearly it is optimal to provide group J with the same amount of consumption in the event of
a loss as group K, since otherwise the IC constraint of the type p 1 type would be slack. So, we
need only consider the case P < 1.
Notice that if the IR constraint of any member of group J binds (i.e. if the IR constraint
for P binds), then their IC constraint implies that the only possible allocation for the lower risk
types p < P is the endowment. This standard result follows from single crossing of the utility
function. Therefore, we have two cases. Either all types P C J\J receive their endowment,
(CL, CNL) = (w - I, w), or the IR constraint cannot bind for any member of J. We consider these
two cases in turn.
Suppose u* (p) = u (w - 1) and u*VL (p) = u(w) for all types jc I\J. Clearly, we must then
have that the IR constraint must bind for type pi, since otherwise profitability could be improved by
lowering the utility provided to types p e TI\J. We now show that the profitability of the allocation
violates the no-trade condition. The profitability of AU is
II (AU) = j [W - pl - pC (UiI (W)) - (1 - p) C (u*NL (P))] dF (p)
Now, we construct the utility allocation AV by
(u(w -l)+t,u(w)- 4-t if p J
(U'L (P) , NL W 
f P
(u(?V l),u(w)) if p J
Since the IR constraint binds for type P, we know that there exists t such that AV = AU. By
Lemma 1.A.4, i > 0 and A satisfies IC and IR for any t c [0, i + g for some r > 0. Since profits
are maximized at t = and since the objective function is strictly concave, it must be the case that
dI (AYt 0
di _ =0
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= pJ
Re-arranging and combining these two equations, we have
S u' (c (u* ()))
1 -U' (c (u*L (p)))
p) c' (u*vL (p)) 1 dF (p)1 -p.
which, by strict concavity of u, implies
p , '(w 
-1)
1-p O'( )
E [P|P > P]
1- E[PIP> P]
which contradicts Condition 1.1.
Now, suppose that the IR constraint does not bind for any member of J. Then, clearly the IC
constraint for type P must bind, otherwise profit could be increased by lowering the utility provided
to members of J. So, construct the utility allocation BU to be
(U'L (P) , U'NL ) { ( if p > Pif Pp
so that Bj consists of allocations equivalent to AU except for p c J. By construction, BU, is IR
for any e. Moreover, because of single crossing and because types are separated (finite types), BU
continues to be IC and IR for E E (-c, g) for some q > 0 sufficiently small. Therefore, we must
have a I( =)e-O = 0, which implies
dUJ(Bj) 
=
de
1p) c' (uy P dF (p)C ~ 
-L (AIP.I
= Pr{pcJ} E [PIP
-p{ j}(1 - E [PIP > P])
u' (c (U* (M)))
> p] -(1 - E [PIP
- U' (c (U* (p)))[ E [PIP > P](1 - E [PIP > ])
> (]) ' ( 1
'( UyTL (13)))
' (c (u*L (p)))
U' (C (U*NL Pf 1# 3
which implies
U3 a'(c (U*()))
1 - p n' (c (u~ (1)))
E [PIP 2 P]
1 - E [PIP > i]
which, by strict concavity of u, implies
P u'(w )- 
1- p '(w)
E [P|P > P]
1 - E [PP > P]
which contradicts Condition 1.1. Therefore, if Condition 1.1 holds, the only possible solution to
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where
dTI (AU)
dt
E [PIP > ]
1 - E [PIP > P]
I
1 
- PI
()-E, U*NLW+I
(U* (P) , U*t (p))
[PC' (u* (p)) - (1
=p [PC' (U* (W) - (1 -
P1 is a full pooling allocation.
This lemma proves the vast majority of the proof for the finite support case. All that remains
to show is that a full pooling allocation cannot be a solution to P1.
Lemma 1.A.6. Suppose Condition 1.1 holds. Then, the only possible full-pooling solution to P1
is EU.
Proof. Suppose for contradiction that AU , EU is a full-pooling solution to P1. Let u*, u*L
denote the full pooling allocations AU. Recall p1 = min T is the lowest risk type. Note that the IR
constraint for the pi = min T type must bind in any solution to P1. Otherwise, profits could be
increased by providing all types with less consumption, without any consequences on the incentive
constraints of types p > pi. Consider the allocations CU defined by
(LUtNL)= +( - ) -- L) UVL -t - UNL))
so that when t = 1 these allocations correspond to AU and t = 0 corresponds to the endowment.
Because the IR constraint of the pi type must hold, we know that these allocations must follow the
iso-utility curve of the pi type which runs through the endowment. Differentiating with respect to
t and evaluating at t = 0 yields
dII (Ctu pi-dfC |t=0 = E [P|P > p1] c'(u (w - 1)) - (1 - E [PP p]) c'(u (w)) P1dt 1 -P1
where P- comes from the fact that we can parameterize the iso-utility curve of the pi type by1
-p1
UL - T, UNL + P1 T. But re-arranging the equation, we have
1I (C P11
d|(t)t= 0  -E [P|P > pi] + (1 - E [P|P > p]) Pi
dt U' (w - ) - ' (w) 1- p)
1 - E [P|P > p1 ] E [PIP > pi] +U (w -- P < 0
n' (W - L) 1- E[P|P p1] a' (w) 1-pi
which yields a contradiction of Condition 1.1 at p = p1.
Therefore, we have shown that if Q is finite, then if Condition 1.1 holds, the only possible
allocation is the endowment. It only remains to show that this property holds when T is not finite.
1.A.1.5 Arbitrary Distribution
If F (p) is continuous or mixed and satisfies the no-trade condition, we first show that F can be
approximated uniformly by a sequence F, of finite support distributions on [0, 1], each of which
satisfy the no-trade condition.
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Lemma 1.A.7. Let P be any random variable on [0,1] with c.d.f. F (p). Then, there exists a
sequence of random variables, PN, with c. d.f. FN (p), such that FN -> F uniformly and
E[PN PN>p]>E[P|P p] Vp,VN
Proof. Since F is increasing, it has at most a countable number of discontinuities on [0, 1]. Let
D = {i} denote the set of discontinuities and WLOG order these points so that lim'+±O F (6) -
lim E-o F (6j) is decreasing in i (so that 61 is the point of largest discontinuity). Then, the
distribution F is continuous on kI\D. For any N, let WN denote a partition of [0, 1] given by
2 N + min {N, DI} + 1 points equal to for j 0,. 2 N and {ili < N}. We write WN
2N~min{,|DI}+
{N}2  minNIDl+l . Now, define _PN :N -> [0, 1 by
P1j=1
PN (p) = F (max {pjIp p})
so that _PN converges to F uniformly as N -+ oc.
Unfortunately, we cannot be assured that FN satisfies the no-trade condition. But, we can
perform the following simple modification to FN to arrive at a distribution that does satisfy the
no-trade condition for all N. We first describe the modification in the abstract and then apply it to
our FN distribution. For any A G [0, 1] and for any random variable X distributed G (x) on [0, 1]
define the random variable XA to be the random variable with c.d.f. AG (x). In other words, with
probability A the variable is distributed according to X and with probability 1 - A the variable
takes on a value of 1 with certainty. Notice that E [XA XA > x] is continuously decreasing in A and
E [XolXo > x] = 1 Vx.
Now, given PN with associated random variable PN, we define Pj to be the random variable
with c.d.f. AFN (p). We now define a sequence {AN}N by
AN=max{A|E (PP p] > E [PP >p] Vp}
Note that for each N fixed, the set {AIE (PN > p] > E [PIP > p] Vp} is a compact subset
of [0, 1], so that the maximum exists. Given AN, we define our new approximating distribution,
FN (p), by
FN (p) = ANFN (P)
which satisfies the no-trade condition for all N. The only thing that remains to show is that AN -± 1
as N -* oo.
By definition of AN, for each N there exists fiN such that
E[ PfN| > N] = E [PIP PN
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Moreover, because AN is bounded, it has a convergent subsequence, AN, -> A*. Therefore,
E [Pqk q E [PA.|PA. > q]
uniformly (over q) as k -+ 0, where PA is the random variable with c.d.f. A*F (p). Moreover,
E [PNk JNk > -+ E [PA.|IPA. > q]
uniformly (over q) as k - 0. Therefore,
E PNkPk > pN -+ E [PIP _ pN
so that we must have A* = 1.
Therefore, the distribution pNk with c.d.f. FNk (p) = ANkFNk (p) for k > 1 has the property
E PNI PNk p] E [PP > p] Vp
and FNk (p) converges uniformly to F (p).
Now, returning to problem P1 for an arbitrary distribution F (p) which satisfies the no-trade
condition. Let H (AIF) denote the value of the objective function for allocation A under distri-
bution F. Suppose for contradiction that an allocation A = (iL (p) , fINL (p)) # (W - L, W) is
the solution to P1 under distribution F, so that H (AIF) > 0. Let FN (p) be a sequence of fi-
nite approximating distributions which satisfy the no-trade condition and converge uniformly to
F. Let WN {p denote the support of each approximating distribution. For any N, define
the augmented allocation AN L N L (p)) by choosing (aL (p) , fNL (p)) to be the most
preferred bundle from the set {UL ) UNL ( . Since A is incentive compatible, clearly we
will have (6 (p)~ ,L (P (L (p NL (pN)) By single crossing, for p f p7 agents
with p E 1, P7 7) will prefer either allocation for type p 1Y or pN
Clearly, AN converges uniformly to A. Since AN satisfies IC and IR by construction, the no-
trade condition implies that the allocation AN cannot be as profitable as the endowment, so that
we have
Hl(NIFN) UH(EIFN)=0 VN
By the Lebesgue dominated convergence theorem (H (AN IFN) is also bounded below by - (W + L)),
have
(A F) < 0
Which yields a contradiction that A was the optimal solution (which required H (AIF) > 0) and
concludes the proof.
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1.A.2 Informal Insurance
Consider the following modification to the standard model which allows agents' privately known
types to affect their demand for informal insurance, such as savings. Suppose agents live for two
periods. They are endowed with non-stochastic wealth w in both periods. In the second period,
they face a potential loss of size 1 which occurs with privately known probability p. There is no
discounting and agents can store resources in period 1 for use in period 2. Agents know p before
making a decision about how much to save in period 1. Utility is given by
u (ci (p)) + pu (CL (p)) + (1 - p) u (cNL (p))
where ci is consumption in period 1, CL (CNL) is consumption in period 2 in the event of (no) loss.
Insurance companies can offer menus contracts {r1 (p) , T2 (p) , b (p)} in which agents pay T1 in the
first period, T2 in the second period if they do not experience the loss, and receive benefits b if they
do not experience the loss in the second period. Contracts are offered in the first period prior to the
agents' saving decision. Thus, the constraints facing the agent after choosing a contract intended
for type p are given by
C1 -+S+T1 (p) < W
cL+b(p) < w+s
CNL+T2(p) < 'ws
No Insurance Suppose there are no insurance contracts. Then an agent of type p chooses s (p)
to maximize utility, so that s (p) is defined from the first order condition
u'(w-s (p)) pu' (w -l s (p)) (1 - p) u' (w + s (p))
where it is easy to verify that s (p) is increasing in p, s (1) = and s (0) = 0. Therefore, the ratio
u' (w - l + s (p))
'' (W + s (p))
is decreasing in p (and equals 1 when p = 1).
No-Trade Condition Consider an insurance company that attempts to provide insurance. The
most valuable infinitesimal transfer is to move consumption in the event of not experiencing the
loss in the second period to consumption in the event of experiencing the loss. The valuation of
this first unit of infinitesimal transfer is given by the MRS
p U'(w -I+s(p))
1-p u'(w+s(p))
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If no other insurance contract is offered, then any contract offered to type p would be preferred by
all types P > p. Thus, the cheapest cost of providing an infinitesimal transfer to which type p is
indifferent is given by _JP1  .. Provided the economy remains well-behaved (which needs proof,
but should be true), the no trade condition is
p u'(w-l+s(p)) E [PIP ;> p]
i-p u'(w +s(p)) 1-E[P\P>p]
or
< T (p) Vp < 1 (1.11)
u'(w~s(p)) ~
In contrast to Corollary 1.2, demand for an infinitesimal amount of insurance (given by u(w l+s(P)))u' (w-+s(p))
is now a function of type, p. The ability to save distorts the demand for insurance differently for
high versus low risk types. Savings, which transfers resources to all states of the world in the second
period, is a better substitute for insurance for people who have a high probability of experiencing
the loss. For people with a low probability of a loss, savings more often transfers resources to the
no-loss state of the world in the second period, which has relatively low marginal utility.
Empirical Tests Robust to Endogenous Savings Equation (1.11) motivates testing a com-
parative static in the pooled price ratio, T (p), at each p, as opposed to testing a comparative
static in the minimum pooled price ratio. These tests are shown in Figures 1-6(a-f), which plot the
pooled price ratio, T (p), at each p for the rejectees and non-rejectees. Figure 1-6(a-c) focuses on
the pooled price ratio at the mean index, q, in each sample, and Figure 1-6(d-f) report results for
the 20th, 50th and 80th quantile of the index, q, in each sample. We truncate the graphs at the
90th quantile of the distribution of P to avoid extremal value issues discussed in Section 1.4.2.
Consistent with the hypothesis that private information leads to rejections, we generally find
larger values of T (p) for the rejectees at each value of p and for most values of the index, q.
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1.B Empirical Methodology Appendix
1.B.1 Properties of the Lower Bound Estimator
This section further examines properties of the nonparametric lower bound approach. To derive
these properties of E [mz (Pz)], we first show P is a mean-preserving spread of Pz. We have
E[P|X,Z] = E[Pr{L|X,P}|X,Z]
= E[Pr{LIX,Z,P}|X,Z]
Pr{LIX,Z}
=Pz
where the first equality follows from assumption 1, the second equality follows from assumption 2,
the third equality follows from the law of iterated expectations (averaging over realizations of P
given X and Z), and the fourth equality is simply the definition of Pz.
We now define the quantiles of P and Pz which will help describe how E [mz (Pz)] relates to
E [m (P)]. Let Qp (a) to be the a-quantile of P,
Qp (a) = inf {ql Pr{P < q} > a}q
and Qa (Pz) to be the a-quantile of our analogue,
Qpz (a) = inf {ql Pr {Pz < q} > a}q
Given these two quantiles, let e (a) denote the difference between them,
e (a) = Qp (a) - QPz (a) (1.12)
This function parameterizes the effect of the "noise" in Z. If e (a) > 0 (< 0), then the a-quantile
of Pz falls below (above) the true a-quantile of the distribution of private information, P. On
average, the effect of the noise is zero, f e (a) da = 0, since P is a mean-preserving spread of Pz.
We now have defined the required variables to characterize the properties of E [mnz (Pz)]. Where
applicable, we let the integers 1 and 2 denote two market segments (e.g. X = x1 and X = X2).
Subscripted 1 and 2 will denote each segment (e.g. P1 and P2 denote the distributions of private
information in segments 1 and 2).
Proposition. The following conditions hold
1. (Characterization of E [m (P)] and E [mz (Pz)]) E [m (P)] and E [mz (Pz)] can be written
as
[m (P)] j (Q p (a) - Pr {L}) log (Ia)da
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and
E [nz (Pz)] = (QPz (Pz) - Pr {L}) log 1 - ) da
2. (No private information) If P is a constant, then E [m (P)] = E [mz (Pz)] = 0
3. (Lower bound - Re-statement of Proposition 2) E [mz (Pz)] < E [mz (Pz)] so that E [mz (Pz)]
is a lower bound for E [,m (P)]
4. (Comparisons across segments) E [mi (P1 )] - E [in 2 (P 2 )] = E [mz,1 (Pz,1 )] - E [nZ,2 (Pz,2)] +
f [ei (a) - e-2 (a)] log (1 e) da
5. (Relation to inf, T (p)) inf, T (p) < 1+ E[m(P) ,with equalityP P E[P(1 -P)] -E[m(P)] Pr{ L}-E[(P-PrL})m(P)])
if T (p) is equal to a constant for all p
The first condition shows that E [m (P)] and E [mz (Pz)] are weighted averages of the quantiles,
Qp (a) - Pr {L} and Q, (Pz) - Pr {L}. The term log ( ) weights upper quantiles (near z = 1)
more heavily than lower quantiles and implies that E [m (P)] and E [mz (Pz)] are positive. This
weighting has an intuitive meaning: high risks (high values of P) are included in the calculation
for the magnitude of private information for more of the population. Therefore, the probabilities
for the high risks are weighted more heavily in E [m (P)]. In this sense, E [m (P)] is a measure of
the thickness of the upper tail of P.
The second condition shows that testing E [mz (Pz)] = 0 provides a test for the existence of
private information in a given segment. The third condition states that E [mz (Pz)] is a lower
bound for E [m (P)], which is a re-statement of Proposition 2 (but for which we will now provide
the proof). The fourth condition shows that one can infer comparisons of E [m (P)] across market
segments using E [mz (Pz)] provided the error, f [ei (a) - e2 (a)] log (1 1.) da is small. In Section
1.B.1.3 we use this result to provide an example which illustrates when inference using E [nz (Pz)]
is valid for inference about E [m (P)].
The fifth condition relates E [m (P)] to the quantity that characterizes the barrier to trade,
inf, T (p). Using a Holder inequality, this condition shows that E [M (P)] is monotonically related
to an upper bound on inf, T (p). Notice that the RHS of the expression in the fifth condition is
increasing in both E [m (P)] and Pr {L}, provided E [P (1 - P)], and E [(P - Pr {L}) M (P)] remain
roughly constant. Thus, smaller values of E [m (P)] lead to smaller upper bounds on the minimum
pooled price ratio. But also, smaller values of the mean risk, Pr {L}, lead to smaller upper bounds
on the minimum pooled price ratio. Thus, since rejectees have larger values of Pr {L}, it could
very well be the case that this lower bound is smaller for non-rejectees even if E [m (P)] is larger
for non-rejectees. In this sense, our lower bound test is a potentially overly restrictive test of the
implications of the theory. Since we nonetheless find larger values of E [m (P)] for rejectees, we do
not discuss this potential bias in detail in the text; it only renders our empirical findings to be even
greater support for the theory that private information leads to rejections.
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1.B.1.1 Proof of Proposition
For part (1), let Qp (a) denote the a-quantile of P. _P denote an independent copy of P. We can
write E [m (P)] by integrating across the quantiles of P,
E [m (P)] = E, [Ep [PIP > Qp (a)]]
so that we have the expansion
E [m(P)]
-I:
-Il
-SI
J> a
SIQp(
- fl
[Ea [Qp (d) Qp (a)| I a]] da
1 a [>a [Qp (') Qp (a) dd] da
Qp (a)d&da 
- E [P]
f)j 1 adad& - E [P]
[Qp (a)
where f0l log (1) da = 1.
Parts (2) follows from the fact that P is a mean preserving spread of Pz
Part (3) can be seen as follows. Because P is a mean-preserving spread of Pz, we know that
iPz (a) da < Qp (a) da VX [ 0,1]
Now, using part (1), we can write
E [m (P)] - E [mz (Pz)] [Qp (a) - Qpz (a)] log 1 a
j[QP (a) -
[QP (a
I , l [Qp (a
([Qp
0
QPz (a)] dda
~) - (a)] dada() -QPz (a)] dad
(a) -Qpz (a)] cia) 1 d
where the last inequality follows from the fact that f [Qp (a) - Qpz (a)] da > 0 for all a because
P is a mean-preserving spread of Pz.
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E [P]] log 1 a
Part (4) follows from part (1) and the definition of e (a).
Part (5) can be seen as follows. Let T (p) be given by
T ) - p+m(p) i-p
1- p- m(p) p
which can be re-written as
1
m (p) t p = p (1 - p) pm (p)
where t (p) = T (p) - 1. Taking expectations, we have
E tPmP)=E [P (1 - P)] - E [(P - E [P]) mn(P)] - M * E [P]
where M = E [m (P)] is the magnitude of private information. Now using Holder's inequality (p 1,
q oo),
E m (P)] < (sup -)E [m (P)]
So that
E[P(1-P)]-E[(P- E[P])m(P)]- M*E[P] s ts(P) JE [m(P)
so that
inf t (p) < E[m(P)]
p E [P (1 - P)] - E [(P - E [P])m(P)] - E [m(P)]* E [P]
and thus
inf T (p) < 1 + E [mr (P)]
P E [P (1 - P)] - E [(P - E [P])rm(P)] - E [m(P)] * E [P]
Equality when T is constant follows from the fact that the holder inequality would hold with
equality (We do not claim there exists a distribution for which T (p) is constant; we only state
the fact that equality would hold if T is constant result to give a sense of the extent to which the
inequality is potentially violated).
1.B.1.2 "Tight" lower bound
Here, we show that the lower bound is "tight" in the sense that there exists a joint distribution of
L, P, and Z satisfying assumptions 1 and 2 such that P = Pz. This follows relatively trivially.
For any elicitation Z, assume that P = Pr {LIX, Z}. Then let e = Z - Pr {LIX, Z}. Then agents'
report Z = P + e but have beliefs given by Pr {L X, Z}.
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1.B.1.3 Measurement Error Example
When do differences in our lower bounds E [mz (Pz)] imply differences in the actual average mag-
nitude of private information, E [m (P)]? Here, we consider a stylized form of elicitation error
which leads to conditions under which our lower bounds are valid for inferring comparisons for the
true values. Intuitively, as long as there is not substantial differential measurement error between
rejectees and non-rejectees, such inferences are valid.
Suppose that with probability A agents report their true beliefs, Z = P, but with probability
1 - A they report a value Z which is independent of their true beliefs (i.e. random noise). It is
straightforward to show that this implies
E [mz (Pz)] = AE [m (P)]
so that our lower bounds are a fraction A of the true value. In this case, a finding of Az >
0 implies A = E [m (P) ix c 9Reject] - E [m (P) x c eNoReject] > 0 as long as ANoReject >
AReject. Moreover, the event that our lower bounds would be misleading (i.e. Az > 0 and A < 0)
requires AReject > mz(Pz)IxeeReject > 1. Thus, the difference in the measurement errorANReject E[MZ (Pz)IX Ee oReject]
must be larger to overturn inference using lower bounds if we estimate much larger values of
E [mz (Pz) X c ()Reect] relative to E [mz (Pz) x c EReject]
1.B.2 Semiparametric Identification
In this section, we discuss identification of the distribution of private information, fp, and the
distribution of elicitation error parameters, 0. For simplicity, we condition on X = x and drop
notation with respect to X.
Our approach assumes the econometrician observes data on Z and L. We make the following
assumptions:
" L is a binary random variable (realizations in {0, 1}, indicating the event of experiencing a
loss
" The joint density of Z and L is observed and given by the p.d.f./p.m.f. fL,Z (1, z) with
conditional distributions fLIZ, fZ|L, and marginal distribution fZ E Dz. for some domain
Dz We assume Z is continuously distributed over [0, 1].
" The variable P is unobserved and continuously distributed with density fp (p) C De for
some domain Dp, where we denote the true value by f (p). We assume D, is closed under
multiplication by p, so that fp (p) C D, implies pfp (p) c Dp.
Recall we have made several assumptions. First, we have assumed agents have correct beliefs and
that Z contains no additional information about L than do agents' true beliefs, P, which together
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imply
Pr{LIZ,P} = Pr{L|P} = P
and second, we have assumed that Z is distributed with p.d.f. fzlp (z|P; 0) where 0 C E is an
unknown parameter from a known set E. We denote the true 0 by Q*. Given these assumptions,
the density of L and Z can be expressed as
1fL,Z ( L, Z ) = fL,Z~P ( L, Z|P = p) fp (p) dp
- j (Pr {LIZ, P = p})L (1 - Pr {LIZ, P = p})1-L fZJP (ZiP = p; 0*) fo (p) dp
PL ( _ P)1-L fZ|P (ZP = p; *)f* (P) dp
With this expression for the observed density, our goal is to "invert" the above functional
equation to identify both 0* and f (p). This problem is made difficult because the functional
equation is nonlinear in 0 and fp.
For any 0 c E, define the operator Ho Dp -+ Dz mapping densities over the space of P into
densities over the space of Z by
[Ho (fp)] (z) j fp (p) fZp (zlp; 0) dp
and let Z (PlO) denote the random variable distributed with p.d.f./p.m.f fzjp (zIP; 0). Given 0, H
is linear in fp. Therefore, we can impose standard invertibility conditions on fzIp.
Ho. is injective at the true 0 = 0* so that Ho. (fi) = Ho. (f2) -- > fl = f2
Injectivitity of Ho. assumes that if 0* is known, then the distribution fp is identified from the
density fz. This is a mostly standard assumption in linear nonparametric identification (Newey
and Powell, 2003 Newey and Powell (2003); Hu and Schennach, 2008 Hu and Schennach (2008)).
Given this assumption, define the generalized inverse correspondence, H- 1 , to map fZ to the
set of functions fp satisfying Ho (fp) = fZ.
H- 1 (fz) = argmin|I|fz (z) - J fzlp (Z|P = p; 0) fp (p) dpI
where the argmin is taken with respect to densities fp E Dp. Our assumption of injectivity implies
that Ho-1 (fz) is unique if fz lies in the range of H and, in particular, is unique at the true value
of 0 = 0*. H- 1 maps p.d.f.s in the Z space to a set of p.d.f.s in the P space. We also define the
corresponding functions, No and 4 1 which operate on random variables, so that fto (P) maps the
random variable with p.d.f. fp to the random variable with p.d.f. Ho (fp).
Now, assumptions 1 and 2 imply that we can write the joint distribution of P and L in two
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ways by conditioning on L = 1,
fPJL (plL =1)Pr{L = 1} = fP,L (pA 1)
= Pr {L = 1|P = p} fp (p)
= pfP (p)
Since P has realizations on [0, 1], it has a moment generating function, so that we can write the
above expression in moment form,
E [PNIL = 1] Pr {L} = E [pN+1] VN > 0 (1.13)
which provides a simple relationship between the moments of P given L = 1 and the uncondi-
tional distribution of P. Equation 1.13 provides an infinite set of moment conditions which aid in
identification of 0 and fp.
At 0 = 0*, we have
E[Hf- (Z)) IL -- 1 Pr {L = 1} = E (H- (Z)) VN > 0 (1.14)
The model is identified if and only if 0* is the only such 0 to generate this equality for all N > 0.
Note that once we have 0*, we have f* = H- (fz).
Because 0 is finite-dimensional, the model is generally over-identified. Intuitively, equation 1.14
for N = 0 provides identification of the mean of the elicitation error
Pr {L} = E [Nft1 (Z)]
and the equation for N = 1 provides identification of the dispersion in the elicitation error,
E [(--l (Z)) IL = 1] Pr {L = 1} = E[(H (Z))]
so that, intuitively, the RHS of the equation varies with the dispersion in the error, holding the
mean of the error constant. We recognize that this intuition is fairly abstract because it relies on
properties of the operator Hi , which is a difficult object to know a priori. We proceed on two
fronts. First, we provide a formal proof that a close analogue to our specification in Section 1.7 for
which the inverse operator has well-known properties and is identified using only equations N = 0
and N = 1 of equation 1.14 (so that the moments N > 1 provide a theoretical over-identification
test). Second, since our specification in Section 1.7 does not have such a well-known inverse
operator, we provide Monte Carlo tests of our specification. This allows us not only to confirm
identification, but also assess the robustness of our results to various possible mis-specifications of
the true elicitation error distribution, f (ZIP).
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1.B.2.1 Identification without censoring
Here, we consider an analogue to our model in which non-focal elicitations are not censored on
[0, 1]. For this specification, the nonlinear inverse problem has well-known properties and Q* and
f* are identified only the observed density, fz and equation 1.14 for N = 0 and N = 1, leaving
equations N > 1 as over-identifying conditions.
In particular, suppose Z is distributed (1 - A) N (P + a. C 2) + AOP (P + a, a2, K), where
OP (P + a, a2, ,) is an ordered probit with variance U2, latent mean P + a, and cutoff regions
[0, K], (K, 1 - r,), and [1 - K, 1] corresponding to values Z = 0, 0.5, 1. Note that our specification in
Section 1.7 is similar but assumes non-focal values follow a censored normal, CN (P + a, o.2), as
opposed to a normal, N (P + a, U2 ), which captures the elicitations lie in [0, 1].
We show identification as follows. First, since Z is continuously distributed for non-focal values,
responses of Z = 0., 0, 5, 1 occur (with probability 1) as draws from the ordered probit, not the
normal distribution. Moreover, because values of Z = 0, 0.5, 1 drawn from N (P + a, 02) occur
with probability zero, we can consider identification of a and o from the observed density of non-
focal values of Z, which is drawn from N (P + a, o.2). Thus, we now consider this simpler elicitation
error distribution and return to the identification of A and K after discussing identification of a and
09.
Let HQ, (fp) map the p.d.f. of a random variable P, fp, to the p.d.f. of the random variable
Z = P + e (a, ( 2 ) where e = N (a, o 2 ) is independent of P. Thus, Z is a mean preserving spread
of P + a, with o indexing the degree of the "spread". Moreover, because the elicitation error, e, is
normally distributed, the inverse operator, Hj,, maps a p.d.f. of the random variables Z to the
p.d.f. of the random variable P (Z; a, u) with the shift in mean a and whose variance is strictly
decreasing in o.
Recall that at the true values, 0* = (a*, u*), we have the equations
E [(P (Z; a*,uo*)) IL = 1 Pr {L 1} = E [ (P (Z; a*, -*)) VN > 0
So, for N = 0, we have the equation
Pr{L=1} = E[6(Z;a*, *)]
E[Z]-a*
so that a* = E [Z] - Pr {L = 1}. Intuitively, the mean bias is identified as the difference between
the average elicitation, E [Z], and the realized probability of a loss, Pr {L = 1}.
For N = 1, we have the equation
E (Z; a*,.*)) IL = 11 Pr {L = 1} = E (Z; a*, *)
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Figure 1-7: Monte Carlo Simulations
(a) Correct Specification (b) Skewed Specification (c) Excess Kurtosis Specification
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Now, notice that the LHS does not vary with o. Moreover, the RHS is monotonically decreasing
in o, since or1 < o2 implies that P (Z; a, Oi) is a mean preserving spread of P (Z; a, o-2 ). Thus, the
equation for N = 1 identifies u*.
Now that we have identified a and o-, we return to our original distribution with focal point
responses. First, notice that A is identified using the fraction of responses Z which are equal to 0,
0.5, or 1. Then, K is identified by the relative frequency of Z = 0, Z = 0.5, and Z = 1 using the
already identified values of a and o.
This example with uncensored non-focal point values is identical to our specification in Section
1.7, except that we use a censored normal, as opposed to normal distribution, to take into account
the fact that elicitations are restricted to the interval, [0,1]. The impact of such censoring on the
quality of our estimation is difficult to assess theoretically; we thus turn to Monte Carlo evidence
to verify the performance of our estimation strategy.
1.B.2.2 Monte Carlo Results
This section presents Monte Carlo analysis of our estimator for the distribution of private infor-
mation. First, we verify that our approach works well under correct model specification for the
elicitation error parameters. Second, we assess the impact of mis-specification of the distribution of
elicitation error. Throughout this section, we assume that F (p) is a censored normal distribution
with mean 0.3 and standard deviation 0.1. Our first simulation assumes Z is follows our specifica-
tion. With probability 0.6, Z is drawn from a censored normal distribution with mean P + 0.03
and standard deviation 0.2. With probability 0.4, Z is a focal point value of 0, 0.5, or 1, drawn
from an ordered probit distribution with mean P + 0.03, standard deviation 0.2, and cutoff regions
[0, 0.3], (0.3, 0.7), [0.7, 1]. In Figure 1-7a, we present the true c.d.f. of private information, along
with the median, 5%, and 95% estimates from N = 100 Monte Carlo simulations (of a sample
size of 2,000) where we estimate the distribution using a mixture of 2 beta distributions, as in our
empirical analysis above. As the figures show, our estimation approach yields unbiased estimates.
Now we consider the impact of mis-specification of the elicitation error. To do so, we assume
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that the latent Z is drawn from a mixture of two normals, allowing us to incorporate skewness and
kurtosis in the distribution. First, we assume with probability 0.4. the latent Z is drawn from a
normal with mean P + 0.03 and standard deviation 0.2 (as before). But with probability 0.6, the
latent Z is drawn from a normal with mean P - 0.05 and standard deviation 0.4. Focal values
(again we assume 40% focal values) are then generated from this latent Z with the same cutoff
regions, [0, 0.3] ,(0.3, 0.7) ,[0.7, 1], and non-focal values are generated as the censored portion of this
distribution on [0, 1]. The Monte Carlo results are presented in Figure 1-7b. As we can see, our
estimation perhaps introduces a slight median bias towards a less dispersed distribution of private
information, but performs quite well given this substantial mis-specification.
Finally, we assess the robustness to excess kurtosis in the distribution of Z. We assume Z is again
drawn from a mixture of normals, but this time assume these normals have the same mean of 0.03.
With probability 0.5, the standard deviation is 0.2 and with probability 0.5 the standard deviation
is 0.05. We assume 40% focal responses with the same cutoffs regions of [0, 0.3]. (0.3,0.7) , [0.7,1].
Figure 1-7c presents the Monte Carlo results. As we can see, our estimation performs quite well
(better than the skewed estimation) despite the mis-specification. In short, our estimation proce-
dure appears robust to alternative specifications for f (ZIP) which relax normality by including
skewness and kurtosis.
i.C Rejections Appendix: Selected Pages from Genworth Financial Underwriting
Guidelines
The following 4 pages contain a selection from Genworth Financial's LTC underwriting guideline
which is provided to insurance agents for use in screening applicants. Although marked "Not for use
with consumers or to be distributed to the public", these guidelines are commonly left in the public
domain on the websites of insurance brokers. The printed version here was found in public circu-
lation at http://www.nyltcb.com/brokers/pdfs/GenworthUnderwriting_ Guide.pdf on November
4, 2011. We present 4 pages of the 152 pages of the guidelines. The conditions documented below
are not exhaustive for the list of conditions which lead to rejection - they constitute the set of
conditions which solely lead to rejection (independent of other health conditions); combinations of
other conditions may also lead to rejections and the details for these are provided in the remaining
pages not shown here.
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INTRODUCTION
Underwriting is the process by which an applicant's current health, medical history
and lifestyle are evaluated to determine a risk profile. The underwriter's decision to
accept or decline an applicant is determined by matching the profile to guidelines,
which outline the limits of acceptable risk to the company.
We underwrite applicants in the age range 18-79. We do not modify the coverage
applied for, nor do we apply extra premiums. We make every attempt to issue the
desired coverage at the corresponding published premium.
The information in this manual reflects over 30 years of experience.. .the longest in
the Long Term Care insurance industry. While not all-inclusive, enough information is
presented to help you in most situations you will encounter. A hotline number is
included should you have questions or run into an unusual circumstance.
An appeal process is also outlined in the event you disagree with our underwriting
evaluation. We are always willing to have a second look, especially when additional
information not included in the original application file is made available.
We value our relationship with you and look forward to providing high quality service
and underwriting for you and your clients.
i
UNINSURABLE CONDITIONS
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)
ADL limitation, present
AIDS Related Complex (ARC)
Alzheimer's Disease
Amputation due to disease, e.g., diabetes or atherosclerosis
Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (ALS) , Lou Gehrig's Disease
Ascites present
Ataxia, Cerebellar
Autonomic Insufficiency (Shy-Drager Syndrome)
Autonomic Neuropathy (excluding impotence)
Behget's Disease
Binswanger's Disease
Bladder incontinence requiring assistance
Blindness due to disease or with ADL/IADL limitations
Bowel incontinence requiring assistance
Buerger's Disease (thromboangiitis obliterans)
Cerebral Vascular Accident (CVA)
Chorea
Chronic Memory Loss
Cognitive Testing, failed
Cystic Fibrosis
Dementia
Diabetes treated with insulin
Dialysis, Kidney (Renal)
Ehlers-Danlos Syndrome
Forgetfulness (frequent or persistent)
Gangrene due to diabetes or peripheral vascular disease
Hemiplegia
Hoyer Lift
Huntington's or other forms of Chorea
Immune Deficiency Syndrome
Korsakoff's Psychosis
Leukemia-except for Chronic Lymphocytic Leukemia (CLL) and Hairy Cell Leukemia (HCL)
Marfan's Syndrome
Medications
Antabuse (disulfiram)
Aricept (donepezil HCI)
Campral (acamprosate calcium)
Cognex (tacrine)
Depade (naltrexone)
Exelon (rivastigmine)
Hydergine (ergoloid mesylate)
Namenda (memantine)
Razadyne (galantamine hydrobromide)
Reminyl (galantamine hydrobromide)
ReVia (naltrexone)
Vivitrol (naltrexone)
Memory Loss, chronic
Mesothelioma
Multiple Sclerosis (MS)
vi
Muscular Dystrophy (MD)
Myelofibrosis
Organ Transplants, except kidney transplants
Organic Brain Syndrome (OBS)
Oxygen use except if used for headaches or sleep apnea
Paralysis/Paraplegia
Parkinson's Disease
Pneumocystis Pneumonia
Polyarteritis Nodosa
Postero-Lateral Sclerosis
Quad Cane use
Quadriplegia
Senility
Spinal Cord Injury with ADL/IADL limitations
Stroke (CVA)
Surgery scheduled or anticipated (except cataract surgery under local anesthesia)
Takayasu's Arteritis
Thalassemia Major
Total Parenteral Nutrition (TPN) for regular or supplementary feeding or
administration of medication
Waldenstrom's Macroglobulinemia
Walker use
Wegener's Granulomatosis
Wernicke-Korsakoff Syndrome
Wheelchair use
Wilson's Disease
vii
Chapter 2
Private Information and
Unemployment Insurance
2.1 Introduction
Why is there not a thriving private market for unemployment insurance (UI) in the US? The onset
of unemployment leads to drops in consumption and significant welfare losses (Gruber (1997),
Browning and Crossley (2001), Chetty (2008)). The government provides some unemployment
benefits, but recent literature suggests individuals would prefer to purchase additional insurance
(Chetty (2008)). So why isn't there a private UI market just like there exists other insurance
markets, such as private health, disability, and life insurance?'
This paper argues that private information about future unemployment incidence prevents the
existence of a market for private unemployment insurance. We make two related claims. First, we
argue that private information prevents the existence of a market for additional insurance beyond
what is currently provided by the government. Second, under additional assumptions we provide
evidence that private information would prevent the existence of a private market even if the
government stopped providing benefits.
We develop and test these hypotheses using a model of unemployment risk with two key features:
people may have private information about their future unemployment incidence and people may
suffer a moral hazard problem, so that insurance can increase their likelihood of unemployment. We
characterize when companies would be willing to sell insurance in this environment. We show that
a private market cannot exist unless someone is willing to pay the pooled cost of those with higher
probabilities of unemployment in order to obtain a small amount of insurance. This pooled cost is
derived from the distribution of probabilities that result from the agents' choices when faced with
their endowment (which may incorporate existing sources of informal or government insurance).
'There are no regulations preventing the sale of private UI. Over the years, many companies have tried to sell
private unemployment insurance, but all have failed. Currently, IncomeAssure is the latest company and only to
attempt it, starting sales in mid-2011.
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When this no-trade condition holds, an insurance company cannot profitably sell unemployment
insurance at any price because it would be too heavily adversely selected to deliver a positive profit.
We then test whether this no-trade condition can explain why there does not exist a private
unemployment insurance market in the US for additional insurance, beyond what is provided
through the government. We derive an empirical test of the no trade condition that depends
on the distribution of beliefs about future unemployment incidence and estimates of the markup
individuals are willing to pay for a small amount of additional unemployment insurance. We
identify private information and the distribution of beliefs using subjective probability elicitations
about future unemployment incidence, following an approach developed in Hendren (2011). We
then show existing estimates from the literature on optimal UI (e.g. Gruber (1997), Chetty (2008))
provide estimates of the markup individuals would be willing to pay for additional unemployment
insurance.
Our empirical results suggest private information prevents the existence of a private unemploy-
ment insurance market in the US. We first show that agents' subjective probability elicitations
are predictive of future unemployment spells, conditional on a rich set of demographic, health,
and employment characteristics. To the best of our knowledge, this provides the first empirical
evidence that private information would afflict a private unemployment insurance market. Second,
we quantify the distribution of beliefs about future unemployment incidence. We show that indi-
viduals must be willing to pay an or implicit tax in excess of 160% over actuarially fair premiums,
in order for a market to exist. We contrast this with existing estimates of this willingness to pay for
additional unemployment insurance. These estimates range from 30%-50% (Gruber (1997)) to 60%
(Chetty (2008)). Thus, we conclude that private information can explain the absence of a market
for additional unemployment insurance beyond what is currently provided by the government.
Finally, we address whether a private market would arise if the government were to remove or
reduce UI benefits. Here, we use estimates how government UI generosity affects the magnitude of
consumption drops upon unemployment, provided in Gruber (1997). Extrapolating to a world with
no government UI provision suggests the markup individuals would be willing to pay for private
UI would roughly double, reaching 50-90% depending on the coefficient of relative risk aversion.
Under a benchmark assumption that the implicit tax imposed by private information would not
change as a result of the reduction in government UI, the demand estimates continue to fall well
below estimates of the markup people would need to be willing to pay of at least 160%.2 Thus, our
estimates suggest that if the government stopped providing UI benefits, a private market would
not arise.
Our paper is related to several strands of literatures. There is a long literature in public
economics analyzing the "optimal" level of government-provided unemployment insurance (Baily
2 The impact of reducing benefits on the implicit tax imposed by private information is theoretically ambiguous;
an important direction for future work is to provide an empirical methodology to estimate how it varies with the
generosity of government insurance.
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(1976), Gruber (1997), Chetty (2008)). Yet there is no existing explanation for what market
failures, if any, provide a role for the government provision of UI in the first place. We show
private information about unemployment risk provides a wedge between the allocations that can
be implemented by a government (which has access to taxes and potentially mandates to mitigate
the selection problem) versus private markets which cannot force people to buy insurance. This
provides a potential rationale for government intervention in UI. 3
Our paper also relates to a large theoretical literature studying the impact of private informa-
tion on the workings of insurance markets. Our no trade result is similar to the notion of market
unraveling in Akerlof (1970), who shows that a market unravels when its demand curve lies every-
where below its average cost curve. Hendren (2011) extends this result to the case when insurers
can offer an endogenous menu of contracts and derives a no trade condition almost identical to
the one derived in this paper. The crucial difference is that, in this paper, we allow agents to
have a moral hazard problem. As a result, we show that moral hazard alone cannot shut down a
market. An insurance company could always design a (less than full insurance) contract that could
earn positive profits. The intuition is that the first dollar of insurance has first order benefit from
insurance but a second-order welfare loss from moral hazard (a result of the envelope theorem). In
contrast, privately known heterogeneity in unemployment probabilities can shut down a market,
even in the absence of any moral hazard problem. 4
Conceptually, our paper is closely related to that of Hendren (2011) which argues private infor-
mation can explain insurance rejections, the practice of insurance companies choosing to not sell
insurance to people with certain observable characteristics. That paper focuses on a comparative
static implication of the no trade condition of more private information for those who would be
rejected relative to those who can purchase insurance. In contrast, this paper tests the no-trade
condition directly by leveraging estimates of the willingness to pay from existing optimal UI lit-
erature. Therefore, while Hendren (2011) shows that private information shuts down segments of
three major insurance markets (LTC, Life, Disability), this paper shows private information shuts
down the entire market for unemployment insurance.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model and the
no-trade condition. Section 3 relates the no-trade condition to the existing literature on optimal
UI benefits and provides our key empirical tests. Section 4 discusses the data. Section 5 presents
evidence that agents have private information about their unemployment risk. Section 6 quan-
3 To be clear, our results suggest the absence of a private UI market is a constrained efficient outcome. But,
government intervention can be justified in many ways, such as utilitarian welfare maximization or ex-ante welfare
grounds (e.g. implementing the optimal insurance contract before agents' realize their types)
4 In this sense, our paper contrasts with Chiu and Kari (1998), which argues the "interaction of private information
regarding employees' preferences for work with the unobservable level of effort exerted on the job may explain the
absence of private unemployment insurance". Our model captures their two-type model as a special case and shows
that the role of moral hazard (i.e. unobservable effort exerted on the job) is actually not relevant for evaluating
the existence of a private unemployment insurance market. Instead, their no-trade result was entirely driven by an
assumption that the high risk type knew with certainty that she would become unemployed.
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tifies this magnitude and compares it to the estimates of the willingness to pay provided by the
existing literature on optimal UI benefits. Section 7 discusses government crowd-out and Section 8
concludes.
2.2 Theory
We consider a theoretical model of unemployment risk that captures both moral hazard (insurance
increases unemployment) and privately known heterogeneity (people differ in their chance of be-
coming unemployed). The key result, given in Theorem 2.1, characterizes when agents can obtain
any insurance beyond what is currently provided in their endowment through informal and formal
systems.
2.2.1 Setup
There exists a unit mass of agents who are currently employed. With probability p agents lose
their job and become unemployed and with probability 1 - p they remain employed. Agents choose
this probability by exerting (unobservable) effort, which incurs an additively separable utility cost
of T (1 - p; 6) which is increasing and convex in 1 - p for each 6. Agents are heterogenous in
their cost of remaining employed, captured by the parameter 0, distributed in the population
according to a c.d.f. F (OIX), where X is a set of observable characteristics that could be used by
insurance companies to price insurance contracts. Insurance companies cannot observe p or 0, but
know F (6|X) and all other aspects of the environment (utility function, effort function, etc.). For
simplicity in this theoretical section, we condition on a particular observable characteristic, X = x,
and let F (0) denote the c.d.f. for some particular observable characteristic, X = x. 5 We let e
denote the set of types, 6.
Unemployed agents have an endowment of c' units of consumption; employed agents have
an endowment of ce > c'. The endowment, (c', c'), incorporates existing formal and informal
sources of insurance, such as savings, government insurance, firm severance, and informal insurance
arrangements. Agents obtain utility v (ce) from consumption when employed and u (cu) when
unemployed.6 We assume v (c) and u (c) are twice continuously differentiable, with v', u' > 0 and
v", U" < 0. Although agents may have some sources of insurance, we assume ,( c) > 1, so that
they are not fully insured against the occurrence of unemployment.
Agents choose p to maximize expected utility:
U (ce, cu; 0) = max {1-p) v (ce) + pu (cu) - T (1 - p; 0)}
5 Note that this specification nests the possibility of no moral hazard by choosing T (p; 0) - {p < 0} for
sufficiently large y. This induces the distribution F (0) as the distribution of probabilities of remaining employed.
6 For now we allow for arbitrary complementarity between consumption and labor, but we will impose further
assumptions in the empirical implementation.
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We assume IF (p; 0) is convex in p so that the effort choice is unique and given by the first order
condition
V (ce) - U (cU) = '(1-p;O)
where 4' (1 - p; 0) denotes the first derivative of IV with respect to 1 - p. Intuitively, the marginal
cost of effort is equated to the benefit, given by the difference in utilities between employment and
unemployment. The assumption a2 a > 0 implies that agents of higher types 0 that face the
same consumption bundle will have a higher probability of being unemployed.
We define an allocation in this economy to be a set A = {cu (0) , ce (0) , p (0)}OEe of consumption
bundles and probabilities of unemployment for each type 0.
2.2.2 Implementable Allocations
We seek conditions under which an insurer or market of insurers, which observes X but not p,
can provide agents the opportunity to consume a bundle other than this endowment. To ask this
question, we consider the set of implementable allocations.
Definition 2.1. An allocation A = {cu (0), c, (0) ,p (O)}oce is implementable if
1. A is resource feasible:
[p (0) c's + (1 - p (0)) c' - p (0) cu (0) - (1 - p (0)) ce (0)] dF (0) > 0
2. A is incentive compatible:
U (Ce (0) , c (0);0) > U (ce () ,cU (6) ;0) VO, e E)
V' (1 - p (0);0) =V (ce (0)) - U (CU (0)) V6 E (9
3. A is individually rational:
U(ce (0) , cU (0) ; 0) > U (c, c; 0) VcG E)
Implementable allocations must not use more resources than are available in the economy and
must satisfy the incentive and participation constraints imposed by private information. There are
two incentive constraints. The first constraint requires agents choose their prescribed consumption
bundle relative to other bundles. The second requires that the probability of unemployment, p (0),
is consistent with agents' effort incentives. 7
It is easy to verify that most models of market behavior (e.g. competition and monopoly) lead
to allocations that must be implementable. We therefore ask under what conditions there exists
7 Note this allows agents who misreport their type to also deviate to their desired choice of p
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implementable allocations that differ from the endowment. By doing so, we provide a no-trade
result that is not dependent on any choice of market structure.
2.2.3 Concavity Assumption
Before turning to the no trade result, we make an additional assumption to ensure that the moral
hazard problem (i.e. choice of p) does not induce non-convexities which could cause our local varia-
tional analysis to be insufficient. To express this assumption, we need to introduce some additional
notation. Let A denote the difference in utilities between being employed and unemployed, so that
lower values of A correspond to greater amounts of insurance. Define P (A; 0) to be the induced
probability of unemployment for type 0, which solves
XF'(1 - P(A; 0);0) = A
It is straightforward to show that pi is decreasing in the size of the incentives to work, A. Now,
define the cost functions,
C" (x) = 
-(x)
C(x) v (x)
C,. (x) measures the amount of consumption required to provide x units of utility when unemployed;
similarly, C0 (x) measures the amount of consumption required to provide x units of utility when
employed.
Now, let 7r (A, p; 0) denote the profit obtained from type 0 if she is provided with total utility
p and difference in utilities A,
w(A, P; 0) (1-p(A; 0)) (c - C (p - (1 - (A; 0))))+p (A; ) (c - CU (p - A - X (1 -(A; 0))))
To guarantee the validity of our variational analysis for characterizing when the endowment is the
only implementable allocation, it will be sufficient to require that 7F (A, p; 0) is concave in (A, p).
7r (A, p; 0) is concave in (A, p) for each 0
This assumption requires the marginal profitability of insurance to decline in the amount of
insurance provided. If the agents choice of p is given exogenously (i.e. does not vary with A),
then concavity of the utility functions, u and v, imply concavity of 7F (A, p; 0). However, allowing
agents to choose p has the potential to create regions in which the marginal profitability of insurance
actually increases in the amount of insurance. Yet, these non-concavities are ruled out by reasonable
parameter restrictions. For example, in Appendix 2.A.2 we show profits are globally concave for
any utility function and effort function satisfying '" > 0 and "Q < 2.8
V8niaT "
8 Thc assumption < 2 holds in our empirical application. The assumption T..." > 0 holds if the probability
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2.2.4 No Trade Condition
Let Pe be the random variable denoting the probabilities of unemployment that occur when agents
consume their endowment
P, (0) =f(V (ce) - u (cu') ; 0)
where the random variable is generated from the realizations of 0 drawn with c.d.f. F (6). Let Ie
denote the support of Pe.
Now, consider an insurance company that tries to sell an insurance contract that provides a
dollar to type 0 in the event she becomes unemployed. Let p = P (v (ce) - u (c')) denote the prob-
ability of unemployment for type 6 if she consumers her endowment. If she prefers this insurance
contract relative to her endowment, then the incentive constraints imply that all of the higher risk
types will also prefer this insurance contract relative to their endowment. Therefore, the average
probability of those selecting this small insurance contract will be given by E [pe 'p > p]. The no
trade theorem says that unless someone in the economy is willing to pay the average cost of risks
worse than them in order to obtain some insurance, there can be no trade.
Theorem 2.1. The endowment, {(ce , c)}eEe, is the only implementable allocation if and only if
p u' (cu) E [P,|Pe > p]
1 - p v' (ce) - 1 - E [Pe|Pe > p]
where F\ {1} denotes the support of pe excluding the point p = 1.
Conversely, if (2.1) does not hold, then there exists an implementable allocation which strictly
satisfies resource feasibility and individual rationality for a positive mass of types.
The LHS of condition (2.1) captures the willingness to pay for a small additional transfer of
consumption from the employed to unemployed state given the existing state of insurance (e.g.
informal and government insurance) leading to c' and c'. The RHS is the cost of providing this
transfer if the pool of worse risks are also attracted to the insurance contract. Unless someone
is willing to pay this pooled cost, there can be no trade. Any contract or menu of contracts
offered by an insurance company would be so heavily adversely selected that they would not deliver
positive profits at any price. This provides a theoretical explanation for the absence of a private
unemployment insurance market: Equation (2.1) holds for all observable characteristics, X.
Moral Hazard versus Private Information Although private information about ones' proba-
bility of becoming unemployed can shut down the market for insurance, moral hazard alone cannot.
In the absence of unobserved heterogeneity, P' is a degenerate distribution equal to a mass point
at Pe = p for some p. Therefore, the no trade condition reduces to !) < 1. Therefore, as long
of employment, 1 - P (A), is concave in the size of the agents' incentives, A.
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as agents have some insurance value, u' (ct) > v' (ce), moral hazard alone cannot shut down the
market. 9
Moral Hazard and the Fiscal Externality If the consumption endowment, (ce, c-), is the
result of other insurance arrangements, such as government UI, then a provision of additional in-
surance by a private insurer imposes an externality on the government by increasing the probability
that the insured will become unemployed and file a claim. As long as the private market insurer is
not required to compensate the government for the moral hazard impact of their claims, equation
(2.1) continues to characterize when a private market can exist. If a third-party insurer must com-
pensate the original provider of insurance, then the no trade condition becomes more restrictive;
condition (2.1) remains sufficient, but not necessary, to ensure no trade.10
2.2.5 Government Insurance and Crowd-out
If the government reduced or eliminated UI benefits, would a private market arise? We model
government benefits as affecting the agents' endowments and incentives to work. Let the endowment
now be given by (ce (g) , ce (g)) where g represents the generosity of government UI benefits. We
assume ce < 0 and c' > 0 so that higher values of g lead to lower consumption when employed
but higher consumption when unemployed. Now, let pg (g; 0) denote the unemployment probability
under government benefit levels g, which solves
and let P (g) denote the random variable induced from P (g; 0) by taking realizations of 0 from
the c.d.f. F (0). In other words, P (g) is the distribution of unemployment probabilities if the
government provides benefits g and all agents consume their endowment, (c. (g) , ce (g)).
Corollary 2.1. Suppose the government provides benefits, g. Then, the endowment {c, (g) , ce (g))}e
is the only implementable allocation if and only if
p u' (ce (g)) E [P (g)|P (g) > p](U < Vp E r (g) \ 1}
-p v' (ce (g)) 1 - E [P (g)|P (g) > p]
where F (g) \{1} denotes the support of P (g) excluding the point p - 1.
Corollary 2.1 characterizes when a private market cannot arise as a function of the government
benefit level, g. Smaller government benefits raise the value of external insurance by raising *'(<.g))
9 The intuition of this result is similar to that of the standard result in distortionary taxation. The first dollar of
insurance has a second-order welfare loss but a first-order welfare benefit resulting from the differences in marginal
utilities between being employed and unemployed.
'OIt is quite uncommon for the government to collect such externality payments from insurers in other contexts.
Moreover, private insurers which have attempted to sell private UI have not been required to make externality
compensation payments to the government.
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However, they can also change the distribution of unemployment occurrences in the population,
P (g). Clearly, our assumption that 0" > 0 implies that greater unemployment benefits lead
to higher unemployment probabilities, on average. However, the impact of government benefits on
the shape of the distribution of unemployment risks, and the value of E [P (g) P (g) 2 p], is an
important area for future work.
For the bulk of the paper, we focus on explaining the absence of a private UI market conditional
on the existing government benefits; but we return to the issue of government crowd-out in Section
2.7
2.3 Empirical Strategy
This section empirically operationalizes the no trade condition (2.1). Multiplying by L yields
(Ce) < Te(p) VP Fe\{1}
v' (ci)-
where Te (p) is the pooled price ratio, given by
T ' (p) E[PeP > p] 1 - p
1 - E [Pe|Pe > p] p
T' (p) is price ratio imposed on type p if she must pay the average cost of all types pe > p in
order to obtain a transfer from the employed to unemployed state. Note that it is a function of the
distribution of unemployment probabilities evaluated at the endowment, Pe. Taking the infimuni,
the no-trade condition is given by
U' (ce)(2)
' < inf T (p) (2.2)
v' (cs) ~ pe\{1}
The value of ,Qc is a measure of the willingness to pay for insurance evaluated at the endowment.
In particula, (Ce,)-1
In particular, Lc - 1 captures the markup individuals are willing to pay for a small transfer
from the event of being employed to the event of being unemployed. The RHS of equation (2.2)
is the measure of the barrier to trade imposed by private information, also evaluated using the
existing probabilities of employment, Pe. In particular, infPCP\{111 T (p) - 1 is the smallest markup,
or implicit tax, individuals must be willing to pay for insurance in order for the market to exist.
To estimate infPETVi1 T (p), we obtain an estimate of the distribution of probabilities of em-
ployment. For this we use subjective probability elicitations about whether someone will become
unemployed in the subsequent year (i.e. a response to the question: "what's the chance you're
going to lose your job in the next year?"). Following Hendren (2011), at no point do we assume
agents report their true beliefs in survey elicitations; rather we allow these elicitations to be noisy
and potentially biased measures of true beliefs. We first provide a simple test for the presence of
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private information and then, using additional assumptions, quantify infpEp\{1 T (p). We provide
more specific implementation details in Sections 4 and 5.
To obtain the willingness to pay for insurance, , (Ce) in equation (2.2), we use two existingin eqain e oeit
sources from the literature on optimal government provided unemployment benefits, which we
discuss here.
WTP #1: Consumption Smoothing By assuming state-independent utility (u = v), we can
follow Baily (1976) by writing the willingness to pay for insurance as a function of the coefficient
of relative risk aversion and the percentage consumption drop upon unemployment:
U' (c) - u' (c ) U" (c*) e
~Ce (C-c)u' (ce) U'(cg) 
-
c u" (c*) c 
-
u'(ce) ce
Ac
c-
where is the percentage consumption drop upon the event of becoming unemployed and o- isCe
the coefficient of relative risk aversion. 1 Gruber (1997) provides estimates of - and how it variesC
with the replacement rate of government UI benefits.
Given the willingness to pay approximation, the no trade condition can be expressed as
Ac
(7-- < inf Te p (2.3)Ci pCFe\{1}
which, given estimates of au , operationalizes a test of equation (2.2).
WTP #2: Ratio of Search Elasticities Chetty (2008) considers a search model conditional
on being unemployed and derives a representation of ,e using ratios of unemployment duration
elasticities. The benefit of this approach is that we do not need to assume state independent utility
or a coefficient of relative risk aversion. The downside of this approach is that the duration model
with homogeneous agents used by Chetty (2008) does not neatly fit into the environment used to
provide the no-trade condition above. Nonetheless we present here the intuition for how the ratio
of the liquidity to moral hazard elasticities recovers the ratio of marginal utilities.
To begin, we assume unemployed agents choose the probability of becoming re-employed, s,
with a separable effort cost, o (s). Agents choose s to maximize
SU (ca) + (1- ) U (c") - 0' (S)
"Note that N is the percentage consumption drop given the observed system of government benefits which
generate c' and c'; thus it is identifiable with data on the incidence of unemployment and consumption.
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where c' and c' are the consumptions that the agent would receive in the event of becoming re-
employed and remaining unemployed, respectively. Assuming c' ~ c' and c' ~ c' , the first order
condition for s solves
o-' (S) = U (ce) - U (c')
so that the marginal disutility of effort equals the difference in utility levels between being employed
and unemployed.
We now analyze how the effort decision varies with the wage and with asset levels. First, consider
a small increase in the wage, 7w, which increases consumption in the event of being employed, but
has no effect on the event of being employed. Taking the derivative, we have
as 
_ a'(c")
9W o-" (s)
so that higher wages lead to an increase in search effort in a manner that trades off the utility
gain against the search effort costs. In contrast, a small increase in the agents assets upon entering
unemployment also provide marginal utility during unemployment, so that
9s U' (ce) -' (c,)
OA o-" (s)
As long as the marginal utility of consumption is larger when unemployed, this implies 2 < 0.
Combining these two equations, we have
u' (ce) - a' (ce) 
_ -a
U' (ce)
Given this representation, we can re-write the no-trade condition as
< inf T (p) - 1 (2.4)
as
which, given estimates of *., provided in Chetty (2008), operationalizes a test of condition (2.2).
One caveat to this representation is that we have not modeled the search effort decision of the
unemployed in the model in Section 2.1.12 Future work could better integrate this search model
with the setup and no-trade condition.
12 In particular, once people become unemployed in this model, they are all homogeneous and one would potentially
expect an insurance market to exist to provide insurance against unemployment duration. Of course, heterogeneity
in ones' knowledge of unemployment duration could endogenously prevent the existence of the market. But, this
yields a multi-dimensional screening problem (heterogeneity in probability of unemployment and duration); we leave
the no trade condition in this setting for future work.
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Summary of approach Our empirical approach is to use subjective probability elicitations about
future unemployment spells to estimate infpEl\{1} T (p). We then compare this to the estimates of
the willingness to pay for insurance: the consumption drop estimates from Gruber (1997) and the
ratio of elasticities from Chetty (2008).
Because we use estimates of the willingness to pay for insurance and the distribution of unem-
ployment probabilities under the existing regimes of government benefits and informal insurance
arrangements, our approach asks whether the no trade condition can explain the absence of a
market for additional UI, beyond what is currently provided through the government and other
informal arrangements. To be precise, our approach simulates a hypothetical market for an addi-
tional dollar of UI. We estimate the implicit tax that would be imposed on this hypothetical market
by adverse selection, and then we compare this to the existing estimates of the willingness to pay
for additional UI. 13 Then, in Section 2.7 we discuss extrapolating our results to a world with less
or no government UI, as discussed in Section 2.2.5.
2.4 Data
Variables Estimating infpEW\{1} T (p) using the methods in Hendren (2011) requires three pieces
of data: a subjective probability elicitation about future unemployment, its corresponding indicator
for whether or not unemployment occurs, and a set of public information insurance companies could
use to price the insurance contracts.
Our data come from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) spanning years 1993-2008. The
HRS is an individual-level panel survey of individuals over 55 and their spouses (included regardless
of age). This survey asks respondents: what is the percent chance (0-100) that you will lose your
job in the next 12 months? We denote these free-responses by Z.
Figure 2.1 presents the histogram of the subjective probability elicitations. As has been noted
in previous literature (Gan et al), responses tend to concentrate on focal point values, especially
zero. As we will discuss further in Section 4 and 5, our empirical approach to identify whether
people have any private information will not require knowing how these elicitations relate to true
beliefs. However, to quantify infpsp\{li T (p) we will specify a parametric model for the relationship
between elicitations and beliefs and estimate the parameters governing this measurement error.
Using the panel of the survey, we construct the indicator, U, denoting the occurrence of un-
employment in the subsequent 12 months from the interview. Our definition of unemployment is
those who report having lost their job because of their business being closed or because they were
"laid off/let go". Therefore, our definition of unemployment excludes voluntary quits; this implicitly
1 3Note that we abstract from whether the benefit is paid initially or distributed throughout the course of the
unemployment spell. If agents can equate marginal utilities throughout the unemployment spell, as is commonly
assumed in the existing literature, then agents valuation of this additional dollar does not depend on when it is paid
during the unemployment spell.
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Figure 2-1: Histogram of Subj. Prob. (Job Loss in 1 Year)
assumes that an insurance company could distinguish voluntary quits from involuntary leaves. 14
We consider three sets of increasing controls for public information insurance companies would
use in pricing, outlined in Table 2.1. Our primary specification includes census region, job indus-
try categories, wage bins, age, gender, and several health status indicators (e.g. diabetes, back
condition, obesity, etc.). This set is parsimonious, although it is generally larger than the set of
information than has previously been used by insurance companies who have tried to sell unem-
ployment insurance.1 5 In addition to this set, we also assess the robustness of our analysis to a
smaller set of controls (age and gender only) and a larger set of controls (which includes additional
job characteristics and health). Moreover, we consider an additional specification that excludes
anyone who experienced a recent unemployment spell in the past four years. This allows us to test
whether insurance companies could avoid adverse selection by selling only to those with stronger
employment histories.
Sample selection We consider the sample of individuals aged 41-59 who are currently employed
but are not self employed. We restrict our sample to those providing a subjective probability
elicitation about future unemployment and for whom we can follow for a subsequent year in the
panel.
Table 2.2 presents the summary statistics of our sample. Our mean age is 55, in the upper end
of the sample range. This is because individuals below age 55 are only found in our sample if they
are a spouse of someone over 55. The average wage in our sample is $19/hr. Roughly 4% of our
sample become unemployed in the subsequent 12 months. The mean of the subjective elicitations is
"Government UI attempts to exclude voluntary quits and arguably gains enforcement power by requiring employer
contributions that are experience-rated. Thus, our approach can be seen as modeling an insurance policy that leverages
the existing government UI system but pays an additional $1 to the unemployed on the first day they receive their
government UI payment.
"IncomeAssure, the latest attempt to provide private unemployment benefits, prices policies using a coarse in-
dustry classification, geographical location (state of residence), and wages.
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Table 2.1: Covariate Specification
Preferred Controls Extended Controls
Age, AgeA2, Gender
Gender*age
Gender*ageA2
Self employed Indicator
Health Variables
Obesity indicator (40+ BMI)
Psych condition indicator
Back condition indicator
Diabetes indicator
BMI (linear)
Job industry dummies
Census region indicators
Full interactions of
Age
Gender
Full interactions of
wage decile
part time indicator
job tenure quartile
self-employment indicator
Presence of back condition,
Full interactions of
Job requires stooping
Job requires lifting
Job requires phys activity
Presence of back condition,
psych condition, or obesity
psych condition, or obesity
Full interactions of
Census region
5 year age bins
Table 2.2: Sample Summary Statistics
Mean Std Dev
Lose Job (1yr) 0.04 0.20
Subj Prob Lose Job (1yr) 0.16 0.25
Age 54.46 3.72
Female 0.63 0.48
Wage ($/hr) 18.98 41.72
Sample Size
Obs 12,880
Households 5,101
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16%, indicating significant (mean) bias in elicitations. Such upward bias is perhaps not surprising
given the low probability of unemployment and the fact that elicitations are bounded between 0
and 1.
Discussion Given these variable definitions, how should one think of our empirical approach?
We study the potential adverse selection that would occur in a market for a hypothetical contract
that provides $1 in the event of losing ones' job in the subsequent 12 months from the initial date
of contracting and is priced based on the observable characteristics, X. 16 We ask what markup
individuals would need to be willing to pay on this hypothetical contract in order for it to earn
nonnegative profits, given by infpcV\{(1 T (p) - 1, and we compare this estimate to the willingness
to pay estimates implied by consumption smoothing (equation (2.3)) and ratios of search elasticities
(equation (2.4)).17
2.5 Presence of private information
Before testing equations (2.3) and (2.4) which require a quantification of infpwy(\l} T (p), we begin
with the more straightforward question of whether or not people have private information about
their unemployment risk, beyond information contained in the observables, X.
2.5.1 Identification Assumptions
As in the theoretical section, Let P be the random variable representing agents' beliefs about
the occurrence of unemployment in the next 12 months, U. Throughout, we assume that agents
elicitations, Z, may not equal agents true beliefs which govern behavior, P. Instead, we assume P
is unobserved to the econometrician. To derive a test for the presence of private information, we
make two assumptions. First, we assume that agents beliefs are unbiased.
Beliefs are unbiased: Pr {U IX, P} = P
This assumption states that if we hypothetically observed someone with true beliefs P then
their probability in the data of experiencing unemployment would equal P. This assumption is
weaker than traditional rational expectations assumptions (we do not require agents to know the
probability structure of the environment), but nonetheless is not a trivial assumption. For our
purposes, it provides a simple link between the unobserved beliefs and the observed occurrence of
unemployment.
In addition to assuming that the unobserved beliefs are unbiased, we assume that the observed
elicitations, Z, contain no more information about U than would the true beliefs.
16By changing the set of observable characteristics, X, we simulate different underwriting strategies and can assess
how variation in the use of observable characteristics potentially mitigates impact of adverse selection.
1 7Note that the minimum pooled price ratio and the willingness to pay can both vary with observables, X, so that
this test can be thought of as being repeated for different values of X. We discuss this further in Section 6.
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No more information: Pr {U|X, Z, P} = Pr {UlX, P}
If we observed both the elicitation and the true beliefs, then the elicitation would not provide
any additional forecasting information about U than does P. This is a relatively weak assumption;
it would be difficult for agents to report predictive information that they did not know themselves.
Indeed, it allows Z to be any noisy measure of true beliefs that is independent of U conditional on
P and X.
Under these two assumptions, the true beliefs are a mean-preserving spread of the distribution
of predicted values:
Pr {U|X, Z} = E [PIX, Z]
In this sense, the distribution of the predicted loss given X and Z, Pr {UIX, Z}, are a lower bound
for the true distribution of beliefs, P. This motivates a simple test for the presence of private
information about U: is Z is predictive of U conditional on X?i8
2.5.2 Specification and Results
We adopt a linear specification 19,
U = 3X +YZ + E
A finding of -y 0 allows one to reject the null hypothesis of no private information. 20 We consider
specifications for each of the three sets of controls, X, outlined in Table 2.1.
Results Table 2.3 presents the results. Across all three public information specifications (Columns
1, 11, and III), we reject the null hypothesis of no private information at p-values less than 0.001.
Indeed, the results suggest that agents have information beyond what is captured by age, gender,
various health characteristics, job industry, and wages. Thus, even if private insurance policies were
priced using all of these variables, insurance policies would likely be adversely selected. Without
additional assumptions, the coefficient -y does not have an interpretation related to the beliefs,
P. However, the magnitude does show that individuals who report a 1 standard deviation higher
subjective probability (0.25) have an average probability of unemployment that is 1.5pp higher.
Historical Screening Although we find evidence of private information conditional on these sets
of controls, insurance companies could potentially also use past unemployment spells to discriminate
applicants. For example, insurance companies could require that applicants have no unemployment
record in the past several years. To assess the impact of this underwriting procedure, Column IV
restricts the sample to those who have not experienced unemployment in the past 2 waves (4 years)
18More formally, if there exists a z such that Pr {UlX, Z = z} # Pr {UIX}, then there exists p such that F (pIX) #
1 {p < Pr {UlX}}.
1 9 0ur results remain robust to other specifications (e.g. probit, logit).2 0Note that the magnitude of the coefficient -y does not have any direct interpretation without additional structure.
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Table 2.3: Presence of Private Information
I 11 III IV
Clean
Age & Primary Extended History
Gender Controls Controls Sample
Subjective Probability 0.061 *** 0.048*** 0.032*** 0.035***
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0004
N 12,880 12,880 12,880 7,933
* p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
of the survey.21 The results suggest the elicitation is still predictive of future unemployment even
on the set of people who have not experienced unemployment in the recent past. Thus only selling
insurance to those who have not experienced unemployment in the past 4 years would not remove
the informational asymmetry.
In short, our results suggest private information would impose constraints on the workings of
a private unemployment insurance market. We now turn to quantifying the size of this barrier to
trade, infpCP\{l T (p).
2.6 Quantification of Private Information
To estimate infp,,P\{11 T (p), we impose additional structure to the relationship between elicitations
and beliefs. While the test for the presence of private information does not impose any structure on
the relationship between elicitations and true beliefs, we now assume the distribution of elicitations
given beliefs can be parameterized by a vector of parameters, 0.
The distribution of elicitations given beliefs is given by fzIP (ZIP; 0) where 0 is a finite vector
of parameters
We then estimate fp (p) using the identity
fZU (Z, U|X) = pU (1 - p)lU fzlp (ZIX, P, 0) fp (pIX) dp
where fz,u is the observed density of elicitations and unemployment, fzip is the density of elic-
itations given beliefs (parameterized by 0), and fp is the density of beliefs. We then flexibly
approximate fp and estimate both fp and 0 using maximum likelihood.22
2 1We use the primary set of controls, although the results remain robust to the extensive set of controls.
2 2 Hendren (2011)discusses identification using restrictions on fzip in more detail. We show that if f (ZIP) is
normally distributed with mean P+ce (X) then fp is non-parametrically identified and there exists an infinite number
of over-identifying moments. In practice, we adopt a censored normal distribution for f (ZIP) which potentially poses
identification concerns but in practice performs quite well as indicated by monte carlo results provided in Hendren
(2011).
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2.6.1 Measurement error distribution
We parameterize the distribution of elicitations given beliefs as a mixture of a censored normal and
an ordered probit distribution. The ordered probit captures excess density of elicitations at 0, 50
and 100, as shown in Figure 2-1. More precisely, we assume that the p.d.f./p.m.f. of Z given P is
given by
- A (X) if Z = 0
1-A-P-a x (-P-a(X) if Z = 0.5f (ZP. X) = 9 ) i
(1-- A) P -a()+ A 1 'C xKPaX if Z=
if oor4Z-P-a(X i O.W.
where 4 denotes the standard normal p.d.f. and P the standard normal c.d.f. We estimate four
elicitation error parameters: (U, A, K, a (X)). o captures the dispersion in the elicitation error, A is
the fraction of focal point respondents, , is the focal point window. We allow the elicitation bias
term, a (X), to vary with the observable variables, X.23
2.6.2 Distribution of fp
Ideally, we would flexibly estimate the c.d.f. of P given X, F (pjX), and the minimum pooled price
ratio, infpc,,,\{1i T (p), separately for every possible value of X. However, the dimensionality of X
prevents this in practice. Instead, we adopt an index assumption:
F (pIX) = P(pl Pr {UjX}) (2.5)
where we assume P (p~q) is continuous in q. This assumes that the distribution of private informa-
tion is the same for two observable values, X and X', that have the same observable unemployment
probability, Pr {UIX} = Pr {UlX'}. Although one could perform different dimension reduction
techniques, controlling for Pr{UlX} is particularly appealing because it nests the null hypothesis
of no private information (F (pIX) = 1 {p < Pr {UIX}}. Moreover, it allows us to easily impose
unbiased beliefs, so that Pr {UIX} = E [PIX] for all X.
We then approximate F (p~q) for q = Pr {UlX} using a mixture of a beta distribution and a
point-mass distribution.24
F (pIq) = w {p < q - a} + (1 - w) EjgiBeta (pi (q) , @b)
where 7j is the weight on the point-mass, q - a is the mean of the point-mass, Beta (pi (q) , V's) is
the Beta c.d.f. with mean pi (q) and shape parameter 0j, and {i}j are the weights on the Beta
2 3 This allows elicitations to be biased, conditional on X; but we maintain the assumption that true beliefs are
unbiased.
2 4 The point mass captures the possibility that a fraction of the population has the same information set.
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distributions. We assume pi (q) is linear in q, pi (q) = gi + hiq. We use two Beta distributions. 25
Unbiased beliefs imposes the restriction E [Plq] = q, which imposes linear restrictions on the mean
and weights of each mixture component. We also impose restrictions on the parameter space to
ensure the support lies over the interval [0, 1].26
2.6.3 Estimation of inf T (p)
Given an estimate of F (plq), we construct E [PIP > p] for each p (and for each value of q). As
discussed in detail in Hendren (2011), the construction of E [PIP > p] suffers an extremal quantile
estimation problem for values of p in the upper quantiles of F (pjX). Intuitively, as p increases, the
estimate of E [PIP > p] relies on a shrinking sample. Thus, we restrict attention to p < F-1 (T)
for r = 0.9 (i.e. values of p less than the 90th quantile of its estimated distribution) and construct
infpE[0,F- 1 (r)] T (p). We then assess robustness to the choice of T.
While the primary motivation for such a restriction is statistical, there is a straightforward
economic rational for restricting attention to p < F-1 (T). If insurance companies must attract a
non-trivial fraction 1 - T > 0 to any given consumption bundle other than the endowment, then
infpC[0,F-1(T)] T (p) characterizes the barrier to trade (See Hendren (2011), Remark 1). Indeed, our
choice of T = 0.9 corresponds to a requirement that insurance companies must attract more than
just the 10% riskiest fraction of the market in order to sell insurance. That said, we re-iterate that
the rationale for this assumption is statistical necessity.
2.6.4 Estimation Results
Figure 2-2 plots the estimated c.d.f., F (p~q) for q = Pr {U} 4% along with its bootstrapped
standard errors. The results suggest a large fraction of the population (~70%) have very low
probability of unemployment, near zero. The remaining fraction of the population is dispersed
throughout an upper tail of higher risks. Translating this into the implied barrier to trade, Table
2.4 presents the estimated values of infpE[O.F-1(0.9)] T (p) for varying values of q = Pr {UjX}. We
estimate a value of 3.506 (95% CI of [2.612, 3.871]) at the mean of the index, q = 0.04, and values
of 2.652 to 9.571 at the 80th and 20th quantile of the distribution of the index, q. Subtracting
1 from 2.652, we conclude that unless people are willing to pay more than a ~165% markup for
unemployment insurance, the results are consistent with the absence of a private unemployment
insurance market.
2 5 The p.d.f. of a beta distribution is given by f (p; a, 3) - where B (a, #) is the beta function. The
mean of the beta distribution is given by p = and the shape parameter is V = a +# . In principle, the point-mass
distribution could be replaced with a Beta distribution with a very low variance. In practice, the point-mass performs
better since numerical integration of low variance beta distributions is computationally time-consuming.
2 6 For example, we allow the parameter, a, to vary with q to ensure that the point mass does not fall below p = 0
or above p = 1.
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Table 2.4: Minimum Pooled Price Ratio, inf T (p)
LTC
Quantile of Index, q Mean 20% 50% 80%
inf T 3.506 9.571 4.325 2.652
5% 2.612 6.600 3.380 2.296
95% 3.871 12.058 4.945 2.863
Pr{Llreject} 0.040 0.015 0.032 0.062
Note: 5/95% CI computed using bootstrap block re-sampling at the household
level (N=150 Reps): Bootstrap Cl presents maximum boundaries from a) non-
accelerated bias-corrected procedure from Efron (1982) and b) studentized
values
Table 2.5: Robustness to Choice of r
LTC
Quantile Region: W, 0-80% 0-90% 0-95%
Reject 3.506 3.506 1.114
5% 2.612 2.612 1.091
95% 3.871 3.871 1.136
Note: 5/95% CI computed using bootstrap block re-sampling at
the household level (N=150 Reps); Bootstrap Cl presents
maximum boundaries from a) non-accelerated bias-corrected
procedure from Efron (1982) and b) studentized values
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Table 2.6: Willingness to Pay
Gruber (1997) Chetty (2008)
Implied WTP
Ac/c, =2 a=3 U=4 u'(C)/'(Ce)-1
.09-.12 .18-.24 .27-.36 .36-.48 0.60
'Range shown for 40-50% replacement rates
Robustness to choice of T Table 2.5 assesses the robustness of the results to lower and higher
values of r, the upper quantile domain for our estimation of infPE[0,F-1(T)] T (p). We focus on the
mean value of the index q = 0.04. The minimum pooled price ratio is not attained at the upper
boundary of [0, F- 1 (T)] for T between the 80th and 90th percentile; thus changes in r in this range
do not affect the estimated value of infpE[O,F-1(T)] T (p). However, at the 95th percentile, we do
estimate the minimum to be at the boundary. Increasing T to 0.95 leads the minimum pooled price
ratio to drop dramatically to 1.136 (95% CI of [1.091,1.136]). However, this result is arguably driven
by functional form. Since the minimum pooled price ratio is not identified as T -+ 1, our estimates
rely on functional form as we increase towards 1. We have only one beta distribution above the
90th percentile which, we estimate to be relatively concentrated (and thus having a lower value of
T (p)). But, follow-up work could assess the robustness to the inclusion of additional betas in the
upper portion of the distribution. In the meantime, this exercise simply highlights the instability
of the estimates of infpE[0,F -1(r)] T (p) as T -*1.
2.6.5 Testing the No Trade Condition
How much of a markup are people willing to pay for unemployment insurance? Table 2.6 presents
estimates of the LHS of equation (2.3) from the existing literature on optimal government unem-
ployment insurance. Gruber (1997) yields estimates of a ranging from 9-12%, depending on the
replacement rate of benefits (which generally range between 40 and 50% depending on the state).
With a coefficient of relative risk aversion equal to 4, this implies individuals would be willing to pay
between a 36% and 48% markup for unemployment insurance, well below the estimated markups
individuals would need to be willing to pay to overcome the barriers to trade imposed by private
information of at least 160% (the value for q = 0.015 in Table 2.4).
Chetty (2008) estimates that roughly 60% of the elasticity of unemployment duration with
respect to benefits is due to a liquidity effect. This suggests people are willing to pay roughly a
60% markup for insurance, which again falls below the willingness to pay required to overcome the
barriers imposed by private information. In short, our results suggest the amount of private infor-
mation about unemployment risk is large enough to explain an absence of a private unemployment
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Table 2.7: Elicitation Error Parameters
Value
Standard Deviation 0.115
s.e. (0.002)
Fraction Focal Respondents 0.552
s.e. (0.006)
Focal Window 0.229
s.e. (0.003)
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors computed using block
re-sampling at the household level (results shown for
N=150 repetitions)
insurance market.2 7
2.6.6 Measurement error variables
Table 2.7 presents the estimated parameters 0 for the distribution of elicitations given beliefs,
f (ZIP, X,0). We find a standard error of 0.115, which suggests people are not able to report
their true beliefs perfectly in their elicitations. We also estimate a sizable fraction of focal point
respondents of 55.2%, which is consistent with the extremely large response rate of Z = 0. We
estimate a focal window of 0.229, which suggests focal point respondents who otherwise would have
reported a value of Z less than 0.229 instead collapse their report to Z = 0, generating the excess
mass at Z = 0.
2.7 Government Crowd-Out
Private information explains why there is no private unemployment insurance market given the
existing set of government benefits. But, if the government were to reduce the generosity of UI
benefits, would a private market arise?
Section (2.2.5) shows that an ideal test would be to observe measures of c and an estimatev' (Ce,(g))ananetm e
of the distribution of unemployment probabilities, P (g), for values of g near zero. Absent such a
world, we make two assumptions that allow extrapolation from our estimates to a world with no
government-provided unemployment benefits. First, we assume government UI benefits does not
significantly affect the distribution of beliefs about the incidence of unemployment. This would
be true, for example, if there were no significant moral hazard effects of government UI on the
2 7 One caveat to this analysis is that our demand estimates are aggregated across values of X. Ideally, we would
obtain or construct separate demand estimates for varying values of X and test equations (2.3) and (2.4) for each
value of X. Indeed, the samples used by Gruber and Chetty are generally younger than our HRS sample. We
leave this adjustment of demand for covariates and a more general test across values of observable characteristics as
important future work.
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occurrence of unemployment.2 8 With this assumption, infpcp\{1} T (p) continues to characterize
the implicit tax imposed by private information in a world without government UI benefits.
However, we do allow for the provision of government UI to affect the ratio of marginal util-
ities, u'(c , consistent with the findings of Gruber (1997). To do so, we adopt the log-linear
specification from Gruber (1997), so that
log (cist) = ai +b * Uit + c * Uit * Rst + yst +eist (2.6)
where cist is consumption of person i in state s at time t, Uit is an indicator for unemployment,
R8 t is the UI replacement rate for state s at time t, and yet are state-by-year fixed effects. With
this specification, b captures the consumption drop upon unemployment at the replacement rate of
R8 t = 0, which corresponds to no government UI. Replacement rates in the data range from 37%
to 54%, and thus one should keep in mind that this extrapolation is of course out-of-sample.
Estimation results of equation (2.6) from Gruber (1997) suggest that the markup people would
be willing to pay for UI would roughly double in the absence of government-provided UI. Gruber
(1997) estimates b = -0.231 and c = 0.280, which indicates ~ 23% when Rt = 0, roughly
twice as large as the estimates of 9 - 12% for the consumption drop at existing replacement rates of
40-50%. Thus, if individuals have a coefficient of relative risk aversion of o- = 4, then they should
be willing to pay roughly a 90% markup for insurance. If individuals have a coefficient of relative
risk aversion of 2, then they would be willing to pay a 46% tax for insurance. Given our much
larger estimates of the barrier to trade imposed by private information, our results suggest that a
private market is unlikely to arise in the absence of government provided benefits.
2.8 Conclusion
This paper studies whether private information explains the absence of a private market for unem-
ployment insurance above and beyond what is currently provided by the government and informal
systems. We first document the presence of private information about unemployment risk by show-
ing subjective probability elicitations are predictive of future unemployment, conditional on a rich
set of public information that could be used to price such insurance. We then quantify the barrier
to trade imposed by private information as equivalent to imposing tax rates in excess of 160% on
insurance premiums on hypothetical insurance contracts. We then show that these estimates are
generally greater than estimates of the willingness to pay, found in existing literature on optimal
government UI benefits, which generally range from 30-60%. Thus, the barrier to trade imposed
by private information is large enough to explain the absence of a private UI market in the US for
insurance beyond what is currently provided by the government. Finally, we argue that, although
the absence of government-provided UI would increase the demand for private UI benefits, this
2 8 The impact of moral hazard on infpc,{l} T(p) is ambiguous; so assuming no change is perhaps not a bad
approximation.
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increase would likely not be large enough to overcome the barriers imposed by private information.
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2.A Appendix
2.A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
We follow Hendren (2011) and consider the maximization program of a monopolist insurer. Whether
there exists any implementable allocations other than the endowment corresponds to whether there
exists any allocations other than the endowment which maximize the profit, 7r, subject to the
incentive and participation constraints.
The insurer can offer a menu of contracts, {p (0) , A (0 )}EFr where p (0) specifies a total utility
provided to type 6 and A (0) denotes the difference in utilities if the agent becomes unemployed.
Note that p (0) implicitly contains the disutility of effort.
For exposition of the proof, we switch focus from the probability of unemployment, P, to 4,
which we define to be the probability of employment,
S(A; 0) = 1 - P (A; 0)
so that the agent's effort cost is T (4 (A; 0) 0). This way we need not keep track of as many sign
changes in derivatives. Note that a type 0 that accepts a contract containing A will choose a
probability of employment 4 (A; 0) consistent with the first order condition ' (4 (A; 0); 0) = A.
Let - (A, p; 0) denote the profits obtained from providing type 0 with contract terms p and A,
given by
7r (A, P; 0)= (A;6 ) (c' - Ce (p -(,A; 0))) + (1 - 0 ;)) (c' - Cu( -'A - T (A;)6)))
Note that the profit function takes into account how the agents' choice of p varies with A. As-
sumption 2.2.3 maintains that 7r is concave in (A, p).
Preservation of Single Crossing In the general problem, we allow the monopolist to offer a
full menu of contracts. However, Hendren (2011) shows if the incentive constraints satisfy single
crossing whereby the higher risk types have higher marginal values of insurance, then we can focus
solely on single contract deviations from the endowment. So, consider the utility provided to a type
0 from contract terms (p, A) when her intended contract was given by (p (6) , A (6)),
y (p," Alp/ (0) ,A (0) , 0) = p--[(1 -- 4 (A; 0)) A - (1 - 4 (A (0) ; 0)),A (0)] - [IF(W (A; 6) ; 0) - XF (4 (A (0) ; 0) ; )]
It is easy to verify that
- (1 - (A; 0))
OA
so that
S (A;) <0
=A& <0
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which is less than zero by the assumption that higher types 0 have higher marginal costs of effort,
> 0. Therefore, the incentive constraints satisfy the single crossing property.
Reformulation of the Profit Maximization Program The profit maximization problem for
a firm choosing a full menu of contracts, {p (0) , A (0 )}OeF is given by
maxp(6o)A(O) 7r (A (0), p (0) 0) dF (0)
s. (6 ) > V ( p (, P$ | (0) , A (6) )
y(0) > U, (0)
However, as shown in Hendren (2011) (Appendix A, Section 4), when the incentive constraints sat-
isfy single crossing, and -r is concave, then there exists an allocation other than the endowment that
solves this maximization program if and only if there exists a single local contract deviation from
the endowment which attracts all types {0> b} to the same consumption bundle. By concavity of
the profit function, it suffices to check only local deviations. Therefore, fix any type 0 C e. Con-
sider providing this type with a small transfer in the event unemployment occurs. By the envelope
theorem, the agent's marginal rate of substitution captures the agent's marginal willingness to pay
for this transfer
1
4 (A -# V' (ce)
Now, if all types 0 > b are also attracted to this contract, the marginal cost of providing the transfer
to type 0 is given by
1 - E [ (Ae;- )| 1 ]
E [4 (Ae;0)|0> b]
If this marginal cost is greater than the willingness to pay, evaluated at each 0, then there does not
exist any local deviations. Thus, the endowment is the only implementable allocation. Replacing
1 - P yields the expression in equation (2.1). Conversely, if the marginal cost is less than this
willingness to pay at some 0, then the insurance company could profitably provide this agent with
a small transfer; thus the endowment would not be the only implementable allocation. QED.
Discussion of Moral Hazard Whether or not trade occurs does not depend on how insurance
affects the probability of being employed. Rather, it only depends on the levels of the probabilities
evaluated at the endowment, 4 (Ae; 0). Why is this? To see what goes on perhaps more clearly,
consider a simpler setup of the monopolist trying to provide consumption bundles ce and c, in the
event of being employed and unemployed, respectively, and assume no heterogeneity in effort costs.
114
Profits are given by:
Irc (Ce, c.) = (ce, cu) (c' - Ce) + (1 - j (Ce, ca)) (c - cu)
so that
C - (Ce) + (c- ce)
and
a7r 8
= -(1- (CU)) - a"(C , - cU)
So, at the endowment where c, = c', and ce = ce, the moral hazard terms, -2- and -- , have no
impact on the marginal profitability of providing insurance. Because of this, moral hazard alone
cannot cause a complete absence of trade.
2.A.2 Concavity Assumptions
Assumption 2.2.3 maintains that -r is globally concave in (t, A). Here, we derive sufficient condi-
tions on the primitives of the model that guarantee this concavity. In particular, we show that if
T"" (q; 0) > 0 and "'c) < 2 then 7r is globally concave in (p, A).V/ (ce)e
For simplicity, we consider a fixed 0 and drop reference to it. Profits are given by
-r (A, P) = 4 (A) (' - Ce (A - ' (q (A))))+(1 - (A)) (C", - Cu (p - A - '( W(A))))
Our goal is to show the Hessian of 7r is negative semi-definite. We proceed in three steps. First,
we derive conditions which guarantee a < 0. Second, we show that, in general, we have a < 0.
Finally, we show the conditions provided to guarantee - <0 also imply the determinant of the
Hessian is positive, so that both eigenvalues of the Hessian must be negative and thus the matrix
is negative semi-definite.
2.A.2.1 Conditions that imply a < 0
Taking the first derivative with respect to A, we have
-(1- 4W))C' (p - A - 'P W ((A (A)C' (p - D(W(A))
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Taking another derivative with respect to A, applying the identity A = V'(P (A)), and collecting
terms yields
[(1 - (A)) (1 + A) 2 C"j (p - A -' (Q (A))) + 4 (A) (A ' (A)) 2 C" (p - D ( (A)))]
+ [(1 - (A)) C' (p - A - T W ((A))) + 4 (A) C' (U - W (,Q(A)))]
+a [- (2 + 2A4/ (A)) C' (, - A - T (4 (A)))]
+ [ce - ci + C (p-A - P ( (A))) - C(p -4q W (A)))]2 e
+ [(14 4 (A)) A C'/p A -XP (4 (A))) + 4 (A) C' (p- (4 (A)))]
We consider these three terms in turn. The first term is always negative because C" > 0. The
second term, multiplying -, can be shown to be positive if
(1+ 4 (A)) C'(p A - P (Q(A))) > 4 (A) C'(p A)
which is necessarily true whenever
a' (ce)<(C) <2
v' (ce) 
-
This inequality holds as long as people are willing to pay less than a 100% markup for a small
amount of insurance, evaluated at their endowment.
Finally, the third term is positive as long as 'T!"' > 0. To see this, one can easily verify that the
term multiplying & is necessarily positive. Also, note that 9 = ). Therefore, if we assume
that T"' > 0, the entire last term will necessarily be negative. In sum, it is sufficient to assume
<2 and T"" > 0 to guarantee that < 0.
2.A.2.2 Conditions that imply 0 < 0
Fortunately, profits are easily seen to be concave in p. We have
07r
- ( - 4 (A)) C'(p - A - ( (A)))-(A) C'(p- (A)))
so that
(12 - (A)) C" (p - A - 1P( W(A))) - 4 (A) C" (p - Q (A)))
which is negative because C" > 0.
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2.A.2.3 Conditions to imply .2q (2 )> 0
Finally, we need to ensure that the determinant of the Hessian is positive. To do so, first note that
Also, we note that under the assumptions T"' > 0 and ", < 2, we have the inequality
a2< -(-(A)) (1 +A)2 C"(p-A - p(4 (A))) + 4(A) (A4,'(A))2 C",(p- (A))
Therefore, we can ignore the longer terms in the expression for - above. We multiply the RHS
of the above equation with the value of a and subtract (ia 2 . Fortunately, many of the terms
cancel out, leaving the inequality
02i 02 2
&A2 0/_2
( 2 r 2
(1 - (A)) q (A) (1 + At' (A)) 2 C" (p - A
+4 (A) (1 - q (A)) (A ' (A)) 2 C" (p - lI (4 (A))) C" (p - A - qI (4 (A)))
2 (1 - 4 (A)) 4 (A) (1 + A' (A)) A' (A) C" (p A - 'P( (A))) C" (P
which reduces to the inequality
- (2) 2
where
K (p, A) - (1+ A4' (A)) 2 + (A4' (A)) 2 - 2A4' (A) - 2 (A ' (A)) 2
- 1
So, since C" > 0, we have that the determinant must be positive. In particular, we have
a2- 
)2 >- (A) (1 - 4 (A)) C" (p - A
2.A.2.4 Summary
As long as tI"' > 0 and "(L < 2, the profit function is guaranteed to be concave. In practice,
Gruber (1997) and Chetty (2008) estimate "',L to be between 1.3 and 1.6. Therefore, our only
unsubstantiated assumption for the model is that the convexity of the effort function increases in p,
qI"' > 0. An alternative statement of this assumption is that a 2 < 0, so that the marginal impact
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02 027
&A2 19/p 2
0A2 a 2
A - kP (4 (A))) (1 + A4' (A)) + 4 (A) C"f (p, - tP (4 (A))) A4' (A)(1-4(A)) C" (pA
1PW ( A)) C" (P - IFW ( A))
>-4(A) (1 - 4 (A)) C"/ (P A - T (4 (A))) C" (p -- T (4 (A))) K (p, A)
'PW ( A)) C" (p- 1PW G A))
of work incentives on the employment probability is declining in the size of the work incentives.
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Chapter 3
Would the Long-Term Care Insurance
Market Survive Adjusted Community
Rating Regulation?
3.1 Introduction
Roughly 20% of 65 year olds have a health condition that would lead them to be rejected for long-
term care (LTC) insurance (Hendren (2011), Murtaugh et al. (1995)). One potential policy response
to this discriminatory practice by insurers is to limit the set of information insurance companies can
use to price their policies. So-called "community rating" regulation requires insurance companies to
offer contracts uniformly to the population ("pure community rating") or based on a limited set of
characteristics, such as age ("adjusted community rating"). These policies allow those with health
conditions to access to the same insurance policies as the healthy. 1
Recently, these types of regulations have garnered significant political attention. The Affordable
Care Act (ACA), passed in 2010, contains adjusted community rating regulations for the non-group
health insurance market. 2 Indeed, eight states have already enacted community rating policies in
their non-group markets (Lo Sasso and Lurie (2009)). Although the goal of community rating is
to increase access and equity in insurance markets by preventing the sick from being rejected or
charged a higher price, these regulations have the potential to induce significant adverse selection
and hinder the workings of the insurance market. Such impacts have been the focus of many
previous studies focusing on the health insurance market (Buchmueller and Dinardo (2002), Simon
(2005), Herring and Pauly (2006), Lo Sasso and Lurie (2009)).
In long-term care insurance, community rating is also a potential policy option, but has never ac-
tually been attempted. The Community Living Assistance Services and Supports program (CLASS
'Under community rating, insurers are generally required to offer insurance to all who apply.
2 This law also contains a mandate requiring individuals to purchase health insurance, which would limit any
potential adverse selection induced by the policy.
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Act), passed as part of the ACA, would have tasked the government with selling long-term care
(LTC) insurance on an adjusted-community rating basis. However, this program was eventually
abandoned by the Obama administration after actuaries could not establish its long-run budget
neutrality. Policy discussions for the future of LTC insurance in the US now focuses on regulatory
and tax subsidy solutions that avoid government provision. Community rating is a natural regula-
tion that could provide access to insurance for those currently excluded from the market because
of the presence of a pre-existing condition.
This paper evaluates the extent of adverse selection that would occur under an adjusted commu-
nity rating regulation in the LTC insurance market that forces insurers to ignore health conditions
and price only based on age. The advantage of our approach relative to existing literature is that
we can conduct the evaluation ex ante: we ask how much adverse selection the market would
suffer under the regulation, without actually needing to observe any regulation. Indeed, no such
regulation has ever been attempted in LTC.
We use subjective probability elicitations to estimate the distribution of beliefs about future
nursing home use conditional on age. We do not require these elicitations to be true measures of
beliefs; rather we employ the approach developed in Hendren (2011), which allows these elicitations
to be noisy and potentially biased measures of true beliefs. We then use the no-trade theorem
of Hendren (2011) to quantify the implicit tax imposed by private information as the markup
individuals must be willing to pay for insurance in order for the market to exist. We compare this
estimate to existing estimates of the willingness to pay and to the estimates from Hendren (2011)
which are argued to lead to a complete absence of trade in LTC.
Our results suggest age-based adjusted community rating regulation would cause the entire LTC
insurance market to unravel. We estimate that the implicit tax imposed by private information
would be between 50% and 130%, depending on ones age. This generally exceeds existing estimates
of the willingness to pay for LTC insurance of 26-62% (Brown and Finkelstein (2008)), and is also
of similar magnitude to existing estimates of 65-75% of the implicit tax which is argued to shut
down the market for those who are currently rejected in LTC insurance (Hendren (2011)). Thus,
our results suggest that if insurance companies could only price based on age, the market for LTC
insurance would completely shut down, leaving neither the sick nor the healthy with insurance.
Adjusted community rating regulation would lead to a (Pareto) decline in welfare.
Our paper is related to several strands of literatures. Several papers have conducted ex post
analyses of community rating regulation in the individual and small group health insurance market
(Buchmueller and Dinardo (2002), Simon (2005), Herring and Pauly (2006), Lo Sasso and Lurie
(2009)). This literature finds that community rating policies lead to change in the composition of
the insured from the healthy to the sick, but do not lead to a complete unraveling of the health
insurance market.3
3 The one caveat is that Buchmueller and DiNardo find evidence that pure community rating in the small group
and individual market is associated with a reduction in the fraction of the population that was insured in New York,
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In contrast to those approaches, this paper conducts an ex ante evaluation of an adjusted
community rating regulation in a market (LTC insurance) that has never attempted such a policy.
In this sense, our paper contributes to the literature on ex-ante policy evaluation. Traditionally,
this literature involves estimating a structural model and conducting out-of-sample simulation by
assuming the stability of certain economic primitives (Wolpin (2007), Todd and Wolpin (2008)).
Many recent papers that apply the structural approach to insurance markets and conduct policy
analysis (Bundorf et al. (ming),Einav et al. (2010)). For example, Einav et al. (2010) document
adverse selection in the UK Annuity market and show that a mandated policy which mandated a
longer length guarantee could obtain higher welfare.
However, existing structural approaches cannot readily be used to simulate community rating
regulation. The reason is that identification of beliefs in traditional structural approaches rely
on revealed preference to identify beliefs. This requires controlling for the set of information
insurance companies use to price insurance in order to identify the distribution of beliefs (Chiappori
and Salani6 (2000)). In contrast, one can use subjective probability elicitations to identify the
distribution of beliefs conditional on any chosen set of observable characteristics, and thus conduct
policy analysis which changes this set.
We believe this approach to analyzing insurance regulation may have widespread applicability.
For example, recent debate over the Affordable Care Act, both in the political sphere and in the
Supreme Court, has questioned whether or not the private health insurance market could survive
the community rating regulation proposed in the ACA if the mandate were omitted or found to be
unconstitutional. The empirical approach taken in this paper is designed precisely to shed light on
this type of question. Beyond insurance, many economic settings in labor, credit, and other markets
involve a trade-off between redistributive goals and the availability/use of public information. Our
approach shows how researchers and policy-makers can evaluate the impact of regulations that
depend on the distribution of knowledge in the population.
3.2 Insurance Framework
This section discusses the framework developed in Hendren (2011), which uses subjective probability
elicitations to estimate properties of what agents' know about their risk. Throughout, we make
explicit how the researcher is free to choose the observables used in the empirical analysis and
how this allows one to simulate regulations, like community rating, which effectively change the
information structure of the economy. Yet in doing so, we do repeat much of the material covered
in Hendren (2011); those familiar with this approach could skip to the next section where we apply
this framework to assess the impact of adjusted community rating regulation in LTC insurance.
yet they find corresponding declines in Connecticut and Pennsylvania and thus argue that it is not clear to be caused
by community rating.
121
3.2.1 Environment
Agents face the potential of some adverse event, L. This event could be an adverse health event,
the onset of work-limiting disability, the need for nursing home care, or any other state of the world
that has a higher marginal utility of income and thus a demand for insurance. Agents have beliefs
about the occurrence of this event, given by the realization of the random variable, P. Agents'
beliefs about L (i.e. their realizations of P) are unobservable to a potential insurance company,
but agents have observable characteristics that could be used to price their insurance. We let X
denote the random variable corresponding to this set of public information. With these definitions,
our goal is to analyze the impact of regulations affecting the set of observable information, X, on
the workings of a market for insurance against L.
We let Z denote a response to the question: "What is the probability /chance (0-100) that L
will occur?". At no point do we assume people can perfectly report their probabilistic beliefs,
Z = P. Rather, we conduct two complementary analyses. First, we test for the potential for
adverse selection using relatively weak assumptions. We then quantify the impact of the potential
adverse selection using assumptions that are stronger but continue to allow the elicitations to be
noisy and potentially biased measures of true beliefs.
3.2.2 Identifying the potential for adverse selection
We identify the potential for adverse selection by asking whether agent's beliefs are predictive of
the loss. This approach slightly weakens the assumptions of Hendren (2011), as we do not require
agents to have unbiased beliefs in order to identify private information. Instead, we only impose
one assumption on the relationship between elicitations and beliefs. We require that agents know
Z.
Agents know Z:
Pr {LIX, Z, P} = Pr {L|X, P}
This assumption requires that any information about L that is captured by Z would also have
been captured by agents true beliefs, P. In other words, if one was trying to forecast the loss, L,
and knew the agents' true beliefs, P, then also learning Z would not help forecast the occurrence
of the loss. Note that we are not assuming that people know how X predicts L, nor do we assume
beliefs are unbiased; nor do we require that Z is a subjective probability elicitation about L.4 All
that we require is that people can't report more information (in Z) about L than is captured by
their true beliefs about L.
Given this assumption, we propose a simple test for whether agents have information about L
beyond what is captured by a set of observable information, X: Is Z predictive of L conditional on
4 To illustrate this more specifically, we do not require Pr {LIX, P} = Pr {L IX}, which would be the case if people
knew X. We do not require Pr {LIP} = P; agents could have biases as in Kahneman and Tversky (1979).
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Pr {LIX, Z} =? Pr {LIX}
Proposition 3.1. Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then,
Pr{LIX,Z} f Pr{L|X} -> Pr{LIX,P} 5 Pr{LIX}
where Pr { L|X, Z} f Pr { L|X} means there exists a positive mass of realizations of Z, say z, and
for X, say x, for which Pr { L|X = x, Z = z} f Pr { L|X = x} and similarly for Pr { L|X, P} f
Pr {LIX}
Proof. Follows immediately from the equality:
Pr {LIX, Z} = Eplx,z [Pr {LIX, P} X, Z]
Proposition 1 suggests running a regression of L on Z controlling for X and asking whether Z
has any explanatory power for L. If so, then agents have knowledge about their loss conditional
beyond what is captured in X. By coinciding X with the set of covariates of the proposed regulation,
we can assess its potential for inducing adverse selection.
Converse The converse to Proposition 1 is not always true. We need a additional assumptions
to ensure that if agents have information about L beyond what is captured in X, then at least a
small amount of it is revealed in Z. Although many assumptions could be made to ensure this, we
find the following two assumptions quite intuitive, although more restrictive than necessary.
Proposition 3.2. (Partial Converse to Proposition 1) Suppose that (a) Pr {LIX, P} is weakly
increasing in P and (b) there exists a 1-1 real-valued function f (Z) such that F (P|X, f (Z)) is
strictly decreasing in f (Z). Then,
Pr {LIX, P} f Pr {LIX} -> Pr {LIX, Z} $ Pr {LIX}
Proof. We have
Pr {LIX, Z} = Pr{LIX,f (Z)}
SfPr {L|X, P} dFplf(z),x (P|X, f (Z)) dP
Pr {L/X, P fFpIf(z),x (PIX, f (Z)) & Pr {LIX, P} dPJ| p F
so that if Fplx,f(z) is strictly decreasing in f (Z) then Pr{LIX, f (Z)} is strictly increasing in
f (Z). LI
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Assumption (a) requires that those with higher beliefs actually have higher probabilities of expe-
riencing the loss. It would clearly be satisfied if agents had unbiased beliefs, so that Pr {LIX, P} =
P. But it is weaker. It would be satisfied under the probability transformations used by Kahneman
and Tversky (1979), among others. Assumption (b) is a stochastic monotonicity assumption that
higher values of Z correspond to higher values of beliefs, P. This would be satisfied if agents re-
ported their true beliefs, Z = P, but also allows for substantial measurement error in Z. In short,
under relatively weak conditions, a test for whether or not Z has predictive power for L conditional
on X provides a test for the agent having information about L beyond what is captured in X. This
is our test for the potential for adverse selection.
3.2.3 Quantifying the size of the potential adverse selection problem
We quantify the size of the adverse selection problem in two steps. First, we add additional
statistical structure to identify the distribution of beliefs in the population. Second, we add a
theoretical structure to translate this distribution into a measure of the implicit tax on insurance
premiums individuals must be willing to pay for a market to exist under the regulation.
3.2.3.1 Identifying the Distribution of Beliefs
We make three assumptions to identify the distribution of beliefs conditional on X, Fp (plX). First,
we retain Assumption 1 that people know Z. Second, we impose unbiased beliefs.
(Unbiased Beliefs) Pr {L IX, P} = P
This assumption requires that the empirical probability of the loss occurring, given ones' beliefs,
is equal to the beliefs. Implicit in this definition is that agents know X, in the sense that the
observables, X, do not have any additional predictive power for L conditional on the true beliefs, P.
Although this is a relatively strong assumption, it is quite standard in the literature. Moreover, our
assumption does not require that agents know how other observables, outside of what is contained
in the chosen set X, affect their probability of L. For example, if X contains only age, then we do
not require that agents know how their medical conditions affect their likelihood of L.
Third, we assume that the variable Z is a noisy and potentially biased measure of true beliefs, P,
where the bias and noise can be parameterized in a parsimonious way. As has been noted in previous
literature (Gan et al. (2005), Finkelstein and McGarry (2006)), subjective probability elicitations
tend to concentrate on focal point values of 0, 50, and 100. Therefore, we follow Hendren (2011)
and allow the elicitations to have excess density on these focal values. To do so, we parameterize
the density of elicitations given beliefs, fzlp (ZIP, X) as a mixture of a censored normal and an
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ordered probit distribution:
(1 -1 P a(X) + A4) (K PQ(X) if Z= 0
A (D (1-K-P--a(X) 
- ( -P-a(X) if Z = 0.5
fZP(1 
- A) 1-P (X) + A (1 - ( -) (1 -"Pc(X) if Z =1I Z-P-(X)) if O.w.
where < denotes the standard normal p.d.f. and 4), the standard normal c.d.f. We estimate four
elicitation error parameters: 0 = (o-, A, K,, a (X)). o captures the dispersion in the elicitation error, A
is the fraction of focal point respondents, , is the focal point window. We allow the elicitation bias
term, a (X), to vary with the observable variables, X. The censored normal distribution captures
the idea that Z may be a noisy measure of P; the ordered probit allows for additional concentration
of mass at 0, 50 and 100 and interprets such concentration as responses of "low", "medium", and
"high".
With this statistical assumption on the relationship between elicitations, Z, and true beliefs,
P, we estimate the density of beliefs through the equation:
fZ,L (Z. L|X) = pL (1 _ P)1-L fZ (ZP = X, 0) fp (p|X) dp (3.1)
where fp (pIX) is the p.d.f. of beliefs given X. We then flexibly approximate fp (plX) and estimate
it along with the parameters governing the elicitation error, 0, using MLE. This provides an estimate
of the distribution of beliefs given the chosen set of observables, X.
3.2.3.2 Quantification using theory
Given a distribution of beliefs, with c.d.f. Fp (plX) and p.d.f. fp (plX), we use theory to quantify
the barrier to trade it imposes.
Consider the following environment. Agents are endowed with wealth w but the occurrence of
the loss, L, imposes a consumption loss of 1 units. All agents have vNM preferences, u. In the
absence of insurance, an agent with beliefs p has utility given by
pu (w - l) + -p)u (w)
We ask under what conditions (on u and Fp (pIX)) agents with observable characteristics, X, can
obtain any insurance. The answer, provided in Hendren (2011), is that insurance companies will
not sell insurance to anyone if
U' (w - l a < inf Tx (p) (3.2)
'(w) pcx\{1}
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where %Px is the support of the distribution of P given X, and Tx (p) is given by
T (p) E [PX, P > p] 1 - p
1-E[P|XP>p] p
Equation 3.2 says that trade can only occur if someone is willing to pay the pooled cost of worse
risks in order to obtain a small amount of insurance. To see this, note that the value u(w-) 1 is
the markup individuals would be willing to pay for a small transfer of resources from the event of
the loss not occurring to the event of the loss occurring. The value Tx (p) - 1 is the markup that
would be imposed on a type p if the contract had to cover the cost of all higher risks, P > p, also
selecting the contract. The smallest such markup is then given by infPpx\{1} TX (p) - 1, which we
call the implicit tax imposed by Fp (plX). If no one is willing to pay this implicit tax, the insurance
market in segment X unravels. Any contract or menu of contracts would be so heavily adversely
selected that they would not deliver positive profits at any price. Thus, the implicit tax imposed
by Fp (plX), given by inf~pExy\{g T (p) - 1 is a natural measure of the magnitude of the adverse
selection problem.
3.2.4 Summary
The approach uses subjective probability elicitations, Z, to identify properties of what people in
the population know about L conditional on a chosen set of observables, X. By matching X to
the set corresponding to the proposed regulation, we identify, under weak assumptions, whether
people know anything about L conditional on X and, with additional assumptions, quantify the
magnitude of the adverse selection as the implicit tax people would need to be willing to pay for
the market to exist. We now illustrate our approach with an application to the LTC insurance
market.
3.3 Impact of Regulation in LTC
We apply the empirical approach to assess the hypothetical impact of adjusted community rating
on the workings of the LTC insurance market.
3.3.1 Data and Sample
Our data come from the Health and Retirement Study (1993-2008), a comprehensive survey of
individuals over age 55 and their spouses. Respondents are asked a range of demographic and
health questions, along with a battery of subjective probability elicitations. In particular, we let Z
denote a response to the question "What is the chance (0-100) that you will enter a nursing home in
the next 5 years?". Corresponding to this elicitation, we let L denote the event that the individual
goes to the nursing home in the subsequent 4-5 years5 . We then let X denote an individual's age,
5 Specifically, L is an indicator for nursing home entry in the two subsequent waves of the survey.
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Table 3.1: Sample Summary Statistics
Mean Std Dev
NursHome (5y) 0.058
Subj Prob 0.125 0.207
Age 71.800 4.126
Female 0.594
Arthritis 0.544
Diabetes 0.161
High BP 0.544
Own LTC Ins 0.139
Sample Size
Obs 23,292
Individuals 11,019
Households 8,385
thereby focusing our estimation on what agents know about L beyond what is captured in their
age.
Our sample starts with all individuals aged 65-79 who do not currently reside in a nursing
home. The subjective probability elicitations are asked only among those 65 and older. Above age
79, a LTC insurance market does not currently exist. Indeed, Hendren (2011) argues this is the
result of private information. Further restricting the set of observables insurance companies use in
pricing would presumably not lead to this market opening up. Therefore, we restrict our attention
to ages below 80, where the market currently exists for those without health conditions which lead
to rejection. We also restrict the sample to those who we can follow for a subsequent 5 years of the
survey to construct L and for whom we have data on the subjective probability elicitation, Z. 6
Table 3.1 presents the sample summary statistics. The sample is 59% female and has an average
age of 72. Our sample consists of 23,292 observations from 11,019 unique individuals and 8,385
unique households. We include multiple observations per individual throughout the panel and
cluster the standard errors at the household level. 7
We include the 14% of our sample who own LTC insurance. Including this group could cause
a problem if people who own insurance are more likely to go to a nursing home. In this case,
heterogeneous LTC insurance purchase could induce heterogeneity in nursing home use which we
could capture as belief heterogeneity. However, multiple studies suggest that moral hazard is not
a significant issue in nursing home usage. Those who purchase LTC insurance are no more likely
60ur sample is the same as the LTC sample in Hendren (2011) but combines the "reject", "no reject", and
"uncertain" categories, but restricts attention to ages below 80.
7 Including repeated observations from individuals throughout the panel does not induce any bias in estimation
because we observe them with different observables (i.e. different ages) at each point in the panel.
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Figure 3-1: Subjective Probability Histogram (Nursing Home Entry in 5 Years)
to go to a nursing home (Finkelstein and McGarry (2006)) and those covered under Medicaid
expansions are no more likely to go to a nursing home (Grabowski and Gruber (2007)). Thus, we
are comfortable including them in our sample.
Figure 3-1 presents the histogram of the subjective probability elicitations, Z. As has been
noted in previous literature (Gan et al. (2005), Finkelstein and McGarry (2006)), responses tend to
concentrate on focal point values, especially at 0. Our approach to identifying private information
does not make any specific assumptions about what generates these elicitations. In contrast, our
approach to quantifying the distribution of beliefs assumes that the specific elicitation structure,
provided in Section 3.2.3.1, generates this histogram from the underlying distribution of beliefs.
Continuous versus binary risk Our empirical approach investigates the properties of what
agents know about L, which is the binary event of going to a nursing home in the next five years.
Of course, nursing home risk extends beyond this binary event. Individuals face risks over the
length of stay and whether or not they enter a nursing home in 6, 7, or even 25 years. So how
should one think of our empirical approach which focuses on binary losses in a world where the risk
for long-term care expenses is continuous?
Our approach identifies the presence of asymmetric information for any insurance contract
that provides payment in the event L occurs. In this sense, identifying asymmetric information is
not limited by only focusing on a binary event. However, our approach quantifies the amount of
adverse selection in a more specific manner: we estimate the implicit tax imposed by asymmetric
information on a hypothetical market that provides an additional dollar in the event that L occurs. 8
3.3.2 Identification of Asymmetric Information
Hendren (2011) shows that individuals with health conditions, such as activity of daily living (ADL)
restrictions, have private information about their future nursing home risk. Therefore, one can al-
ready conclude that individuals have private information conditional on age. But for completeness,
8The implicit tax for related events other than L may be different, and could be estimated with additional
elicitations and corresponding loss information.
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Table 3.2: Presence of Private Information
1 11 Ill
Specification Logit Linear Linear
Subjective Probability 2.351*** 2.973*** 2.287***
p-value 0.0007 0.0016 0.0136
N 23,292 23,292 23,292
Observables
Age, Age squared X X
Age Dummies X
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
All standard errors clustered at the household level
we present the results of our test for the identification of private information conditional on age.
Recall that we wish to know whether the subjective probabilities, Z, can explain the realized
loss, L, conditional on age, X. For our primary specification, we consider a probit of L on Z:
Pr {LIX, Z} = # (X# + -yZ)
where X consists a quadratic function of age. We also consider a linear specification where X is a
quadratic function of age and a linear specification where X contains a dummy variable for each
age.
Results Table 3.2 presents the coefficients, -y, along with their p-values. We reject the null
hypothesis that agents have no information beyond what is captured by their age across specifica-
tions. 9 The logit rejects with a p-value of less than 0.001, the linear specification with age and age
squared rejects with a p-value of 0.0016, and the fully-saturated age model rejects with a p-value
of 0.0136. In short, agents know more about their future risk of going to a nursing home than what
is captured by their age. Thus, a market which only allowed insurance companies to price based
on age would face a potential adverse selection problem.
3.3.3 Quantification of Asymmetric Information
To quantify the impact of adverse selection in the regulated market, we now adopt the assumptions
outlined in 3.2.3.1. We flexibly approximate F (pJX) and estimate it using equation (3.1) as a likeli-
hood function. The estimated parameters are the elicitation distribution parameters (a (X) , a, K, A)
and the parameters used in the flexible approximation of F (plX), which we now specify.
9 This result is consistent with the findings of Hendren (2011) that those who have health conditions that would
prevent them from being able to purchase insurance have private information about their risk.
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Approximation for F (pJX) We approximate F (plX) with a mixture of beta distributions,
along with a point-mass distribution. 10
F (plX) = w1 {p < Pr {LIX} - a} + (1 - w) EigiBeta (pi (Pr {LIX}) , 'i)
where w is the weight on the point-mass, Pr {LfX} - a is the mean of the point-mass. The term
Beta (pi (Pr {LIX}), ,b) is the Beta c.d.f. with mean pi (Pr {LjX}) and shape parameter , and
{(i}i are the weights on the Beta distributions." We assume the mean of the beta distributions
vary linearly with Pr {L IX}, pi (X) = y + 7ri Pr {L IX}. 2 We use two Beta distributions for our
results.
Our specification for F (plX) is flexible and nests the null hypothesis of no information, F (plX)
1 {p < Pr {L|X}}. Moreover, we can easily accommodate the restriction E [Plq] = q imposed by
unbiased beliefs. That said, future work could explore an even more flexible specification.
Given an estimate of F (pIX), estimation of the implicit tax must account for the fact that
estimating E [PIX, P > p] for values of p in the upper quantiles of F (pJX) suffers an extremal
quantile estimation problem. As p increases, there is less effective data with which to construct the
average of P > p. Thus, we follow Hendren (2011) and restrict attention to values of p less than
the T-th quantile of F (plX), p < F- 1 (r|X), and estimate infpC[0,F- 1(TIX)] TX (p). We then assess
the robustness of our results to the choice of T. 13
Results Figure 3-2 presents the estimated F (plX) evaluated at age X = 72 (the age which
induces mean loss probability in our sample, Pr {LIX} = 0.058). The results suggest a significant
fraction with relatively homogeneous beliefs, along with the presence of a smaller number of people
who have a higher risk of going to a nursing home. Indeed, this is consistent with the findings
of Hendren (2011) which shows that those who are able to purchase insurance have no private
information (i.e. are represented by a point-mass distribution). But those who would be rejected
(roughly 20% of the population) are higher risk and do have private information, generating the
presence of an upper tail.
Table 3.3 reports the estimates of the implicit tax, infpC[0,F- 1(0.8|X)] TX (p) - 1, for various ages.
'oThe point mass captures the possibility that a fraction of the population has the same information set.
"The p.d.f. of a beta distribution is given by f (p; a,B) = 1( / where B (a,B#) is the beta function. The
mean of the beta distribution is given by i = - and the shape parameter is = a+ #. In principle, the point-mass
distribution could be replaced with a Beta distribution with a very low variance. In practice, the point-mass performs
better since numerical integration of low variance beta distributions is computationally time-consuming.
1 2 We also impose restrictions on the parameter space to ensure the support lies over the interval [0, 1]. For example,
we allow the parameter, a, to vary with q to ensure that the point mass does not fall below p = 0 or above p = 1 and
we allow the means of the beta distributions, pi (X), to be censored on [0,1].
13 While the primary motivation for such a restriction is statistical, there is a straightforward economic rational
for restricting attention to p < F-1 (T). If insurance companies must attract a non-trivial fraction 1 - r > 0 to
any given consumption bundle other than the endowment, then infpC[0,F- T (p) characterizes the barrier to trade
(See Hendren (2011), Remark 1).
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Figure 3-2: CDF of Private Information
Table 3.3: Minimum Pooled Price Ratio, inf T (p)
LTC
Mean Pr{LIX} 20th Quantile Median 80th Quantile
Age (X) 73 68 72 76
inf T 1.673 2.288 1.847 1.479
5% 1.600 2.097 1.699 1.417
95% 1.745 2.479 1.980 1.542
Pr{LIX} 0.058 0.034 0.050 0.083
Note: 5/95% C1 computed using bootstrap block re-sampling at the household level (N=150 Reps);
Bootstrap Cl presents maximum boundaries from a) non-accelerated bias-corrected procedure from
Efron (1982) and b) studentized values
Table 3.4: Robustness to Choice of T
LTC (Mean Pr{LIX})
Quantile Region: 'W, 0-70% 0-80% 0-90%
Reject 1.673 1.673 1.673
5% 1.600 1.600 1.600
95% 1.745 1.745 1.745
Note: 5/95% Cl computed using bootstrap block re-sampling at
the household level (N=150 Reps): Bootstrap Cl presents
maximum boundaries from a) non-accelerated bias-corrected
procedure from Efron (1982) and b) studentized values
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Table 3.5: Elicitation Error Parameters
Value
Standard Deviation 0.124
s.e. (0.001)
Fraction Focal Respondents 0.628
s.e. (0.004)
Focal Window 0.259
s.e. (0.002)
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors computed using block
re-sampling at the household level (results shown for
N=150 repetitions)
The results suggest private information imposes a barrier to trade equivalent to an implicit tax of
67.3% for those aged 73 (5/95% CI: [60%,74.5%]) and ranges from 47.9% at age 76 to 128.8% at
age 68. Unless people are willing to pay this implicit tax, the impact of the adjusted community
rating policy would completely unravel the market.
Comparison to willingness to pay Are people willing to pay this implicit tax? Two pieces of
evidence suggest they are not. First, the calibrated model of Brown and Finkelstein (2008) suggest
people are willing to pay roughly 26-62% markups on insurance policies, which falls generally below
our estimates. Second, Hendren (2011) argues that implicit taxes of 65-75% currently lead to an
unraveling of the market for LTC insurance among those who are currently rejected. This suggests,
by revealed preference, that the markup people are willing to pay is below 65-75%.14 Thus, it is
likely that the LTC insurance market would completely unravel if insurance companies were only
allowed to use age to distinguish amongst applicants.
Robustness to choice of r and estimates of 0 The estimates in Table 3.3 focus on the value
of infpE[0,F-I(TIX)1 T (p) - 1 over the domain up to T = 0.8, the 80th quantile of the distribution of
P given X. Table 3.4 shows that these estimates are quite robust to changes in T. The estimated
minimum of the pooled price ratio does not occur on the upper boundary of the restricted support,
so that changes in T do not affect the estimated implicit tax.
Table 3.5 presents the estimated parameters 0 for the distribution of elicitations given beliefs,
f (ZIP, X, 0). We find a standard error of 0.124, which suggests people are not able to report
their true beliefs perfectly in their elicitations. We also estimate a sizable fraction of focal point
respondents of 62.8%, which is consistent with the presence of a large fraction of responses at 0,
50, and 100, as shown in Figure 3-1. We estimate a focal window of 0.259, which suggests focal
point respondents who otherwise would have reported a value of Z less than 0.259 instead collapse
their report to Z = 0, generating the excess mass at Z = 0.
"Of course, this comparison requires the values of " (e.g. risk aversion) among those currently rejected to
be similar to those who can buy insurance.
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Limitations There a couple of important limitations to our analysis. First, our sample is limited
to those 65 and older. Although 65 is roughly the average purchase age for LTC insurance (CBO
(2004), Brown and Finkelstein (2008)), it may be the case that such regulation would not shut
down the LTC insurance market for applicants below 65. In the extreme, it may only distort the
timing of purchase and not have significant welfare implications. Such concerns with our analysis
could easily be alleviated with additional data from those below age 65. Second, our quantification
measure is the implicit tax on a hypothetical market for a contract which pays $1 in the event
of going to a nursing home in the subsequent 5 years. LTC insurers may be able to redesign
contracts, perhaps through waiting periods or payment caps, that counteract the impact of adverse
selection. To analyze such policies, we would require additional data to construct the relevant loss,
L, and corresponding elicitation, Z. 15 However, the estimated implicit tax is similar in size to what
Hendren (2011) finds is large enough to shut down the entire market for those with pre-existing
conditions; thus one could be skeptical that redesigning the policy with waiting periods or other
features could overcome the adverse selection problem. At a minimum, our results suggest great
caution in attempting adjusted community rating in the LTC insurance market.
3.4 Conclusion
This paper evaluated the impact of a hypothetical adjusted community rating regulation in the
LTC market that would force insurers to provide equal treatment to those of the same age. Our
results suggest such a policy would lead to significant adverse selection and would likely lead to a
complete unraveling of the LTC insurance market. Thus, we conclude such a policy would lead to
a (Pareto) reduction in welfare.
We hope this paper illustrates the usefulness of belief elicitation in assessing the impact of
regulation in economies with informational asymmetries. Although our approach is developed in
the context of insurance, we believe it could be applied to other settings in which a policy maker
is interested not only in choosing price schedules, but also the set of public information available
for use in the economy.
1 5 For example, one could test whether a 1 year waiting period would help if we had elicitations of 1 year entry into
a nursing home, in addition to the 5 year entry elicitations. We leave these multiple dimensional design questions as
an interesting and perhaps important direction for future work.
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